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Abstract
This dissertation explores how benevolence and self-interest converge, thereby
lessening moral demandingness, in the writing of the eighth century Indian Buddhist
monk, Śāntideva. In the opening chapter, I argue that Śāntideva appears vulnerable to the
overdemandingness objection, the claim that a moral system asks too much of its
followers. This is because he endorses an extremely demanding process of virtue
development during which an individual commits to becoming a bodhisattva, the
Buddhist saint who voluntarily takes countless rebirths, often in painful situations, in
order to attain full Buddhahood and liberate all beings from suffering. In the dissertation,
I show that Śāntideva can make a powerful response to the overdemandingness objection,
largely because the psychological transformation bodhisattvas undergo, as they perfect
the virtues of buddhahood, also greatly lessens the severity of the sacrifices they make.
I begin to reconstruct this response in the second chapter, by showing how the
Buddhist analysis of suffering implies that a bodhisattva gives up less than it appears
when they commit to advanced Buddhist training. The final three chapters each explore
an aspect of how demandingness lessens and self-interest and benevolence converge as
the bodhisattva progresses along the path. The third chapter explores how perfecting
Buddhist virtues allows the bodhisattva to overcome a particularly pernicious form of
weakness of will that prevents doing what is in one’s best interest. The fourth chapter
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explains how developing key Buddhist virtues like patience, mindfulness and
introspection lessens the amount of suffering experienced by the bodhisattva when they
make sacrifices for others. The final chapter explores several demand-lessening benefits
that result from perfecting wisdom and realizing the truth of no-self (anātman). The
dissertation illustrates the philosophical value of Śāntideva’s writing, by showing that
even though he does not explicitly raise and respond to the overdemandingness objection,
he is aware of the need to lessen the demandingness of his ethical requirements and
incorporates philosophically interesting demand-lessening strategies in order to do so.
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Introduction
A striking feature of certain Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical texts is their
integration of what appears to be an enormously demanding conception of moral
perfection with the claim that progressing towards this achievement benefits the aspirant.
The one who adopts this aim is the bodhisattva, the being (sattva) who strives for full
Buddhist awakening (bodhi), a process which takes countless rebirths and requires
undergoing an extraordinarily difficult process of virtue development, in order to work
tirelessly to benefit all sentient beings. Few verses in the Mahāyāna canon illustrate this
theme as forcefully as the one by the eighth century Buddhist monk, Śāntideva, in the
eighth chapter of his Introduction to the Practice of Awakening, or Bodhicaryāvatāra
(hereafter BCA).
Thus those whose mind-streams are cultivated in meditation and who equally
accept the suffering of others dive into the Avīci hell like swans into a pool of
lotuses. (BCA 8:107)
They become oceans of joy when sentient beings are liberated. Have they not
found fulfillment? What is the use of sterile liberation? (BCA 8:108)1
The image of the bodhisattva joyfully diving into the hell realms shatters any
conception of moral excess developed in the West. While contemporary ethicists like
Peter Singer and Peter Unger insist that morality tells us we should donate surplus
income saved from forgoing afternoon matinees and ski vacations, the bodhisattva prays
to be reborn in Avīci, the unrelenting hell where fires from all directions slowly burn
away the skin and bones of beings that dwell there for billions of years (Tsong-Kha-Pa

1

Citations are from the Wallace and Wallace translation of the BCA unless otherwise noted. I cite using
the chapter and verse number corresponding to this translation.
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2000, 164).2 Bodhisattvas undergo this and many other torments as they voluntarily
delay final liberation from suffering for countless lives in order to develop the full virtues
of Buddhahood and liberate sentient beings.
Based on passages such as this, as well as his argument that beings should commit
to impartial benevolence and work tirelessly for the benefit of all, in the first chapter of
this dissertation I argue that Śāntideva appears to be vulnerable to what has been called in
contemporary ethical theory the overdemandingness objection, the claim that a moral
theory makes unreasonably severe demands on its adherents.3 Although Śāntideva does
not explicitly frame and respond to the problem, in the remainder of the dissertation I
argue that his BCA contains numerous demand-lessening techniques that provide a
powerful defense against it. The overall strategy Śāntideva employs to lessen
demandingness is psychological transformation by means of which the interests of self
and others become closely entwined. Several chapters of this dissertation show how
demandingness is lessened by this psychological transformation as one progresses along
the Bodhisattva path.
For reasons I explain at the end of this introduction, I state my thesis in both a
stronger and a weaker form. The stronger version is that, if we grant the Buddhist certain
key presuppositions, in particular the efficacy of certain Buddhist virtues, the
psychological effects of realizing no-self (anātman), and the saturation of ordinary
experience by subtle forms of suffering, then Śāntideva’s moral requirements are not

2

See Singer 1972 and Unger 1996. Perhaps the most powerful Western resonance is the stoic happy on the
rack. For descriptions of the Buddhist hell realms, see also the discussion in Vasubandhu’s
Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. See Vasubandhu 1988, 456-460.
3
It is often referred to as the demandingness objection, but since the real problem being levied against the
theory is that it is overdemanding, I refer to it as the overdemandingness objection or problem. Thanks to
Anne Baril for this suggestion.
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overly demanding. In other words, he can provide a satisfactory response to the
overdemandingness objection. The weaker version is that, assuming these same
presuppositions, the demandingness of the bodhisattva path is significantly less than it
appears, although it may still be overly demanding. I wait till the end of this
introduction to explain why it is helpful to provide a stronger and weaker form of my
thesis, since discussing the actual demands of the bodhisattva path first will help me to do
so.
Śāntideva, in fact, makes a claim more forceful than even the stronger version of
my thesis. This is hinted at in the second verse quoted above, where the bodhisattva is
said to achieve fulfillment as a result of his apparent sacrifice, and Śāntideva makes his
position explicit in the first chapter of his BCA.
Bodhicitta should never be released
by those wanting to escape from the many sufferings of existence,
by those wanting to eliminate the evil predicament of sentient beings,
and by those wanting to experience many kinds of enjoyments. (BCA 1:8, my
translation)4
Bodhicitta is the root virtue of the bodhisattva.5 It can be translated as the thought
or aspiration (citta) for awakening (bodhi). It is the aspiration to attain the full
awakening of a Buddha in order to rescue all sentient beings from suffering and the perils
of cyclic existence. The bodhisattva nurtures this compassionate intention, voluntarily
delaying liberation from saṃsāra and taking countless rebirths while developing the
virtues of full Buddhahood.
The quoted passage explains three benefits of developing bodhicitta. The third
line refers to the fact that the bodhisattva, who is motivated by bodhicitta to fully develop
4

bhavaduḥkhaśatāni tartukāmairapi sattvavyasanāni hartukāmaiḥ| bahusaukhyaśatāni bhoktukāmai ma
vimocyaṁ hi sadaiva bodhicittam (Śāstrī 2001, 9).
5
See Brassard 2000 for an in-depth study of bodhicitta.
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the virtues of Buddhahood like compassion, patience, generosity and skillful means will
be able to work most effectively to remove (hartum) the evil predicament (vyasana) of
sentient beings (sattva), that is to liberate them from saṃsāra. The other two benefits are
initially rather puzzling. In the first line, Śāntideva claims that those wanting to escape
(tartum) from the suffering (duḥkha) of existence (bhava) should develop the virtue of
bodhicitta. This is surprising, since it is the bodhisattva, motivated by bodhicitta, who
delays liberation from suffering in order to take additional rebirths and develop the
virtues that allow her to liberate sentient beings. It would seem that the early Buddhist
goal of individual liberation would be the natural endpoint for one whose deepest
motivation is to escape from saṃsāra. The final line refers to enjoying (bhoktum) many
pleasures (saukhya). The reference here is to the ordinary happiness experienced by
persons in saṃsāra, such as pleasant rebirths and material prosperity. In this verse,
Śāntideva is claiming that adopting the bodhisattva path, and committing to work
tirelessly for the welfare of others, results in deep benefits for oneself.
In this dissertation, I want to make sense of Śāntideva’s claim that adopting the
bodhisattva path is in one’s interest. An obvious explanation that is discussed by
Śāntideva shortly after the quoted verses is the accrual of vast amounts of positive karmic
benefit (puṇya) that results in good material conditions, fortunate rebirth in future lives,
and creates the conditions for progress on the bodhisattva path.6 I discuss this benefit in
more detail later in this introduction. Since this dissertation is a work in comparative
philosophy, however, I am primarily interested in exploring the ways that self-interest
and benevolence come together in Śāntideva’s text that will be acceptable to, or at least
have a good deal of plausibility for, persons outside the Buddhist tradition. Since this is
6

See BCA 1:13-1:22.
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not the case regarding the specific causal functions of karmically fruitful action, I simply
note the importance of this element in Śāntideva’s thought, but do not incorporate it into
my argument. Instead, I focus on strategies developed in Śāntideva’s BCA, and other
related Buddhist works, which narrow the gap between self-interest and benevolence and
lessen demandingness by using premises that are not at least wholly alien to one outside
the Buddhist tradition. For instance, chapter four of the dissertation examines positive
psychological effects of Buddhist virtues. Most of us will, I think, agree with the
Buddhist that the virtue of patience can dissolve some forms of anger, and that this
sometimes benefits the individual by decreasing her mental suffering. At the end of this
dissertation, I also consider the reasonableness of the Buddhist presuppositions upon
which the various demand-lessening techniques that I will consider depend.
A clarification it is worth making at the outset is that although I am focusing on
benefits to an individual from following the bodhisattva path, I am not arguing that
Śāntideva is an ethical egoist. Ethical egoism claims that an agent should do whatever is
in his or her own benefit. One reason to be cautious in ascribing such a position to
Śāntideva is that he offers arguments that we ought to help others escape from suffering
that make no obvious appeal to our benefit. In other words, in the BCA we find both
self-regarding and other-regarding reasons to become bodhisattvas and dedicate our lives
to ending the suffering of all. I will consider the most developed of these other-directed
arguments in the first chapter of this work. Second, the project of classifying Śāntideva’s
ethics according to contemporary Western categories like egoism, consequentialism and
virtue ethics faces several difficulties, including underdetermination as to which ethical

5

theory provides the best fit for Śāntideva’s normative views. I also develop this
argument in the initial chapter of this work.
In the remainder of this introduction, I provide background information on
Mahāyāna and early Buddhism, as well as a brief introduction to Śāntideva. I also offer a
survey of the difficulties the bodhisattva undergoes, and summarize several demandlessening strategies found in the BCA that I will not be focusing on in the body of this
work. I also explain why, even given the Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anātman),
Buddhists still hold that talking of the moral responsibilities of individuals is
unproblematic. Finally, I provide a chapter-by-chapter summary of my argument to
follow.

Early Buddhism and the Mahāyāna
Although we are not clear about what his exact dates were, the historical Buddha
probably founded the religion of Buddhism somewhere in the fifth century BCE. The
goal of Buddhist practice, as illustrated in the earliest texts that are available to us, is to
liberate oneself from the round of rebirth that is saṃsāra, and the various kinds of
suffering experienced within. The Buddhist path is represented in these texts, as well as
throughout its tradition, by the Four Noble Truths. The first truth, that of suffering (Pali:
dukkha/ Sanskrit: duḥkha), is the claim that the experience of non-liberated humans is
pervaded by both obvious and subtle forms of suffering. 7 The second truth claims that
the cause of our suffering, and our continual rebirth in saṃsāra, is craving (taṇhā/tṛṣṇā).
This craving itself arises because of ignorance (avijjā/avidyā), referring to both a
7

Since the BCA, which is the main focus of this study, is written in Sanskrit, generally I will only provide
the Sanskrit of the translated term. Sometimes, when dealing with texts from the early Buddhist tradition, I
provide the Pali term followed by the Sanskrit, as I have done here.
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mistaken intellectual belief that phenomena are permanent, independent and able to
provide lasting satisfaction, as well as the cognitive process by which these non-existent
attributes are superimposed upon transitory and dependent entities. The third noble truth,
nirvāṇa (Pali: nibbāna), represents the cessation of craving and ignorance which cause
suffering and rebirth. The final noble truth of path (magga/mārga) is comprised of the
Buddhist teachings by which liberation is attained.8 All of these teachings are adopted by
Mahāyāna Buddhists like Śāntideva, and as we will see the early Buddhist understanding
of suffering in particular plays an important role in the defense he can give in response to
the overdemandingness objection.
Already in the early Buddhist canon, there are references to the historical Buddha
being, in his past lives, a bodhisattva, that is a being (sattva) aiming towards
enlightenment (bodhi). The contrast here is to the arhat, or noble one, the spiritual ideal
emphasized in early Buddhist texts, who eliminates his or her own suffering and escapes
rebirth. The bodhisattva, by contrast, aims at a higher state of awakening whereby he is
able to teach beings effectively and lead them to liberation. Although the historical
Buddha was said to be a bodhisattva in his past lives, early Buddhist texts provide little if
any encouragement for ordinary persons to aspire to this goal.
The days when scholars believed early Buddhism and the Mahāyāna Buddhist
movement to be discrete schools coexisting independently are gone. Recent scholarship
has shown that for much of its history in India, the Mahāyāna was a doctrinal
development existing within early Buddhism. 9 A key piece of evidence for this is the

8

A number of excellent introductions to Indian Buddhism have been published, including Williams 2000
and Gethin 1998.
9
See Nattier 2003, especially pps. 172-176. Also relevant are Harrison 1987, Samuels 1997, and Silk
2002.
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fact that the Mahāyāna schools have no ordination lineages of their own. Mahāyāna
monks like Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Śāntideva, then, must have been ordained in the
lineages of the early Buddhist schools. What this strongly suggests is that Mahāyāna
monks lived and practiced alongside their mainstream Buddhist counterparts. What
distinguishes monks who come to identify with the Mahāyāna movement is the gradual
acceptance of a new group of Mahāyāna scriptures (sūtras) and certain key doctrines
emphasized within them. One such tenet is the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness
(śūnyatā), an expansion of the early Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anātman), in which the
lack of the independent existence of all phenomena is emphasized.
The doctrinal development in the Mahāyāna that is central to my study is the
greater emphasis placed on the role of the bodhisattva, the saint who develops bodhicitta,
the aspiration to attain full Buddhahood in order to liberate all sentient beings. In nonMahāyāna early Buddhist texts, there is not yet a clear distinction between the awakening
of an arhat whose focus is on his own liberation, and that of a fully awakened Buddha
who has completed the bodhisattva path.10 As both Mahāyāna and early Buddhist
traditions develop, the awakening of a Buddha is distinguished from that of an arhat in
that he completely destroys the defilements (āśravas) of ignorance (avidyā). As a result,
the bodhisattva gains supernormal powers, including a limited omniscience that allows
him to perceive the karmic propensities of other beings, and thereby work most
effectively for their benefit. A second distinction between the two paths, implicit in
bodhisattva manuals like the BCA, is a much more radical development by the Mahāyāna
of the other-regarding virtues like compassion (karuṇa) and generosity (dāna). Of

10

See Bodhi 2010.
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course, it is also only the bodhisattva who develops the root bodhisattva virtue of
bodhicitta.
As the Mahāyāna movement continues to develop, so too does the emphasis on
the importance of the bodhisattva ideal. Texts like The Lotus Sutra begin to refer to early
Buddhist traditions emphasizing personal liberation as hīnayāna, a derogatory term that
means inferior.11 The Lotus Sutra also claims that there is only one vehicle, that of
Mahāyāna Buddhism, and one possible spiritual attainment, that of full Buddhahood
attained after following the Buddhist path. In the BCA, Śāntideva’s text that is the focus
of this study, individual liberation from suffering is derogatorily referred to as arasika,
meaning sterile, or literally “without taste.”12 Furthermore, he offers arguments that
everyone should commit to impartial benevolence that seem to imply that all beings are
obligated to take up the bodhisattva path. I consider one such argument in the opening
chapter.

Demandingness on the Bodhisattva Path
From the outside, early Buddhist monastics appear to live extraordinarily
demanding lives. Monks and nuns forgo sensual pleasure, abandon family and wander
homeless possessing almost nothing, wearing robes sewn together from discarded rags,
and so on. According to Buddhist texts, however, living these lives is actually in the
interest of the practitioner. This is because the pleasures of ordinary life that monks and
nuns renounce are pervaded by subtle forms of suffering and are not really worth pursuit.
Accepting monastic discipline is in the individual’s own benefit, since it is the most
11

See Reeves 2008 for a translation of The Lotus Sutra. .
BCA 8:108, quoted above. Arasika can also mean “in bad taste.” It is tasteless, or in bad taste, in
comparison to the achievement of the Mahāyānist, who takes great joy in liberating others from suffering.
12
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efficacious way of eliminating these forms of suffering, and of ending rebirth. I will
discuss Buddhist conceptions of suffering in the second chapter of this dissertation. For
now, we can note that if we accept this analysis of suffering, then the particularly
demanding nature of the Bodhisattva path has nothing to do with the austere nature of
monastic lives.13
The particular kinds of demandingness faced by the bodhisattva are several. Most
obviously, the bodhisattva voluntarily takes almost limitless additional rebirths after the
stage at which she could have attained individual liberation from suffering and rebirth, in
order to completely develop the full virtues of Buddhahood to benefit all sentient beings.
At the end stages of the Buddhist path, the bodhisattva will have greatly attenuated the
mental defilements of ignorance, attachment and craving, and thereby lessened the deeper
forms of suffering which they cause. Therefore, these additional rebirths will contain less
of the subtler forms of suffering. Nevertheless, in many of these additional lives, the
bodhisattva voluntary undergoes severe physical torments. The jātaka or birth stories,
which recount the past lives of the historical Buddha while he was a bodhisattva, tell of
numerous instances in which the Buddha-to-be, as a result of his great generosity (dāna)
and compassion (karuṇā), offered limbs or even his life to others. One tale has him
giving his eyes to a blind man, while in another he offers his body for food to a hungry
tigress, and in another he lets demons feast on his flesh (Ohnuma 2000, 43; Ohnuma
1998.)14

13

As Goodman points out, many Buddhist texts also allow the majority of Buddhists to practice as lay
followers who do not renounce household life. Goodman argues that this may be justified through a
consequentialist commitment to maximizing benefit. See Goodman 2009, chapter seven.
14
Versions of all these tales may be found in the relatively compact Sanskrit jātaka collection, Jātakamālā
of Āryaśūra. See Āryaśūra 2010.
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An even more violent trauma experienced by the bodhisattva is his voluntary
taking of unfortunate rebirths, particular in the hell realms. I began this introduction by
citing a verse by Śāntideva in which he links voluntary rebirth in hell to the flourishing of
the bodhisattva. For our purposes, we do not need to go into detail about the various
forms of torture the inhabitants of the different hells experience.15 It is enough to note
that the bodhisattva is willing to take rebirth in the most horrible place imaginable
because of his vast compassion for sentient beings.
There are two kinds of pain that, according to Buddhists, would be relevant to
assessing how demanding these various kinds of austere activities would be. Buddhist
psychology distinguishes painful physical sensation (kāyika-dukkha/kāyika-duḥkha) from
mental pain (cetasika-dukkha/caitasika-duḥkha, or domanassa/daurmanasya).16 The first
arises when one of the five sense organs connects with certain sense objects. For
instance, when I prick my finger with a pin, unpleasant physical sensation arises in
dependence on the organ of touch, and when I smell garbage, it arises dependent on the
organ of smell. In addition to the five physical sense organs, Buddhists posit a sixth, the
manas, or mental organ, which takes for its object mental experience like ideas, concepts,
physical sensations etc. Mental painful sensation (domanassa/daurmanasya) arises based
on the contact between the mental sense organ (manas) and unpleasant mental objects.
For instance, immediately after experiencing the painful physical sensation (kāyikadukkha/kāyika-duḥkha) of the pinprick, the mental organ can take this moment of

15

See Vasubandhu 1988, 456-460.
For instance, at Walsh 1995, 345: D ii 306. Both types of pain are kinds of sensation (vedanā), which
can be either positive, negative, or neutral in affective tone. This distinction between physical and mental
pain is distinct from the Buddhist three-fold classification of suffering that I will consider in the second
chapter. Physical and mental pain experienced while undergoing physical sacrifices would be kinds of
explicit suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhatā) under the three-fold classification.
16
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physical pain as its object, and mental pain (domanassa/daurmanasya) can arise as I
psychologically recoil from the experience. Likewise, mental pain can arise when I think
of unpleasant ideas, or experiences, like going to the dentist or being betrayed by a friend.
I will say more about these and other Buddhist kinds of pain in chapters two and
four. For now, the point to note is that for most of us, both physical and mental pain will
be involved when making sacrifices like cutting off a body part that the bodhisattva
undergoes. An ordinary person would experience tactile physical pain when a hand is cut
off, for instance, but also massive amounts of mental pain, both in anticipation of the
amputation, and in recoiling against the physical pain as it occurs, and finally in the form
of grief and regret over losing the lost body part. In chapter four, I will examine how
certain Buddhist virtues emphasized by Śāntideva radically decrease the amount of
mental pain the bodhisattva experiences when undergoing physical austerities. This
explains an important aspect of how demandingness lessens as she progresses along the
path to Buddhahood.
A final kind of apparent mental pain the bodhisattva undergoes is the pain of
compassion when he perceives others suffering. Śāntideva himself describes compassion
feeling like one’s body is on fire (BCA 6:123).17 At another place in the BCA, he has an
opponent object that compassion should not be nurtured, since it causes its possessor
much suffering (BCA 8:104). Interestingly, Śāntideva’s response is not to deny that
compassion is painful, but to point out that one’s own suffering matters little when
compared to the suffering of so many (BCA 8:104-105).
The pain a high-level bodhisattva experiences as a result of compassion is almost
paradoxical, since by this point he should have eliminated the ignorance and craving that
17

See also Lele 2007, 66.
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account for the deeper forms of mental pain. In chapter four, I consider this issue and
argue that in fact there is nothing mysterious about an enlightened being experiencing
mental pain.18 My own sense of the issue is that the pain of compassion would not
necessarily have a negative value on the bodhisattva’s well-being; unlike the kinds of
suffering (duḥkha) explored in my second chapter, it seems to me that the pain of
compassion is an essential element of a life worth living. Śāntideva does not consider
this response, however, and I have not incorporated it into my argument.

Summary of Argument/Chapters
As stated above, the primary thesis that I will defend in this dissertation is that if
we grant certain key Buddhist presuppositions, in particular the efficacy of certain
Buddhist virtues, the psychological effects of realizing no-self and the saturation of
ordinary experience by subtle forms of suffering, then Śāntideva’s moral requirements
are not overly demanding. In other words, I will argue that he can make an adequate
response to the overdemandingness objection. I begin in the opening chapter by
explaining the objection and argue that Śāntideva appears to be vulnerable to it. First, I
consider and dismiss the possibility that Śāntideva faces this objection as a result of being
a consequentialist. In reply to Charles Goodman, I argue that Śāntideva is not committed
to any particular foundational ethical theory, and therefore he will not face the
overdemandingness objection as a result of accepting a particularly demanding theory of
the right. I then argue that Śāntideva becomes vulnerable to the objection as a result of
his argument that we should commit to impartial benevolence, which implies that we
should become bodhisattvas.
18

See pps. 136-8.
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The later chapters of the dissertation each explore an important element in
Śāntideva’s resolution of the tension between a commitment to impartial benevolence
and the pursuit of one’s own welfare. Each of these chapters explores in some way how
the bodhisattva path is less demanding than it appears. In the second chapter, I examine
how the Buddhist analysis of ordinary experience being permeated by subtle forms of
suffering implies we give up less than it seems when we commit to the bodhisattva path.
I begin by exploring the early Buddhist categorization of the three kinds of unsatisfactory
experience (duḥkha), paying special attention to the two deeper forms of conditioned
suffering (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā) and the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā).
Next, I explain how these forms of suffering constrain the kinds of items that the
Buddhist can incorporate into a theory of well-being. This allows me to conclude, in
support of my overall thesis, that the sacrifices the bodhisattva makes are much less than
they initially appear, since items of supposed value like career success and personal
prosperity are infected with suffering and are not really worth pursuit.
The final three chapters each explore an aspect of the demand-lessening elements
of the psychological transformation the bodhisattva undergoes as he approaches his goal.
The third chapter explores Śāntideva’s strategy of applying the virtuous mental states
(kuśala dharmas) as antidotes to the afflictive mental states (kleśas). This use of the
virtuous qualities, I argue, should be understood as Śāntideva’s response to the problem
of weakness of will, or akrasia, in which an agent freely acts against their better
judgment. I argue that, for Buddhists like Śāntideva, weakness of will is a particularly
deep problem, due to the series of cognitive mistakes made in perception that lead us to
desire items that do not exist in the way they appear to us. I also draw upon work by
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Amelie Rorty in broadening the concept of akrasia to include psychological responses
such as emotional reaction and pernicious perceptual classification. I show that
Śāntideva provides antidotes to several of these akratic breaks identified by Rorty, and in
particular I illustrate how he redirects negative energy from mental defilements to break
the hold of habitual pernicious perceptual and emotionally reactive patterns. In keeping
with my overall thesis, this chapter illustrates that one of the central benefits an
individual receives from traveling the bodhisattva path is breaking these habitual reactive
patterns that bind one to saṁsāra.
In the fourth chapter, I examine whether the virtuous mental qualities developed
by the bodhisattva contribute to his or her well-being. Certain other-regarding virtues
emphasized in the bodhisattva’s path, like generosity (dāna) and compassion (karuṇā),
lead the bodhisattva to take additional painful rebirths in saṃsāra, and therefore seem to
decrease her well-being. I argue that developing these virtuous mental states (kuśala
dharma) is less demanding than it initially appears. First, full development of Buddhist
virtues like patience (kṣānti), mindfulness (smṛti) and introspection (saṃprajanya) results
in a deeply rooted tranquility that is resistant to severe mental suffering, even during
temporary experiences of painful sensation. Second, certain passages in the BCA suggest
that Śāntideva ascribes a kind of perfectionist value to the development of the
bodhisattva’s virtues, holding that this represents a praiseworthy achievement far greater
than the accomplishments of the seeker after individual liberation.
In the final chapter, I draw upon the writing of Vasubandhu, a Buddhist author
who considers how bodhisattvas are psychologically able to perform their deeds of
compassion, as well as meditations by Śāntideva on how to develop compassion for
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others, to reconstruct several demand-lessening strategies dependent upon the
psychological effects of realizing no-self (anātman). As a result of realizing the
nonexistence of any enduring, unitary identity, the bodhisattva not only eliminates his
mental suffering arising from self-cherishing and fear, but he is also able to identify his
welfare with the welfare of others and thereby lessen the tension between altruistic action
and self-interest. I illustrate Śāntideva’s use of this strategy, and argue that if we accept
certain Buddhist presuppositions, it results in a great lessening of demandingness as one
progresses along the bodhisattva path.

Other Demand-lessening Elements of the BCA
There are several demand-lessening elements present in Śāntideva’s text that I
will not focus on in this study, the most important of which I mention here.19 My choice
to focus on the demand-lessening elements just summarized was guided mainly by my
belief that each of these elements was philosophically interesting, both in its own right,
and as a premise in my reconstruction of Śāntideva’s response to the overdemandingness
objection. “Philosophically interesting,” here, indicates that the issue dealt with in each
chapter is closely related to a distinct area of philosophical theorizing, such as akrasia,
virtue theory and moral demandingness. It also indicates that each of these elements does
not depend merely upon religious premises, but will be plausible enough to be taken
seriously by someone outside the tradition. By contrast, I find the demand-lessening
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See Jenkins (1999) for a detailed consideration of the interrelationship between one’s own and other’s
benefits in Mahāyāna Buddhism. There is some overlap between Jenkins and my own study, particularly in
the attention he pays to the functioning of the virtues as antidotes to the mental afflictions. See for
instance, p. 40. Jenkins places much more emphasis on the karmic benefits of compassion for the
bodhisattva, an aspect of Śāntideva’s text that I leave out of my argument. See for instance his claim that
the intention to descend to the hell realms may result in rebirth in heaven (p. 111).
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elements treated below have less philosophical interest, in one or both of these senses,
although this in no way entails they are of less value to our understanding of Śāntideva’s
text.
First, the very fact that Śāntideva has written a bodhisattva manual is itself
indicative of an awareness of the need to lessen demandingness. The function of any
instruction manual is to make some task accessible to a wide variety of persons. A
manual for operating a complicated copier, for instance, indicates the expectation
(generally mistaken) that most people will be able to operate the machine competently
without professional assistance. In the early Buddhist tradition, where bodhisattvahood
was something accomplished only by extremely rare individuals, a bodhisattva manual
was not needed. But as the Mahāyāna develops, and more persons aspire towards
bodhisattvahood, a need grows to make the path accessible to a larger audience. The
result is the appearance of bodhisattva manuals like Śāntideva’s BCA that lay out in
detail the various meditations and practices leading to bodhisattvahood. One result of a
well written instruction manual is that the task in question, here that of becoming a
bodhisattva, will itself become easier to achieve, since the practitioner now knows
exactly what must be done to accomplish her goal.
Second, an important benefit of developing bodhicitta that is strongly emphasized
by Śāntideva is its karmic benefits. Below I quote a group of verses from the first chapter
of the BCA in which Śāntideva develops this theme:
Owing to [bodhicitta’s] protection, as due to the protection of a
powerful man, even after committing horrendous vices, one
immediately overcomes great fears. Why do ignorant beings
not seek refuge in it? (BCA 1:13, translation modified)
Although the result of the aspiring bodhicitta is
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great within the cycle of existence, it is still not like the
continual state of merit of the venturing bodhicitta. (BCA 1:17, translation
modified)20
From the time that one adopts bodhicitta with an irreversible
attitude for the sake of liberating limitless sentient beings,
From that moment on, an uninterrupted stream of merit,
equal to the sky, constantly arises even when one is asleep or
distracted. (BCA 1:18-- 1:19, translation modified)
Verses seventeen through nineteen point out that great karmic merit (puṇya)
accrues as a result of generating bodhicitta. Verse seventeen distinguishes between two
kinds of bodhicitta, the desire to enter the bodhisattva path, and the actual setting out on
the path, and points out that while both create karmic merit, the latter is vastly more
advantageous than the first. Karmic merit results in fortunate rebirths as a human or
deity, as well as material prosperity and attaining the conditions to practice Buddhism in
the future. Verse thirteen remarks on another benefit of bodhicitta, its ability to protect
one from past negative karma created by former negative actions (pāpa). Significantly,
these verses follow shortly after the verse I quoted at the beginning of this introduction,
in which Śāntideva promises that developing bodhicitta will help one to acquire worldly
happiness and also to escape saṃsāra. The most obvious answer Śāntideva gives as to
why bodhicitta benefits oneself, then, is because of the way the universe is karmically
wired. Of course, this is not a particularly philosophically satisfying response, and while
it is important to acknowledge its significance in Śāntideva’s text, I do not focus on it in
this study.
Another strategy explicitly employed by Śāntideva that is relevant to this
dissertation is his conception of the bodhisattva path as a progressive one in which the
20

Wallace and Wallace translate “bodhicitta” as “Spirit of Awakening.” I do not think any translation
adequately captures the sense of the term, and leave it untranslated throughout.
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most demanding of the other-regarding virtues are developed gradually, in order to avoid
overwhelming the novice bodhisattva. Śāntideva discusses this strategy explicitly in
relation to the virtue of generosity (dāna), which causes the bodhisattva to give her body
to sentient beings.
At the beginning, the Guide prescribes giving vegetables and
the like. One does it gradually so that later one can give
away even one's own flesh. (BCA 7:25)21
When insight arises that one's own flesh is like a vegetable,
then what difficulty is there in giving away one's flesh and
bone? (BCA 7:26)22
In the first verse, Śāntideva offers an easy and undemanding way to develop
generosity, by giving away food and other inexpensive possessions. The second verse
explains that developing another virtue, the wisdom that realizes the emptiness of all
phenomena, makes the sacrifice of body easier, since the bodhisattva realized in wisdom
understands that there is neither an enduring person, nor an enduring body to be given
away. For such a bodhisattva, giving away flesh is very like giving away possessions,
since neither belongs to one in any deep sense. These verses illustrate a general strategy
that I will comment on in more detail in the later chapters of this study. By progressing
along the bodhisattva path, the bodhisattva undergoes massive psychological changes,
here resulting from the realization of emptiness, and as a result what is painful at the
beginning of the path may create no great hardship to the late stage bodhisattva.
At another point in his text, Śāntideva is explicit that one should not sacrifice
one’s life until psychologically prepared to do so:
One should not afflict this body, which serves
the true dharma for the sake of another.
21
22

“Guide” here refers to the Buddha.
Thanks to Charles Goodman for suggesting the importance of these verses.
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In this way, one can quickly cause
the wishes of sentient beings to be fulfilled. (BCA 5:86, my translation)
Therefore, when the thought of compassion is impure, one
should not sacrifice one's life, but it should be sacrificed
when one's thought is equal to this. Thus, life must not be
wasted. (BCA 5:87, translation altered)23
What this means is that much of the early practice of the bodhisattva will be spent
developing virtues that directly benefit both self and other at the same time. The virtue of
patience, for instance, not only protects others from one’s anger, but also frees a person
herself from the suffering of feeling angry. Radically other-regarding virtues like
compassion will be developed slowly, so that demanding acts like sacrificing one’s body
will not be made until one’s psychological resources have been developed in ways that
meliorate or even outweigh these difficulties.
A final demand-lessening theme that appears in many Mahāyāna works, although
not at least obviously in Śāntideva’s BCA, is the description of high-level bodhisattvas
possessing something akin to immunity to pain. The Universal Vehicle Discourse
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saddharmasevakaṁ kāyamitarārthaṁ na pīḍayet| evam-eva hi sattvānāmāśāmāśu prapūrayet||86|| tyajenna
jīvitaṁ tasmādaśuddhe karuṇāśaye| tulyāśaye tu tattyājyamitthaṁ na parihīyate||87|| (Śāstrī 2001, 85-86).
In verse 5:87, I use the Wallace and Wallace translation, except that I substitute “equal to this” in place of
“unbiased,” as a more literal translation of tulya. Crosby and Skilton translate the second verse as follows:
“Therefore one should not relinquish one’s life for someone whose disposition to compassion is not as
pure. But for someone whose disposition is comparable, one should relinquish it. That way, there is no
overall loss” (Śāntideva 2008, 41-42). Ohnuma’s construal is similar. “Therefore, he should not sacrifice
his life for someone who lacks the pure intention of compassion, but he should do so for someone whose
intentions are equivalent to his own. In this way, nothing will be lost.” Ohnuma claims that in this verse
Śāntideva seeks to limit the bodhisattva’s acts of self-sacrifice to only worthy recipients. See Ohnuma
2000, 60-61. I believe, however, that Wallace and Wallace are right to construe “aśuddhe karuṇāśaye” and
“tulyāśaye” as locative absolute clauses, indicating respectively that the bodhisattva should not give up his
life when his compassion is impure, but may give it up when his compassion is sufficiently developed.
Śāntideva’s intention here is to limit self-sacrifice to those psychologically ready to do so without regret,
pride, resentment or any other negative mental state corrupting the act. The alternate reading, while
grammatically possible, has Śāntideva implausibly claiming that a bodhisattva should sacrifice his life only
for a very advanced spiritual practitioner, who of course would have no need of the gift. As Ohnumo
points out, the jataka stories themselves emphasize exactly the opposite of this, since they are filled with
bodhisattvas sacrificing their bodies for unworthy recipients (Ohnumo 2000, 60-61).
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Literature (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra), for instance, claims that bodhisattvas dwelling in
hell are not harmed by the suffering they experience (Thurman 2004, 170-171). In
Śāntideva’s other text, the Śikṣāsamuccaya (hereafter, ŚS), he discusses a concentration
called “the production of happiness towards all phenomena” (Sarvadharmasukhakrānta)
in which the bodhisattva maintains a happy mind even while undergoing hellish
tortures.24
There are two ways of understanding passages like these. One is to treat this
ability as a magical power, on line with reading minds and teleportation, gained by the
bodhisattva at the late stages of the path. This, like the link between bodhicitta and
positive karma (puṇya), will not provide a philosophically satisfying defense of
Śāntideva’s claim that developing the virtues of bodhisattvahood is in one’s own interest.
A second possible interpretation of these passages is to treat them as the end result of a
psychological transformation, some of the major elements of which I will be exploring in
this dissertation. In this interpretation, the bodhisattva maintains a happy mind in
severely painful experiences, not by magical powers, but through her extreme facility
with the demand-lessening strategies I explore below. The production of happiness
towards all phenomena, here, is the limit case in which psychological transformation has
progressed to the point to where the bodhisattva’s mental state cannot be severely
disrupted by any amount of pain, and likewise, erupts into joy when offering aid to
others.

24

I take this translation of Sarvadharmasukhakrānta from Lele 2007, 63. See Śāntideva 1971, 177-178,
and also Lele 113-115.
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Śāntideva and the BCA
Very little is known about the life of Śāntideva. He is said to have lived at the
great monastic university, Nalanda, in the seventh or eighth century CE. It is unknown
how influential the text that is the focus of this study, Introduction to the Practice of
Awakening (Bodhicaryāvatāra), was in India, but it has been regarded as a spiritual
masterpiece in Tibet for over a thousand years. Śāntideva describes his purpose in
writing the text as presenting a guide to the discipline (saṁvara) of the bodhisattvas
(BCA 1:1). As described above, it is a how-to manual on developing the essential
attributes of a bodhisattva. Chapters one, three and four of the text focus on the
development and protection of bodhicitta, the root virtue of the bodhisattva. Chapter two
contains offerings to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, as well as confession of past
wrongdoings, meant to prepare the mind to take the actual bodhisattva vow, which takes
place in the third chapter. Chapters five through nine each focus on the development of
one or more of the core virtues that partially constitute bodhisattvahood. The fifth
chapter is named after introspection (saṁprajanya), and also focuses heavily on
mindfulness (smṛti). It acts as Śāntideva’s chapter on ethical discipline, since
mindfulness and introspection are seen as essential factors in preventing negative mental
states from arising, which cause harm in their own right, as well as lead to unskillful
verbal and physical action. The sixth chapter is dedicated to the perfection of patience
(kṣānti). The seventh emphasizes the development of effort (vīrya), the enthusiasm to
engage in Buddhist practice. The eight chapter is devoted to meditative concentration
(dyāna), and the ninth the wisdom (prajñā) realizing the emptiness of all phenomena.
The tenth chapter contains a series of beautiful dedications in which karmic merit (puṇya)
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from the bodhisattva’s efforts are dedicated to all sentient beings. I will discuss the
virtues that Śāntideva emphasizes in more detail in the fourth chapter of this study.
The other extent text usually ascribed to Śāntideva is the Śikṣāsamuccaya, or
Compendium of Trainings (ŚS). Unlike the BCA, this is for the most part not written in
the author’s voice, but is mainly complied from earlier Buddhist sources. The ŚS is an
anthology of Buddhist teachings on how to develop the physical and mental qualities of
the bodhisattva.25 Although the text is of immense value, I have chosen not to draw
heavily upon it in this study. One reason for this is that since it is largely an edited work,
it is less than clear that Śāntideva would fully endorse everything he has chosen to
include in the volume.26 The second, more important reason is that the BCA possesses a
unity and eloquence that is almost unmatched by any other Indian Buddhist text. It leads
the reader systematically through acknowledging the benefits of bodhicitta, taking the
vow to become a bodhisattva, developing the virtues essential to attaining the state of
Buddhahood, and finally dedicating the merit from this practice to all sentient beings.
Therefore, there is an advantage to focusing my consideration of how Śāntideva wrestles
with the issue of the demandingness of the bodhisattva path upon this single text. I will,
however, draw upon other Mahāyāna and early Buddhist texts as an aid in making
explicit strategies and presuppositions Śāntideva would accept, but does not always
clearly articulate in the BCA.
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See Clayton 2006 and Mrozik 2007 for recent studies of the ŚS.
I have argued elsewhere (Harris, forthcoming) that there may be passages in the BCA that are used as
skillful means, rather than statements Śāntideva is intellectually committed to. Nevertheless, the BCA has
an obvious unity as a text in the voice of a single author that provides an advantage for taking it as the
primary object of my study.
26
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No-self and Moral Attribution
One concern that can be profitably addressed in this introduction is the question
of how, given the Buddhist acceptance of no-self (anātman), it makes sense to talk of
unfair levels of demandingness, or indeed to ascribe any kind of moral properties to
persons. Below, I briefly explain the early Buddhist doctrine of no-self, before passing
onto Śāntideva’s understanding of the doctrine, and finally explain why both early and
later Buddhists believe one can deny any enduring self but still talk about the moral
responsibilities of persons.
Early Buddhism denies convention-independent existence to any entity
composed of parts. The classic example comes from the early Buddhist text, The
Questions of King Milinda in which the monk Nāgasena debates with the Greek king
Milinda about the existence of persons and chariots. Defending himself from charges of
nihilism, Nāgasena argues that the names “chariot” and “Nāgasena” are conventional
designations (prajñapti) useful to refer to a group of parts in close causal association, but
not referring to any single independent entity. Persons and chariots, the monk teaches the
king, exist, but only as conventions useful for transacting our daily affairs in life (Rhys
Davids 1890, 40-46: Miln II 1:25—29).
The systematic philosophical texts arising out of the early Buddhist tradition
called “abhidharma” develop the doctrine of no-self (anātman) by claiming that whatever
can be analyzed, either physically or conceptually, is only conventionally real
(saṃvṛtisat), but has no ultimate existence (paramarthasat), that is existence independent
of human needs and practices. What is ultimately real, for the Ābhidharmika, are the
dharmas, partless radically impermanent moments of matter and consciousness, like
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color, shape, and mental events like hatred and compassion, whose causal relationships
account for all ordinary experience.27 Śāntideva is a member of the Mahāyāna
Madhyamaka school, whose defining feature is the rejection of the possibility of any
element of experience being unanalyzable. In contrast to abhidharma, even the dharmas,
claims the Madhyamaka, can be analyzed into their causal conditions, and therefore lack
essence (svabhāva). This is the famous Madhayamaka doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā),
and it implies the corresponding claim that whatever exits does so in dependence on
causal conditions (pratītyasamutpāda). Like Nāgasena, however, the Madhyamaka does
not deny that partite objects, including persons, exist as conventional designations
(prajñapti), useful fictions that help us conduct business in the world. Although no
enduring self (ātman) exists, Madhyamakas, as well as Ābhidharmikas accept the
existence of conventional persons as useful ways of treating together discrete moments of
mind and body in close causal relationship.
Both early Buddhists and later Mahāyāna thinkers also agree that these
conventional selves are both the bearers of moral responsibility and the agents who
progress along the Buddhist path. This issue is addressed perhaps most famously in The
Questions of King Milinda. In the text, Nāgasena tells the king Milinda that there is no
enduring being who transmigrates from one life to the next. In reply, the king asks
whether the transmigrating being will escape its “evil deeds” (Rhys Davids1890, 112:
Miln III 5:7). Although the question is couched in terms of transmigration, the
application to a single life is obvious. Since there is no enduring self, the king could as
well have asked whether the man would escape the deeds performed earlier in the same
life. Nāgasena’s reply is to offer the example of a thief stealing mangos that grew from
27

See the summary in Vasubandhu 1988, 910.
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seeds a neighbor planted. The mangoes are not identical to the planted seeds, but they
grow as a result of them. Because of this close causal connection, the king agrees that the
man who takes the mango is guilty of theft. Likewise, the body and mind in a future life
carry with it the negative actions performed by the body and mind in the current life
(Rhys Davids 1890, 112; Mil III 5:7). Obviously, the same answer can be given in regard
to actions performed within one lifetime. Because of the close causal connection
between my present self and my self of five years ago, I bear responsibility for his
harmful acts, even though there is no enduring entity to act as the bearer of this moral
responsibility.
What this means is that the Buddhist view of no-self still allows for the existence
of a conventional self that can be the bearer of moral attributes. For all Buddhists, the
fact that selves are conventional designations does not entail that they do not deserve
moral consideration. Different schools of Buddhism will justify the ascription of moral
properties to the conventional self in different ways. For instance, Ābhidharmikas will
point out that the designation refers to actually existing mental and physical moments,
including pain and happiness, which it is possible to prevent or increase. Madhyamakas
reject any such ultimately existing dharmas, but claim that conventionally labeled selves
are not wholly nonexistent. When designated upon a valid (although itself empty) basis
of mental and physical moments, a conventional self has a robust enough existence to
deserve moral consideration. It is not my purpose here to consider whether these
positions are plausible. All I want to emphasize is that for these Buddhist, it is no
contradiction to talk about moral responsibilities, virtuous characters, ethical goals and so
on, even though no enduring unitary agents possess these moral attributes. Likewise,
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there should be no objection to my consideration of the demandingness of the bodhisattva
path for the conventionally existing individual.
Finally, one interesting feature of moral demandingness in Mahāyāna Buddhism
that deserves note is that it ranges over multiple lifetimes. The sacrifice that a
bodhisattva makes when she willingly takes rebirth is one that her conventional self in a
future lifetime will experience. The question of continuity of personal identity over
future rebirths is a difficult one that I cannot here consider in any detail. I can note,
however, that not just Ṣāntideva and the Mahāyāna tradition, but all Indian Buddhists link
the well-being of the present conventional self with that of future rebirths. In early
Buddhism, where the goal of personal liberation is emphasized, much of the motivation
to deeply engage in Buddhist practice is to bring one’s future rebirths closer to the
complete cessation from suffering that is nirvāṇa. Although Buddhist schools explain
rebirth in different ways, what is common to each treatment is that the mental continuum
is said to continue, connecting with a new physical body, while the physical continuum
perishes. Śāntideva’s own concern for the well-being of future transmigrations in one’s
own mental continuum is evidenced in his frequent encouragement to consider the karmic
consequences of present actions upon future rebirths. This emphasis on continuity of
well-being over lifetimes allows us to consider whether the multi-lifetime project of the
bodhisattva asks to much of the transmigrating being (or series of closely related beings)
undertaking it.
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Translation and Referencing of Terms in the Source Language
With occasional exceptions, in this dissertation I limit my consideration of
Buddhist texts to those written in Sanskrit and Pali. Since the BCA is written in Sanskrit,
I primarily use this language when providing the original term along with the translation.
When drawing upon sources in Pali, I generally provide both the Pali and the Sanskrit of
the translated term. In such cases, the Pali term precedes the Sanskrit. If only one term
from a source language is provided, it is in Sanskrit.
There are a number of valuable translations of the BCA into English.28 For this
reason, I did not feel it necessary to provide my own translations of the text. I have used
as a primary translation that of Alan and Vesna Wallace, both because of its accuracy and
its readability. These authors base their translation mainly upon the Sanskrit version of
the text, using the edition edited by Louis de la Vallee Poussin, and the one edited by P.L.
Vaidya. They also consult the Tibetan Derge version (Wallace and Wallace 1997, 6-7).
Where I have felt some feature of their translation is not adequate to my purposes, I have
altered it and indicated this in the citation. I believe that no English translation
adequately captures the sense of “bodhicitta,” and have left it untranslated throughout,
removing the Wallace and Wallace translation of “spirit of awakening” when necessary.
If I provide my own translation I note this in the citation. I have used the Sanskrit edition
of the text edited by Dwārikādās Śāstrī (2001) when I do so. I have also frequently
consulted the excellent translation, also from the Sanskrit, by Kate Crosby and Andrew
Skilton (2008). These authors have chosen to emphasize literalness and accuracy of
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Translations from the Sanskrit include Crosby and Skilton 2008, Wallace and Wallace 1997 and Matics
1972. Translations from Tibetan include Padmakara Translation Group 2006 and Stephen Batchelor 1999.
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translation over readability, and it is for this reason that I do not use it as my primary
source in this study. This is not, of course, meant as a critique of the quality of their
translation.

Concluding Introductory Remarks
In the opening of this introduction, I claimed that my main purpose will be to
explain how demandingness is lessened as one progresses along the bodhisattva path. I
then gave a stronger and a weaker form of the thesis I will defend. The stronger version
was that, if we grant the Buddhist certain key presuppositions, like the efficacy of certain
virtues, the psychological effects of realizing no-self, and the saturation of ordinary
experience by subtle forms of suffering, then a requirement to adopt the bodhisattva path
will not be overly demanding. The difficulty with this thesis is not so much that it is too
ambitious but rather that it will be difficult to evaluate its success. The
overdemandingness objection arises when a theory makes unfair demands on its
adherents. Moreover, the usual way to determine when a theory makes excessive
demands is by appeal to our intuitive judgments. It simply seems unreasonable, for
instance, for a consequentialism to demand that we never spend money on a movie when
these resources could do more good elsewhere.
The bodhisattva, however, undergoes radical torments well beyond anything
condoned in contemporary ethics. Bodhisattvas gouge out their eyes and present them to
beggars, give their bodies for food to hungry animals, take rebirth in hell realms and so
on. Moreover, Mahāyāna Buddhism has a radical conception of the psychological
potential of the human mind. Parts of this dissertation will explore how a bodhisattva
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who has perfected patience, for instance, can undergo great physical pain without mental
distress, while taking great joy in making sacrifices for another’s benefit. My argument
will be that the radical psychological transformation of the bodhisattva both ameliorates
the distress she feels, and compensates her for any distress she may experience while
undertaking these apparently demanding activities.
The concern with the stronger phrasing of my thesis is that the radical nature of
Buddhist ethics is liable to disrupt our intuitive judgments about what is overly
demanding. Is it too much to ask that the bodhisattva experience the physical pain of
sacrificing a limb repeatedly in thousands of rebirths if we also accept that her
development of the virtue of patience means little to no mental pain is experienced while
she does so? Does the bodhisattva come out on top when she takes rebirth in a hell realm
but experiences unimaginable amounts of refined mental pleasure as a result of liberating
sentient beings there? Although there is no reason to doubt that Śāntideva and other
Mahāyāna authors were sincere in holding that bodhisattvas do actually undertake these
difficulties, it is not realistic to try to stipulate the hedonic value of various bodhisattva
activities and weigh the sacrifices against the gains. For instance, we are unlikely to
have reliable intuitions about the negative value of severe physical pain unaccompanied
by mental torment because these sufferings always accompany each other in our
experience. Likewise, we will have no way to assess the welfare of an individual who
wholly identifies her well-being with the flourishing of others, since this is a condition
we are unlikely to have experienced.
It is for these reasons that I also offer a weaker version of my thesis, which is that,
granting the Buddhist presuppositions listed above, the demandingness of the bodhisattva
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path is much less than it appears. The weaker thesis differs from the stronger in being
agnostic about whether the demand-lessening elements of the BCA provide a successful
response to the overdemandingness objection. Defending this thesis would, however,
successfully accomplish my goal of showing how altruism and self-interest converge and
how demandingness lessens as one progresses along the bodhisattva path. I will hereafter
phrase my project in defense of the stronger thesis, but to the extent that my arguments
are unconvincing, it should be kept in mind that my project will remain largely successful
so long as I successfully illustrate how the demand-lessening aspects of the text function,
even if it is uncertain if they would provide an adequate response to the
overdemandingness objection facing Śāntideva.
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Chapter 1: Śāntideva and the Overdemandingness Objection29
In the introduction, I surveyed some of the major demands the bodhisattva path
makes on the individual. Just because a moral system is demanding, however, does not
mean it is overly demanding, since any plausible moral system will sometimes be
demanding (Chappell 2007, 255). It will probably, for instance, tell us we ought to
sacrifice our lives if it is the only way to save the entire world from nuclear disaster.
The overdemandingness objection only applies when a theory asks too much of its
followers. We could also phrase this by saying that it makes unreasonably high demands
on its adherents. Of course, there will be differences of opinion over what constitutes
unreasonable demands. Usually, the overdemandingness objection is supported based
upon an appeal to our intuitions.30 Intuitively, it seems too much to ask a person to give
up all her free time and money to help others. Act consequentialism, however, demands
that she do so, since this will maximize good consequences overall. For this reason, act
consequentialism is usually held to be vulnerable to the overdemandingness objection.
There have been a number of different formulations of the overdemandingness
objection. The version I am concerned with arises when a moral system asks the agent to
make what appears to be an unreasonable sacrifice of her well-being. This is, I believe,
the version of the objection to which Mahāyāna Buddhist authors like Śāntideva are most
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The first half of this article (up to p. 48) is based upon Harris (forthcoming), used by permission of
Philosophy East and West.
30
Hooker (2009, 149) formalizes this by claiming that the overdemandingness objection depends upon
accepting a metaethical principle that says a satisfactory moral theory should correspond with at least most
of our considered intuitions. Considered intuition, here, refers to intuitive ethical judgment that upon
reasonable reflection one still believes to be correct.
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vulnerable. 31 This is because on the face of it Mahāyāna authors seem to be asking the
bodhisattva to make massive sacrifices to their well-being, by remaining in saṁsāra,
sacrificing limbs or even their lives, taking voluntary rebirth in painful realms and so on.
Moreover, it is demandingness in the well-being reducing sense that the various forms of
psychological transformation the bodhisattva achieves will reduce.
For a moral theory to be vulnerable to the overdemandingness objection, it must
do more than accept a particularly demanding moral ideal. A theory praising selfsacrificing sainthood as the highest ethical achievement, but permitting adherents to
commit to a much less demanding moral code does not face the objection. The objection
only has force when a theory requires adherents to make what appears to be overly
demanding sacrifices of their well-being. For this reason, as we have seen in the
introduction, most forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism do not face the objection. Although
they praise the bodhisattva ideal as the exemplar of spiritual life, they permit the less
demanding path of aiming at liberation for one’s own benefit.
There is a feature of the well-being sacrificing version of the overdemandingness
objection that is particularly important to my argument in the chapters to come. This is
31

The overdemandingness objection is often linked to Bernard Williams’ claim that Utilitarianism alienates
us from our life projects by requiring us to abandon them whenever doing so would promote the good
(Williams 1973). Moral theories are also sometimes said to be overly demanding if they severely narrow
the range of options open to the agent (Murphy 2000, 26), or require an agent to make sacrifices, even
when all things considered they have most reason not to do so (Portmore 2011, 26). To the extent that
these formulations do not depend on a loss of agent well-being, I think it better to treat them as distinct
problems, rather than group them under the overdemandingness objection, but I will not argue for that here.
The alienation and option-narrowing versions of the objection do seem to face a Mahāyānist like Śāntideva
if, as I will argue, he obligates individuals to become bodhisattvas. This is because the bodhisattva’s
training will radically limit the type of projects he can pursue. But these objections will have little force
against Buddhists, since they will claim these options are pervaded by subtle forms of suffering, and are
therefore not worth pursuit. I will develop the connection between the Buddhist analysis of suffering and
the welfare-reducing version of the overdemandingness objection in the second chapter, and so we will also
get a sense of how Buddhists would respond to these other forms of the overdemandingness objection. See
also Harris 2010 regarding how the Buddhist analysis of suffering narrows the goals that are worth pursuit.
As for Portmore’s all-things-considered version of the objection, the Buddhist would claim that all-thingsconsidered what we have most reason to do is aim at individual liberation, or turn to the bodhisattva path.
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that demandingness in the well-being decreasing sense will increase or decrease
depending upon the resources possessed by an individual. Consider the classic example
of giving surplus income to charity. A moral theory that only required a donation
manageable relative to my level of income is unlikely to be unreasonably demanding.
Moreover, as overall income increases, the amount that can be asked increases as well.
Similar claims could be made about other demanding situations, such as whether a person
is obligated to rescue a child in a burning house. If it is likely that I will be badly hurt in
the attempted rescue, it may be too demanding to claim that I am required to attempt the
rescue. A former firefighter in great physical shape, however, might have only a small
chance of being injured if she attempted the rescue. Intuitively, we would probably not
think it too demanding if a moral theory required her to do so.32
What this shows is that as resources increase, which in these examples include
material goods and physical abilities, the amount of well-being that is lost as a result of
aiding others may decrease. Since the version of the overdemandingness objection that I
am considering depends on an overly demanding loss of well-being, this means that
individuals with greater resources are less likely to experience overly demanding losses
of well-being as a result of moral demands of the relevant kind. The relevant Buddhist
point, to be developed in particular in the third through fifth chapters of this dissertation,
is that the resources in question can also be psychological. The bodhisattva undertakes a
number of trainings as she progresses through the bodhisattva path that lessen the mental
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Relevant here also is Moss 2011, 85, who emphases the importance of taking into account the position
of the individual facing the apparently demanding tasks.
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pain she experiences when enduring physical hardships.33 These include the
development of virtues like patience that lessen frustration and anger, and the ability to
radically identify one’s well-being with the well-being of others. I explore these demandlessening strategies in detail in the chapters to come. What is important to note for now
is that the demandingness of the bodhisattva path should be assessed not from the
standpoint of one outside the discipline, but for a bodhisattva advancing in these mental
trainings.
In the remainder of this chapter I argue that the Mahāyāna Buddhist monk
Śāntideva does face the well-being-reducing version of the overdemandingness objection.
In the first part of the chapter I consider and reject the possibility that he might face the
objection as a result of consequentialist commitments. In response to Charles Goodman,
I argue that we do not have sufficient evidence to identify Śāntideva as a
consequentialist. In the second part, I consider Śāntideva’s extended argument in the
eighth chapter of the BCA that we should accept a commitment to impartial benevolence.
I suggest the implied conclusion is that we are ethically obligated to become
bodhisattvas, and claim that as a result Śāntideva is vulnerable to being charged with the
overdemandingness objection. The final section of the chapter sets up my discussion of
demand-lessening techniques found in the BCA to follow by surveying possible
responses to the overdemandingness objection as a way of situating Śāntideva’s
contribution within the terrain traveled in contemporary discussions of the issue.

Consequentialism and Demandingness
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In other words, when undergoing physical hardships, the bodhisattva experiences physical painful
sensation (kāyika-duḥkha) but lessened mental painful sensation (caitasika-duḥkha) like irritation or mental
suffering arising as a result of the physical pain. See the introduction to this dissertation, pps. 11-12.
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Perhaps the most influential way the overdemandingness objection has arisen in
the Western tradition is as a result of committing to a particularly demanding theory of
the right. In principle, the objection can apply to versions of any moral theory; for
instance, a virtue ethics or a deontology that accepts a particularly demanding set of
virtues or rules may face the objection.34 Nevertheless, the objection has been associated
most strongly with consequentialism, since an act consequentialist claims that the right
action is the one that maximizes impersonal value, and therefore she is required to
sacrifice her well-being whenever doing so would maximize welfare overall.
In this section, I consider Charles Goodman’s argument that Buddhist authors,
including Śāntideva, are consequentialist. If this were correct, Śāntideva would face the
overdemandingness objection as a result of his consequentialist commitments. Indeed, as
I consider below, Goodman claims that its severe nature provides one piece of evidence
that Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics is consequentialist. I argue in reply that although
Goodman is right to emphasize the severity of Mahāyāna ethics, this does not arise as a
result of committing to any particular theory of the right.
Classifying Śāntideva’s Ethics
One of the chief tasks of many normative theories is to provide a theory of the
right, which unifies moral judgments by explaining why certain actions are right or
wrong at the deepest level. Ethical theories are usually classified depending on their
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answer to this question.35 Consequentialism, for instance, holds that consequences are,
ultimately, the sole factor that determines the rightness or wrongness of action.
Generally, consequentialist theories claim that the right act is the one that maximizes
good consequences, and a universal consequentialist theory holds that the right action is
the one that impartially maximizes good consequences for all concerned.36 Egoism
claims the right action is the one that most benefits the agent. A deontological normative
theory, in the sense I will be using the term, claims that the right action is the one that
fulfills the appropriate duty or obeys the relevant rule. Virtue ethics has been understood
a variety of ways, but a prominent form claims that the right action is the one a person of
virtuous character would characteristically perform in the relevant situation (Hursthouse
1999, 28).37
Writers of Buddhist moral texts do not themselves develop taxonomies of ethical
theories, such as the four I have just mentioned, and so do not provide criteria for
distinguishing one from another. Śāntideva, therefore, will not directly tell us whether he
ascribes to a particular normative theory. Instead, an author who wants to classify the
ethics of a writer like Śāntideva must engage in rational reconstruction, and infer which
normative theory, if any, provides the best fit for those passages that state his ethical
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Of course, normative ethical theories also provide guidance over how we ought to act, and may consider
questions such as what a good life consists in. My interest here, however, is limited to the possibility of
whether the demanding nature of Śāntideva’s ethics arises from his commitment to a given theory of right.
36
Forms of egoism that claim the right action is the one that maximizes good consequences for the agent
are also consequentialist. Nevertheless, I follow the standard practice of restricting the term
“consequentialism” to refer to universal consequentialist theories.
37
These terms are used in various ways in contemporary ethical writing. For instance, ‘deontology’ is
sometimes used to refer to Kant’s moral theory. My arguments are intended to highlight the difficulty of
ascribing any underlying normative theory to Śāntideva, and so do not hinge on a particular specification of
the underlying right-making criteria of action.
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views. 38 There are various ways this project might be developed. Charles Goodman
talks of determining which ethical theory a Buddhist author would ascribe to, should he
learn of the available contemporary options (Goodman 2009, 4).39 A stronger
characterization claims a Buddhist writer should commit to a given normative theory, or
even that they are implicitly committed to it, based upon their stated ethical views. My
argument will apply to all of these ways of characterizing the project of rational
reconstruction; I will be claiming that Śāntideva’s BCA does not provide sufficient
evidence to allow us to conclude that Śāntideva would, or should commit, or had already
implicitly committed to consequentialism. For brevity’s sake, however, I will usually
phrase this project as determining whether Śāntideva is committed to consequentialism,.
Goodman’s general strategy is to point to features Buddhist authors like Śāntideva
share with consequentialism, and take this as evidence that Buddhism is consequentialist.
Below I consider several of the most promising of these similarities, and argue they do
not provide significant evidence that Śāntideva is a consequentialist.

Consequences and Consequentialism
In defense of his claim that Buddhism is consequentialist, Goodman cites
numerous passages from both early Buddhist and Mahāyāna texts emphasizing features
that are strongly associated with consequentialist theories. Below, I cite three such
passages, along with Goodman’s analysis of the first and last, as representative of his
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I take the phrase from Siderits 2003, pp. xiii-xiv, where he characterizes rational reconstruction as
determining what contemporary position a traditional author should accept.
39
At times, Goodman’s phrasing suggests Buddhist writers have already committed to consequentialism,
although of course they would not use that term. See for instance his comments about Śāntideva in
Goodman 2009, 89-91.
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method. The first is from an early Buddhist text, but I quote it because Goodman
analyzes it in detail, and it illustrates how he treats similar passages by Śāntideva.
When you reflect, if you know: “This action that I wish to do with my body
would lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction
of both; it is an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences, with
painful results,” then you definitely should not do such an action with the body.
But when you reflect, if you know: “This action that I wish to do with the body
would not lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the
affliction of both; it is a wholesome bodily action with pleasant consequences,
with pleasant results,” then you may do such an action with the body.40
Goodman takes the passage as prima facie evidence that early Buddhist ethics is
consequentialist.
This passage says that actions are to be evaluated in terms of their consequences
for both self and others, just as in universalist versions of consequentialism. It
refers only to happiness and suffering, suggesting a hedonistic consequentialism
such as classical utilitarianism . . . This statement purports to state a criterion that
distinguishes right action from wrong actions. (Goodman 2009, 48)
Goodman also cites passages from the Mahāyāna writers, Śāntideva and Asaṅga,
that state rules may be set aside and small harms committed when outweighed by large
gains. The following passage comes from Śāntideva’s BCA:
Even what is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person who sees it will
be of benefit. (Goodman 2009, 98)41
The third passage, taken from Śāntideva’s Compendium of Trainings
(Śīkṣāsamuccaya), is cited by Goodman as illustrating a number of pieces of evidence of
Śāntideva’s consequentialism.
Through actions of body, speech, and mind, the Bodhisattva sincerely makes a
continuous effort to stop all present and future suffering and depression, and to
produce present and future happiness and gladness, for all beings. But if he does
not seek the collection of the conditions for this, and does not strive for what will
prevent the obstacles to this, or he does not cause small suffering and depression
to arise as a way of preventing great suffering and depression, or does not
40
41

Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995, 524-5: M i 415. Cited in Goodman 2009, 48.
BCA 5:84, translation by Goodman.
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abandon a small benefit in order to achieve a greater benefit, if he neglects to do
these things even for a moment, he is at fault.42 (Goodman 2008, 21; Goodman
2009, 89-90)
This passage requires a commitment to the welfare of all beings, and endorses
causing some suffering when greater positive consequences arise as a result. Goodman
analyzes the passage as follows:
None of the distinctive characteristics of classical act-utilitarianism are missing
from this passage. The focus on actions; the central moral importance of happy
and unhappy states of mind; the extension of scope to all beings; the extreme
demands; the absence of any room for personal moral space; the balancing of
costs and benefits; the pursuit of maximization—every one of these crucial
features of utilitarianism is present. (Goodman 2008, 21; Goodman 2009, 89-90)
Goodman’s treatment of these passages illustrates his general strategy of pointing
out commonalities between Buddhist texts and consequentialism as evidence that
Buddhist authors like Śāntideva would identify as consequentialist, should they have
known of the theory. Taken together, these passages suggest four such commonalities.
The first passage shows that Buddhist authors are concerned with the consequences of
actions on the welfare of themselves and others. The second passage shows Śāntideva
holds that rules may sometimes be violated when they lead to good consequences. The
last passage shows both that the bodhisattva has a universalistic concern that puts the
welfare of others on par with his own, and at least some commitment to balancing, the
view that we can inflict small amounts of harm when much greater benefits will result.
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Goodman also cites similar passages from the Mahāyāna author, Asaṅga. For instance: “If the
bodhisattva sees that some caustic means, some use of severity would be of benefit to sentient beings, and
does not employ it in order to guard against unhappiness, he is possessed of fault, possessed of
contradiction; there is fault that is not defiled. If little benefit would result for the present, and great
unhappiness on that basis, there is no fault” (Goodman 2009, 79).
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The last passage also mentions the extreme demands required of the bodhisattva, a factor
I delay for treatment until the next section.43
Goodman is correct that all four of these features often appear in consequentialist
theories. What distinguishes consequentialism from other ethical theories, however, is
the claim that consequences alone determine the rightness of an action.44 None of the
features cited by Goodman provide strong support that Śāntideva would accept this
claim. Regarding the early Buddhist passage emphasizing concern for the consequences
of our actions on others, almost any moral theory, as well as common sense, insists we
should care about the effects of our actions. To provide support for a consequentialist
interpretation, the passage would have to be coupled with ones indicating there are
absolutely no constraints in play that may limit our pursuit of good consequences. It is
not clear to me that Goodman cites any passage supporting this much stronger
conclusion. The final passage cited by Goodman indicates that the bodhisattva should
inflict small amounts of harm for great gain, but this does not mean there might not be a
constraint against preventing massive harm, even when greater good is at stake. A
traditional consequentialist, for instance, would claim that if a bodhisattva could spur
countless sentient beings towards buddhahood by drastically impeding the spiritual
progress of a single sentient being, he should do so. But I know of no Buddhist text that

43

Goodman also draws attention to the passage’s hedonic emphasis, but since my purpose here is on
whether Buddhist thought can be classified, I set aside for the moment concerns as to its theory of the good.
44
Of course various definitions of consequentialism are possible, but this is certainly the basic
understanding of consequentialism that has been adapted by ethical theorists. Goodman characterizes
consequentialism as the view that “of all the actions available to an agent in any given situation, the right
action is the one that produces the best consequences” (Goodman, 2009, 24).
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rules out the possibility that constraints, such as not doing great spiritual harm to an
individual, might be relevant in determining the correct action for a bodhisattva.45
As to the passages emphasizing the possibility of violating rules, and inflicting
small amounts of harm for great benefits, again most normative theories, and simply
common sense morality, will hold that some rules may be broken on occasion, and that
sometimes we need to hurt people a little to help them a lot.46 A mother taking away her
son’s video games as punishment does not provide evidence that she is a consequentialist,
nor does the actions of a father who relaxes curfew to let a child attend a late movie with
friends.
The last common factor identified by Goodman, universal impartial concern for
all beings, is the most convincing, since this feature is strongly identified with many
varieties of consequentialism, and absent from many other normative theories.47
Nevertheless, one might have an impartial concern for all beings, and still accept
constraints that limit how one might promote their welfare. A father might, for instance,
have an impartial concern for the welfare of all his children, but still be obligated to
fulfill his promise to their grandfather to disperse an inheritance only to the grandfather’s
favored grandchild.
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See also, on this point, Barnhart 2012, 20-21, and 25. See Barnhart 2012, 20-26 for his full critique of
Goodman’s position.
46
A virtue ethics might hold that a generous person occasionally violates rules to benefit others, while a
deontology need not claim every rule is inviolable. Even rule consequentialism can posit a rule requiring
occasional violations of ethical rules if this would raise good outcomes overall. I will not consider here
whether this blurs the distinction between rule and act consequentialism.
47
As Michael Barnhart has recently pointed out, one concern here is that the passage contains advice for
bodhisattvas, those who have taken a vow to become Buddhas and work for the sake of all sentient beings
(Barnhart 2012, 22). It does not, directly at least, claim that all beings should manifest this level of
benevolence. To strengthen his position, Goodman also owes us textual support for the position that
Mahāyāna texts claim all beings should become bodhisattvas See Nattier 2003, 174-176, for doubts as to
whether this was the dominant position in Mahāyāna Buddhism.
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We should conclude, then, that the evidence Goodman cites illustrates impartiality
and a universal commitment to all sentient beings as important features of Śāntideva’s
thought. This is a conclusion well worth noting. They do not, however, provide strong
support that Śāntideva would accept that only consequences are relevant in determining
the rightness of action. Therefore, they do not allow us to conclude that Śāntideva would
endorse consequentialism.
Another way of making this point is to note that all the features cited so far are
compatible with versions of non-consequentialist normative theories that a Buddhist
would be able to accept. As Goodman points out, a universal concern for others’ wellbeing is incompatible with a virtue ethics like Aristotle’s in which other regarding virtues
like generosity are exercised in moderation (Goodman 2009, 90). A Mahāyāna Buddhist
virtue ethics, however, would place far greater stress on other-regarding virtues,
including a radical form of generosity (dāna) that leads the bodhisattva to sacrifice his or
her body when needed by other beings, and compassion (karuṇā) so strong that the
bodhisattva is willing to undertake painful rebirths in hell realms for the sake of sentient
beings suffering there. It would also stress the virtue of impartiality (upekṣā), resulting in
an unbiased mind caring for all sentient beings equally.
Acceptance of these virtues would lead to the endorsement of the four features
identified by Goodman considered above. Since the compassionate bodhisattva wants to
eliminate the pain of others, he will carefully consider the results of his actions, and he
will be willing to violate an ordinary rule of morality, or inflict a small amount of pain
when a great benefit will result. Finally, development of the virtues of impartiality
(upekṣā) and compassion (karuṇā) results in a mind imbued with an impartial universal
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concern for the welfare of all sentient beings. Therefore, these four features would
appear in a Buddhist virtue ethics that claimed that the right action was the one that
would be performed by the virtuous person acting characteristically.
The most likely form of deontology acceptable to Mahāyāna Buddhists would be
one emphasizing the vow the bodhisattva takes to liberate all sentient beings from
suffering. The claim here would be that the radically other-regarding actions of the
bodhisattva derive, at the deepest level, not from the value of perfecting virtuous mental
states, nor from an obligation to maximize good consequences, but from the commitment
he or she has made to liberate all sentient beings. Moreover, this commitment would also
lead the bodhisattva to exhibit the four features identified by Goodman. Since her vow is
to liberate all beings from suffering, she would pay careful attention to the consequences
of her actions on others. On occasion, she might commit a small harm, or even violate a
less important rule or commitment in order to greatly improve the well-being of others.
Finally, the vow requires committing to removing the suffering of all, entailing that the
bodhisattva must develop an impartial concern for everyone’s well-being.
One might think that a radically other-regarding ethics like Śāntideva’s would be
diametrically opposed to egoist theories, but surprisingly, given background Buddhist
assumptions of how karma functions, even a indirect egoism is compatible with the
bodhisattva’s commitments. Buddhists hold that performing actions for another’s
welfare creates karmic merit (puṇya) that results in benefits in this and future lives, and
ultimately creates some of the conditions for obtaining nirvāṇa. Furthermore, merit is
created in dependence on the intention (cetanā) one has when one performs an act, so that
if I perform a generous act motivated by the selfish desire to gain future karmic benefits,
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the merit will be less beneficial than if I perform an act motivated to help another
person.48 We have also already seen in the introduction that Śāntideva suggests that one
reason to develop bodhicitta is the vast amounts of positive merit (puṇya) that a
commitment to eliminating the suffering of all living beings results in (BCA 1:21-22). It
is consistent with these passages, therefore, to claim that an author like Śāntideva
endorses other-regarding commitments and mental attitudes, but justifies this at the
deepest level by reference to one’s own benefit.49
I am not suggesting that Śāntideva is really an egoist, or a virtue ethicist, or a
deontologist, but rather am arguing that all of these normative theories are, like
consequentialism, compatible with the four features identified by Goodman and
considered above.50 Although Goodman has accurately identified features important to
Buddhist ethics, simply citing these features does not tell us what at the deepest
normative level entails their acceptance. On the basis of the evidence so far considered,
Śāntideva’s deepest ethical commitments are underdetermined, and additional evidence
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As I will explain in chapter three, “cetanā” has a wider semantic range than “intention.” The slightly
inexact way I have expressed this point will serve for present purposes, however.
49
A possible response is suggested by Goodman, who argues that the dedication of merit (puṇyapariṇāmanā) endorsed in Mahāyāna texts, in which the bodhisattva transfers his good karmic merit (puṇya)
to others, shows that bodhisattvas place others’ welfare above their own. See Goodman 2009, 75-77. Such
a dedication of merit, however, would be an act of generosity, which would itself help the practitioner
accumulate meritorious karma; therefore, it remains possible that the ultimate normative justification for
the dedication of merit itself is egoistic.
50
Another way of putting the difficulty is to use Shelly Kagan’s distinction between normative factors and
normative foundations. Normative factors are those considerations that need to be taken into account in
determining whether an action is right or wrong (Kagan 1998, 17-18). In contrast, normative foundations
explain why these given factors determine whether an act is wrong or right (Kagan 1998, 190). The
passages cited by Goodman strongly suggest that consequences are at least an important factor in
determining rightness of actions. They do not, however, show that Buddhism is foundationally
consequentialist, since they do not show what justifies, at the deepest level, the acceptance of these
consequences.
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would need to be introduced to show that he was committed to, or at least would be more
likely to endorse one or another of these theories.51

Demandingness and Consequentialism
In the last section, I argued that the presence of the consideration of consequences
and similar factors in texts like Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra does not provide sufficient
evidence that the author is a universal consequentialist, since such consideration is
consistent with multiple normative theories. Goodman’s argument continues by
identifying several other factors that Buddhism and Consequentialism share. Elsewhere I
argue that like the appeal to consequences considered above, these additional factors
underdetermine which theory Śāntideva would endorse (Harris forthcoming). Here, I
will only consider one of these additional factors that is particularly relevant to this study,
the demanding nature of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics.
Consequentialist theories, in general, tend to be demanding because they require
the adherent to choose the act or follow the rule that would maximize good
consequences. For instance, since donating all my income above that needed to pay basic
living expenses could alleviate great amounts of suffering, and since this would far
outweigh the relatively modest pleasure I would gain from spending it on myself, I ought
to donate it. Goodman contrasts this to certain forms of virtue ethics, such as Aristotle’s,
that emphasize personal flourishing and leave room for the agent to develop their own
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The list of ethical theories I have suggested are compatible with Śāntideva’s ethical commitments is not
meant to be exhaustive. One might, of course, claim Śāntideva is an ethical pluralist, and other possibilities
might be argued for as well. To such possibilities my response would remain the same: we would need
textual evidence that supports the claim that Śāntideva is a pluralist, rather than a consequentialist or virtue
ethicist etc. For a recent study suggesting similarities between Śāntideva and particularism, see Barnhart
2012.

46

interests (Goodman 2009, 90). He claims that “if we find a thinker presenting an ethical
position that is extremely demanding, that is evidence that we are dealing with a form of
consequentialism” (Goodman 2009, 44).
Goodman then points out that the conception of the bodhisattva developed by
Śāntideva is extraordinarily demanding.
Whatever suffering is in store for the world, may it all ripen in me. May the
world find happiness through the pure deeds of the Bodhisattvas (Goodman 2009,
92).52
We can also remember here the various apparent sacrifices that the bodhisattva
makes that I considered in the introduction to this dissertation. Goodman holds that the
shared demanding nature of Śāntideva’s ethics and universal consequentialism supports
his thesis that Buddhist authors like Śāntideva would endorse consequentialism
(Goodman 2009, 90-92).
As this dissertation progresses, I will argue that the apparent sacrifices the
bodhisattva makes are much less demanding than they appear. Nevertheless, it at least
initially appears that Mahāyāna Buddhism is extremely demanding, and so it is
worthwhile to consider whether demandingness would provide evidence that Buddhism is
consequentialist. The difficulty with Goodman’s argument, as before, is that the property
of being demanding is compatible with multiple ethical theories. Consider, again, the
possibility of interpreting the commitments of the bodhisattva as deriving their normative
force from the vow she takes to liberate all sentient beings. If this were the case, at its
deepest level Mahāyāna Buddhism would be a deontology whose demanding nature
results from the specific form of the rules accepted. Since the bodhisattva’s vow requires
her to liberate all sentient beings, great demands are placed upon her; however, in this
52

BCA 10:56, Goodman’s translation.
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interpretation, the normative force of the demands stems from the nature of her vow,
rather than a commitment to consequentialism.
Goodman is right to claim that many forms of virtue ethics, including Aristotle’s,
are much less demanding than consequentialist theories, and appear to ask less of their
adherents than the bodhisattva path. Nevertheless, how demanding a virtue ethics is
depends upon which virtues it endorses, and how strongly these virtues must be
developed. As we have already seen, Mahāyāna ethics stresses radically strong versions
of other-regarding virtues like compassion and generosity, and therefore a Mahāyāna
virtue ethics would be as demanding as many kinds of consequentialism.53
In fact, given Buddhist presuppositions about the functioning of karma, as
mentioned above, even an indirect ethical egoism is compatible with the demanding
nature of Śāntideva’s ethics. This is because both the karmic and the psychological
benefits of being a bodhisattva committed to helping others are positive. Therefore, even
apparent self-sacrifice might be seen, at the deepest level, as entailed by a commitment to
help oneself as much as possible. As above, I am not arguing that Śāntideva would
endorse a foundational virtue ethics, a deontology or an ethical egoism, but only that his
moral commitments are compatible with all these theories. For this reason, simply noting
the demanding nature of his ethics does not provide evidence for any particular
interpretation of its underlying normative structure.
Since Śāntideva does not explicitly ascribe to a theory of right, Goodman is
correct to believe that if we are to categorize his normative thought, we will need to infer
which theory is the best match for his stated commitments. In this section, I have argued
53

See also Clayton 2009, 17-18, regarding the bodhisattva’s development of virtues for the welfare of other
beings. Clayton, however, seems to side with Goodman in holding this endorsement of other-regarding
virtues is a consequentialist element in Śāntideva’s moral theory.
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that this task is much more difficult than it at first appears. Although Goodman draws
attention to a number of features Buddhist authors share with consequentialists, this does
not provide significant evidence that Buddhism is consequentialist, since given Buddhist
presuppositions all of these feature are compatible with multiple foundational normative
theories including kinds of virtue ethics, deontology and egoism.
Elsewhere, I argue that similar concerns face authors claiming that Śāntideva
should be classified as a virtue ethicist (Harris, forthcoming). Of course future attempts
to classify his thought might be made, but for our purposes, it is enough to note that it
does not appear that we have sufficient evidence to identify him as a consequentialist.
Therefore, we have no reason to believe that the demandingness of his moral thought
arises out of any foundational consequentialist commitments. In the following section, I
examine an extended argument by Śāntideva that concludes we should commit to
impartial benevolence and remove the suffering of all without partiality. I argue that
Śāntideva faces the overdemandingness objection as a result of this claim that we should
commit to impartial benevolence.
Śāntideva, Impartial Benevolence and Demandingness
Although we do not have adequate evidence to infer that Śāntideva is a
consequentialist, the overdemandingness objection can arise for an author regardless of
whether they ascribe to any particular theory of the right. This is the case in what is
probably the most influential normative argument of the last century, Peter Singer’s
argument that we ought to provide greater assistance to impoverished nations. The
version quoted below, taken from Singer’s Practical Ethics, argues that we ought to
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prevent extreme poverty, meaning poverty which results in a lack of basic necessities,
like food and essential medical care.
1) “If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of
comparable [moral] significance, we ought to do it.
2) Extreme poverty is bad.
3) There is some extreme poverty we can prevent without sacrificing
anything of comparable moral significance.
Conclusion: We ought to prevent some extreme poverty” (Singer 2011, 200).54
We need not evaluate the argument’s success here. Rather, I cite it to show that
demandingness can arise from normative arguments that do not commit their authors to
any particular theory of the right that specifies at the deepest level what makes an action
right or wrong. Although Singer is generally considered a consequentialist, his first
premise is compatible with deontology and virtue ethics, since these theorists can claim
that one need not “prevent something bad” when doing so would require violating a
relevant rule or acting unvirtuously, since this may be of “comparative moral
significance.”55 Further, Singer’s employment of this argument makes him vulnerable to
the overdemandingness objection, since many of us will think it requires too severe
sacrifices of personal time and income.
In the eighth chapter of his BCA Śāntideva makes an argument that we should
commit to impartial benevolence that, like Singer’s argument, does not commit him to
any particular theory of the right. Like Singer, we will see that Śāntideva is content to
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It is clear from the context, as well as Singer’s third premise, that he intents the reference to “comparable
significance” in the first premise to refer to moral significance. I add the term “moral” to make this
explicit.
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Singer points out that his principle is compatible with multiple forms of moral theory at Singer 2011,
199-200.
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rely on our intuitive judgment that certain premises are correct instead of specifying a
theory of the right and illustrating how the premise follows from its acceptance. Also
like Singer, I will argue that Śāntideva’s argument makes him vulnerable to the
overdemandingness objection.
Śāntideva’s argument takes place over sixteen verses in the eight chapter of the
BCA. The initial portion of the argument establishes a prima facie reason to remove
suffering, no matter to whom it belongs. I cite the essential four verses.
One should first earnestly meditate on the equality of oneself
and others in this way: "All equally experience suffering and
happiness, and I must protect them as I do myself.” (BCA 8:90)
I should eliminate the suffering of others
because it is suffering, just like my own
suffering. I should take care of others
because they are sentient beings, just as I
am a sentient being. (BCA 8: 94)56
When happiness is equally dear to others and
myself, then what is so special (viśeṣa) about me that I strive after
happiness for myself alone? (BCA 8:95)
When fear and suffering are equally abhorrent
to others and myself, then what is so special (viśeṣa) about
me that I protect myself but not others? (BCA 8:96)
Śāntideva begins the argument by asking us to contemplate the way suffering
feels. Our immediate reaction, when we experience pain, is to want to remove it. These
four verses then remind us that the suffering of others feels just as bad to them as ours
does to us. Since the badness of the suffering we and others feel is alike, Śāntideva
concludes that we have a prima facie reason to remove any suffering, no matter to whom
it belongs.
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“Sentient being” here translates “ sattva,” which in Buddhist thought refers to anything possessing
consciousness.
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An opponent might not be willing to give Śāntideva even this much. They might,
for instance, claim that although suffering motivates its own removal, it provides no
reason to remove it apart from this basic motivation.57 Further, we are only
automatically motivated to remove our own suffering, not the suffering of other persons.
Therefore, the suffering of other persons, of itself, provides us no reason to remove it.
There might be other reasons, such as our relationship with particular persons, that give
us reasons to care about their suffering, but the mere fact that they are suffering does not
do so. Śāntideva does not consider objections like this, but is simply content to rely on
the likelihood that most persons will be willing to accept that we have some reason to
remove suffering, regardless of to whom it belongs (BCA 8:103).58
In verses 90 and 94, then, Śāntideva establishes both that others abhor suffering
and desire happiness as much as we do, and claims that this provides at least some reason
to remove their suffering. The argument continues in verses 95 and 96 by asking what
distinction (viśeṣa) justifies my prioritizing my own welfare above others. If two
persons were in agony and we could rescue only one of them, we should be able to
provide some justification for our choice as to which one to help, such as the fact that one
caused his own suffering through unethical behavior. Śāntideva, likewise, is asking
whether we can provide some kind of rational justification for prioritizing our own wellbeing over the well-being of others.
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There are actually a couple of forms this objection might take. One might agree that being motivated to
do something provides a reason to do so, and then claim that since one is not automatically motivated by
the suffering of another, we do not necessarily have a reason to remove it. Alternately, one could claim
that being motivated to do something does not, of itself, provide a reason to do it. Therefore, I may not
even have a reason to remove my own suffering.
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See Nagel 1986, 159-162 for an argument that we have reason to remove the pain of others.
Interestingly, Nagel also claims that he finds the position “self-evident,” and expresses doubt about whether
his argument provides any additional evidence for it (Nagel, 162).

52

These verses, then, provide Śāntideva’s initial argument that we ought to commit
to impartially removing everyone’s suffering. First, we have a reason to remove
suffering, no matter to whom it belongs, because of the badness of that suffering.
Second, if we are going to prioritize removing our own suffering, we should be able to
provide some kind of relevant distinction about ourselves that justifies this prioritization.
For the remainder of the argument, Śāntideva considers and dismisses as irrelevant
several potential distinctions that might justify prioritizing my well-being over that of
others. Verses 95 and 96 go on to rule out one possible justification. Since suffering and
happiness are equally dear to myself and others, it isn’t the case that there is anything
particularly repugnant about my own suffering that warrants its prioritization.
In verses 101-103, Śāntideva considers what is probably the most powerful
distinction the opponent can appeal to as rationally justifying his prioritization of his own
well-being. The opponent can claim that he is justified in giving his own suffering
greater consideration because it belongs to him. In reply, Śāntideva invokes the Buddhist
doctrine of no-self (anātman).
The continuum of consciousness, like a series, and the
aggregation of constituents, like an army and such, are
unreal. Since one who experiences suffering does not exist,
to whom will that suffering belong? (BCA 8:101)
All sufferings are without an owner without exception.
They should be warded off simply because they are suffering.
Why is any restriction made in this case? (BCA 8: 102, translation modified)59
Why should suffering be prevented? Because everyone
agrees. If it must be warded off, then all of it must be warded
off; and if not, then this goes for oneself as it does for
59

asvāmikāni duḥkhāni sarvāṇyevāviśeṣataḥ| duḥkhatvādeva vāryāṇi niyamastatra kiṁkṛtaḥ. Śāntideva
2001, 190. Wallace and Wallace translate “aviśeṣatah” as an ablative of reason, “because they are not
different.” It is unclear, however, why Śāntideva would be claiming that suffering is ownerless because it
is not different. Instead, I translate “aviśeṣatah” adverbially, as “without exception.”
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everyone else. (BCA 8: 103)
Śāntideva’s opponent, in these verses, appears to be a Buddhist who accepts the
nonexistence of any enduring unitary self, but rejects any suggestion that we have an
obligation to care for others as much as ourselves. In the first verse, Śāntideva reminds
his opponent that the Buddhist commitment to the unreality of partite objects entails that
the self, which is composed of causally connected mental and physical moments, is
unreal. As a result, suffering is not owned by anyone. The second verse goes on to claim
that since all moments of suffering are ownerless, it is their intrinsically negative feel
alone that should motivate us to remove them. In the last verse he considers the possible
objection that if there are no selves, we have no reason to remove anyone’s pain. He
replies that since no one claims pain should not be removed, we need not consider this
objection. Arguments must end somewhere, and the premise that we ought to remove
suffering because it is bad is as deep as we can or need to go. He concludes that since
there is no good reason to prioritize our own welfare, if we are to be rationally consistent
we must commit to removing everyone’s pain, or care about none of it, our own included.
This last option has already been dismissed by his claim that everyone agrees pain should
be removed. Thereby a commitment to impartial benevolence, which for Śāntideva
would mean committing to the bodhisattva path as the way of most quickly liberating
sentient beings, seems to follow.
The force of the central point of the argument can be appreciated by considering a
distinction Derek Parfit makes between apparent and real reasons. An apparent reason is
a belief “whose truth would give us a reason to act in some way.” If these beliefs are
true, then this apparent reason is also a real reason (Parfit 2011, 35). For instance, if I
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love chocolate, seeing what I take to be a chocolate candy bar gives me an apparent
reason to eat it. If it turns out to be unsweetened bakers chocolate, then this apparent
reason will not be a real reason, since it is founded upon a false belief.
Śāntideva can be understood as making a similar claim about the self. Ordinarily,
most people will consider the fact that I am numerically identical to my future self as
providing a good reason to prioritize my own welfare. This provides only an apparent
reason, however, since it is grounded on the mistaken supposition that my future self
exists. By contrast, suffering provides a good reason to remove it, since at least in this
argument Śāntideva seems to accept that suffering does exist.
There are a number of responses the opponent can make to Śāntideva’s argument.
One difficulty is what I have elsewhere called “Śāntideva’s dilemma” (Harris, 2011).
Ordinarily, we accept a prima facie obligation to remove suffering, regardless of to whom
it belongs, but we also believe it is justifiable to give more priority to removing our own
suffering. Śāntideva emphasizes the nonexistence of the self to undercut the second of
these attitudes. In doing so, however, he may also undercut our natural acceptance of the
first attitude. In verse 103, he suggests that we need not debate about whether suffering
need be removed because everyone agrees that it should be. Yet perhaps this agreement
is itself dependent upon the mistaken belief that we are actually enduring independent
entities. Once we accept the ultimate nonexistence of the self, it is open to the opponent
to claim that we need not be concerned about anyone’s pain, including our own. In this
response, the opponent agrees with Śāntideva that there is no distinction justifying
prioritizing one’s own suffering, but claims this provides a justification for total apathy as
much as impartial benevolence (Harris 2011).
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Another strategy the opponent might use is to focus on the fact that even
Śāntideva accepts that selves conventionally exist as superimpositions upon causally
connected mental and physical events. He might then focus on facts about these
momentary events and their connections that might provide the needed distinction to
justify prioritizing the well-being of one’s own set of closely related mental and physical
moments. Here is one way the opponent might develop this strategy. Let us accept with
Śāntideva that my current self is obligated to remove suffering, no matter to whom it
belongs. Yet I have a special connection to my own future conventional self. Because
of our close causal connection, there are facts that are true about my understanding of the
experience of my future self that are not true about my understanding of any other
conventional self. Śāntideva claimed in verse 8:102 that the quality of the pain everyone
experiences is the same. Even if this is true, each person may experience their pain
differently. My dread of going to the dentist is not the same as yours, and the way I
mentally recoil from an insult will differ from your own reaction. Because of the close
causal connections between my current and future self, I know that his reaction to his
pain will be extremely similar to my own. I have a window into the subjective feel of the
experiences of that future self. Therefore, I relate to his experiences in a way that I
cannot relate to the suffering of any other being. Śāntideva’s opponent might argue that
this distinction can rationally ground special concern for my own welfare.
What I have done by raising these two objections is to show that Śāntideva’s
argument is far from uncontroversial. My primary purpose here is not to evaluate the
argument, however, and so I will not consider potential responses that might be made.
For our purposes, we can conclude that Śāntideva argues for the conclusion that we are
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obligated to accept impartial benevolence and strive to remove the suffering of all
persons. Since this project appears to be extremely demanding, he is therefore vulnerable
to having the overdemandingness objection raised against him.
There is another possible interpretation of these verses that deserves brief
mention. The passages are placed not in the Wisdom chapter of the BCA, where
Śāntideva argues against opponents’ views, but in a chapter detailing various meditations
designed to reduce attachment and generate compassion. Especially since the argument
is not obviously convincing, we might wonder whether it is correct to interpret these
verses as an analytic argument trying to derive the conclusion that we are obligated to
become bodhisattvas. Perhaps Śāntideva’s main purpose in these sets of verses is to
encourage us to think closely on the suffering others experience, as well as to meditate
deeply on the fact that we have no self as a way of removing egoistic attachment. If this
were the case, it might be that Śāntideva is not necessarily claiming that all humans
capable of understanding his argument are obligated to become bodhisattvas, but rather
only to present a set of tools to help those who have already made this commitment to
develop further.60 One of the reasons it is worth considering this hypothesis is because,
as I explained in the introduction, most Mahāyāna texts hold the bodhisattva path to be
optional, and this interpretation would bring Śāntideva back into line with the
predominant Mahāyāna position.
Although I think this is a possible reading of the text, I will not here consider its
merits in detail. These verses are at least presented as an extended argument in which
Śāntideva argues we are obligated to commit to impartial benevolence, and by
implication that we should adopt the apparently very demanding bodhisattva path. If we
60

I develop this possibility in Harris 2011.
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take the verses at face value, then, Śāntideva faces the overdemandingness objection.
The remaining chapters of this dissertation will reconstruct important aspects of the
response he can make.
Nevertheless, even if this is an incorrect understanding of Śāntideva’s text, my
thesis has been framed in a way that its defense will remain unaffected. I will be arguing
that if we accept certain Buddhist presuppositions like the psychological effects of
realizing no-self and the Buddhist analysis of suffering, an obligation to commit to the
bodhisattva path is not overly demanding in the welfare decreasing sense. Even if
Śāntideva does not think we are obligated to become bodhisattvas, it is still an important
finding that the bodhisattva path is far less demanding than it appears, and that therefore
Mahāyāna ethics would be resistant to the overdemandingness objection if a Mahāyāna
author claimed we were obligated to undertake it. Moreover, all Mahāyāna authors,
because of the emphasis they place on ordinary beings committing to become
bodhisattvas, should be concerned about lessening the demandingness of the bodhisattva
path. Therefore, this study should be of considerable interest regardless of whether my
interpretation of Śāntideva’s argument above is correct.

Possible Responses to the Overdemandingness Objection
Thus far, I have argued that Śāntideva appears vulnerable to the
overdemandingness objection, as a result of his claim that we are obligated to act with
impartial benevolence, and by implication to adopt the bodhisattva path. In the
remainder of this chapter, I survey potential responses to the overdemandingness
objection as a way of situating Śāntideva’s contribution to this discussion alongside
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contemporary responses to the issue. The following chapters will develop different ways
that demadingness is actually addressed by Śāntideva and other Buddhist authors.
The most straightforward response to the objection is to simply claim that the
correct moral theory is extremely demanding. Versions of this ‘bite-the-bullet’ response
have been adopted by prominent ethicists including Shelly Kagan, Peter Singer and Peter
Unger. 61 Generally, this approach is matched with a campaign against the intuitions that
lead us to believe the demands of the theory in question are unfair. This approach is not
really available to the Mahāyānist, however. The difficulty is that endorsing an
extremely demanding theory generally requires accepting that most persons will not do
what is morally required. Singer, for instance, argues that although we are morally
required to give up all our free time and income to help relieve poverty, it is only realistic
to expect most persons to make a far smaller contribution (Singer 2011, 211-215). The
goal of a Mahāyānist like Śāntideva, however, is to help all beings achieve full
Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. This suggests Śāntideva will need to
offer some response to the overdemandingness objection that actually lessens
demandingness, rather than merely endorse a standard of rightness that most persons will
be unable to follow.
A second kind of response to the objection, which has received considerable
attention from authors writing from a consequentialist perspective, is to restructure a
moral theory to lessen the amount owed to others. Although theoretically this
restructuring might take place on either the criteria of right action, or the theory of wellbeing endorsed by the system, in fact most contemporary approaches have focused on the
first of these options. Michael Slote’s satisficing consequentialism, for instance,
61

See Kagan 1989, 13-14; Singer 1972 & 2011; Unger 1996.

59

decouples consequentialism from maximization, and claims that although consequences
alone determine the rightness of an act, an act may still be right if it does not have the
best consequences (Slote 1985, 36). An agent in Slote’s view fulfills his ethical
obligations if his action is good enough, even if it is not as good as it could be. Likewise,
Samuel Scheffler abandons the consequentialist commitment to impartiality and allows
agents to give their own interests greater weight than that of other persons (Scheffler
1982). Adherents of rule consequentialism, similarly, lessen the demands placed on
adherents by determining individual obligation by the set of rules that would be most
beneficial if followed by everyone.62 Mahāyāna Buddhism cannot adopt this kind of
demand-lessening restructuring of the criteria of right action, however, because to do so
would require giving up its primary commitment, the achievement of full Buddhahood in
order to liberate all sentient beings from suffering. The bodhisattva vow requires the
bodhisattva to devote all his resources and energy towards awakening as a means of
liberating all sentient beings, and any diminution of this goal would mean abandoning
this supreme intention.
Although it has been a less popular option, it is also possible to alter a theory of
well-being to reduce the tension between moral demands and an individual’s welfare.
Three theories about the basic units of welfare value have been particularly prominent in
recent contemporary ethical theory. Mental state theories, like hedonism, claim that
welfare consists solely in experiencing certain psychological states. A desire-satisfaction
theory, by contrast, claims that our life goes best when we satisfy our desires. An
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Hooker (2000) provides a carefully constructed defense of rule consequentialism. Another version of a
collective consequentialism that serves as a response to the overdemandingness objection is developed in
Murphy (2000). See Mulgan (2001) chapters three, five and six for an accessible summary of rule,
satisficing and hybrid consequentialism.
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objective list theory claims that certain items enhance our welfare, regardless of whether
they bring us pleasure or satisfy our desires. This list might include such items as
friendships, appreciation of beauty, character development, and might also include items
focused on by the other theories, such as pleasure and desire satisfaction.63 Other
theories of well-being have also been defended, but considering these three influential
views will be sufficient for my purpose.64
In this welfare restructuring response, the strategy will be to endorse an
alternative theory of welfare that will define the foundational units of well-being in terms
that lessen apparent demandingness. A Christian objective list theory, for instance, might
claim that closeness to God is the most significant element in individual well-being, and
devalue items such as pleasure or satisfaction of worldly aims. This is largely the
strategy we find in early Buddhist texts that devalue worldly pursuits and claim most
forms of sensual pleasure are pervaded by subtle dissatisfaction. As a result, the life of
the monk who has forgone family and material comforts is held to be the best available
for the monk himself. Moreover, Śāntideva presupposes this early Buddhist analysis of
suffering, and will therefore claim that the bodhisattva gives up much less than it initially
appears, thereby lessening our overall evaluation of the difficulty of his path. The second
chapter of this study will be devoted to an explanation of Buddhist conceptions of
suffering, and their relevance to the demandingness of the bodhisattva path.
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Parfit (1984, 403-407) offers an influential discussion of these three theories which is often taken as a
starting point for considering what theory of welfare is correct. See also Heathwood (2010) for a good
introductory discussion. I discuss the relationship between theories of well-being and Buddhist accounts of
suffering in chapter two.
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Other influential views about well-being are developed in Sumner 1996 and Darwell 2002. Almost any
plausible theory of well-being will give importance to either desire-satisfaction or experiencing certain
mental states, and since the Buddhist demand-lessening strategy developed below depends upon these, it
will be compatible with any of these theories.
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This strategy, alone, cannot provide an adequate response to the
overdemandingness objection facing a Mahāyānist like Śāntideva, however. As we have
just seen, the bodhisattva undergoes severe torments in numerous rebirths as part of his
training and the activities he undergoes to aid sentient beings. Further, all Buddhists
accept that suffering is bad. Although the Mahāyānist can claim the bodhisattva suffers
no deprivation from renouncing saṁsāric pursuits, she still seems to face the
overdemandingness objection if she claims an individual is obligated to undergo these
difficulties, rather than aiming for personal liberation from suffering.
The previous two kinds of responses to the overdemandingness objection are alike
in altering the deep structure of an ethical theory to lessen the demands on its adherents.
There are, however, a number of what we can call demand-lessening strategies, that leave
the structure of a theory unmodified, and instead focus on psychological transformation
to lessen the demandingness the adherent experiences.65 One version of this approach
emphasizes the development of mental fortitude and flexibility, likely resulting from
virtuous qualities like patience and endurance, as a way of lessening the suffering
experienced when fulfilling demanding moral requirements. Another version reduces the
tension between altruism and self-interest by closely linking the well-being of self and
others through psychological transformation to bring an individual’s interests into line
with what the theory demands. This approach could be adapted to various theories of
well-being. For instance a sense of joy at giving might be nurtured which, under hedonic
theories of well-being, will help balance out any loss of well-being from making
significant charitable contributions. For a desire-satisfaction theorist, the strategy will be
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The possibility of using psychological transformation as a means of reducing demandingness has been
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62

to over time eliminate self-regarding desires, like achieving personal success, and replace
them with desires for the well-being of others. Since most plausible objective list
theories will include either desire-satisfaction or at least certain kinds of pleasure as
elements of what makes a life go well, this same strategy applies to these types of
theories as well.
It is these kinds of demand-lessening strategies, focused on gradually shaping
psychological response, that I will argue are to be found in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts.
Chapters three through five of this study are devoted to reconstructing different aspects of
the demand-lessening psychological transformation the bodhisattva undergoes as she
travels towards Buddhahood. In chapter three, I argue that developing Buddhist virtues
allows the bodhisattva control over her physical and mental reactions, thus benefiting
from overcoming a particularly severe form of weakness of will. Chapter four discusses
the role of Buddhist virtues in lessening mental suffering. Chapter five explores the
strategy used by Śāntideva and other Buddhists of adopting other-regarding desires and
mental reactions that, I will argue, increase the bodhisattva’s welfare on most plausible
theories of well-being.
In chapter two, I will argue that although Buddhist conceptions of suffering
undermine many of the items we intuitively take to make a life go better, Buddhists do
not commit to any single foundational theory of well-being. Because of this, it’s worth
noting here an interesting feature of the demand-lessening strategy of psychological
transformation found in Buddhist texts. This is that this approach is not tied to any
particular theory of well-being. This is because there is relatively broad agreement
among theories about the welfare increasing value of certain kinds of psychological
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states. Almost any plausible theory of well-being will give importance to at least some
pleasurable mental states, as well as the satisfaction of some desires. Theories will differ,
of course, about what at the deepest level explains this increase to well-being. Hedonism
will claim that the satisfaction of desire is valuable because it creates pleasure, while a
desire-satisfaction theory will claim that pleasure is valuable because we desire it.
Objective list theories might take one or both of these items as having intrinsic value.
Therefore, as long as the psychological transformation strategy focuses on these
commonly accepted items of value, it will be compatible with multiple foundational
theories of well-being. Of course, there may be some disagreement about which kinds of
pleasure or satisfied desires have welfare increasing value, and so adaptations to the
strategy might still be necessary.
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Chapter 2: Buddhist Conceptions of Suffering and Well-being
I have two aims in this chapter. First and primarily, I illustrate how the Buddhist
analysis of ordinary experience as permeated with suffering reveals that that bodhisattva
path is less demanding than it appears. The bodhisattva, in concentrating on her training,
forgoes many of the ordinary goods we take to make life worth living, such as family
involvements, career achievements, sensual pleasure and so on. This chapter illustrates
how Buddhist conceptions of suffering undercut the value of these supposed goods,
thereby showing that the bodhisattva gives up much less than is at first apparent. I draw
heavily on early Buddhist sources in doing this, since their insights are presupposed by
Mahāyāna authors like Śāntideva, and since they often offer a more explicit treatment of
the dissatisfactory nature of ordinary experience than we find in Śāntideva’s BCA.66
The second closely related aim of this chapter is to illustrate one way Buddhist
ethicists defend their conception of what a worthwhile life looks like. It’s probably fair
to say that ancient Indian Buddhist conceptions of how lives ought to be lived cut against
the grain. Communities of Buddhist monks limit their possessions to essentials like
robes, themselves sewn together from rags, and begging bowls, and wander without
reliable food or shelter. Śāntideva praises the life of the renunciant who lives at the foot
of a tree or in a deserted temple, isolated from all human contact (BCA 8:27). Even
household bodhisattvas are urged to scorn their wives (Nattier 2003) and the status of
ordinary lay practitioners is generally seen as inferior to that of monastics.
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Śāntideva refers frequently, sometimes almost to the point of exhaustion, to various dissatisfactory
aspects of cyclic existence in the BCA. I will refer to some of these descriptions as this chapter progresses.
Unlike some early Buddhist texts, however, he does not explicitly categorize the kinds of suffering sentient
beings experience. It is for this reason that I do not take the BCA as my primary source in this chapter.
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With occasional exceptions, like Śāntideva’s argument for impartial benevolence
considered in the first chapter, Buddhist ethicists provide very little in the way of
explicitly stated normative argument. This does not, however, mean their conception of
the good life is left without philosophical defense. The Buddhist analysis of suffering
that shows why the Buddhist path is not as demanding as it appears also provides a
defense of these lives. In essence, what the Buddhist claims is that ordinary conceptions
of what makes a life go well are massively deluded, so much so that the lives of homeless
monastics who have abandoned almost everything ordinarily held to be of value are far
better than those of the householder who appears to flourish. In other words, they will
challenge what we ordinarily take well-being to consist in. The philosophical task of
determining with precision what makes a life go well is that of specifying a theory of
welfare, and the fact that Buddhist texts contest much of what we ordinarily take to be in
our best interest suggests this may be a fruitful area of comparison.
I proceed as follows. In the first section I explicate the most influential of the
Buddhist taxonomies of suffering: the threefold division into explicit suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā), the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā), and conditioned suffering
(saṃskāra-duḥkhatā). In the second, I sketch the three theories of welfare that have been
most influential in contemporary ethical theory. I then argue that Buddhist commitments
underdetermine which of these theories would have been accepted by ancient Indian
Buddhists. Moreover a modified form of each theory would be compatible with the
Buddhist analysis of suffering detailed in the first section. Nevertheless, the Buddhist
analysis of suffering constrains the shape any acceptable theory of welfare may take. In
my conclusion, I argue that this narrowing process itself is enough to reconstruct a
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philosophical defense of the forms of life endorsed in Buddhist texts. Although Buddhist
texts do not offer a theory of welfare, in the sense of explicating at the deepest level the
units that make a life go well, their analysis of suffering provides justification for their
view that the lives of homeless monastics and renunciants are better than those the rest of
us lead. This analysis of suffering also illustrates why giving up saṁsāric items of
apparent value is not really detrimental to the well-being of the early Buddhist monk or
Mahāyāna bodhisattva.

The Three kinds of Suffering
The most influential of the Buddhist categorizations of suffering divides
unsatisfactory experience into three categories: explicit suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhatā), the
suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā), and the suffering of being conditioned
(saṃskāra-duḥkhatā). Duḣkha-duḣkhatā, or explicit suffering, refers to the discomfort
caused by pain. These are the sensations we ordinarily identify as being painful, like
stubbing my toe and experiencing frustration or embarrassment. Unlike explicit
suffering, the second and third forms of suffering arise as a result of ignorance (avidyā)
and craving (tṛṣṇā) infecting the cognitive and perceptual processing systems of sentient
beings. Buddhist texts describe these systems in a variety of ways, but for our purposes a
simplified general formulation will suffice. In dependence upon an object and sense
organ, a particular sense consciousness is said to arise. The meeting of these three is
called contact (sparśa), the event of sensory awareness. For instance, in dependence
upon a properly functioning eye organ and the external object, awareness of the sensory
properties of the apple, like color and smell, arise. After this sensory event (sparśa),
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hedonic feeling tone (vedanā) follows of pleasant, painful, or neutral variety. This
pleasure gives rise to the impulse (cetanā) to reach out and touch and taste the locus of
the color. Sensations of pleasure continue as the apple is grasped and tasted.
What is important to note is that according to the Buddhist, there is neither a
unified enduring subject that experiences, nor a unified enduring object that is
experienced. Although for convenience Buddhists sometimes talk of persons or apples,
what is actually experienced is a stream of momentary impressions: multiple seeings,
touchings, tastes, smells and physical sensations. For any ordinary sentient being, not far
advanced in Buddhist training, these experiences are erroneously reified into a unified
object, the apple, possessed by an independent and enduring subject (ātman). This is
ignorance (avidyā), the deeply rooted tendency to superimpose the three marks of
permanence, independence and satisfactoriness upon impermanent (anitya), selfless
(anātman) and unsatisfactory (duḥkha) phenomena. As a result of these
superimpositions, craving (tṛṣṇā) for the apple arises, followed by an intensified form of
desire called clinging (upādāna) in which I actively seek out what is wanted. The other
mental defilements (kleśas), such as anger and jealously, arise as a result of these root
defilements of ignorance and craving. I become resentful or envious when you claim the
apple that I want as your own.
Important for our purposes is to recognize that a fully awakened being, an arhat,
or a Buddha, who has eliminated ignorance and craving from his mindstream, uses the
same cognitive and perceptual system as the rest of us. He can see, hear, smell, touch
and taste the apple’s sensory properties, and even labels this conglomeration of
properties for convenience with the concept “apple.” Unlike ordinary beings, the
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awakened arhat does not erroneously believe sense experience to be caused by a unified
enduring independent object. Rather, the name given to the object is used as a
convenient designation (prajñapti), much as a group of trees might be called a forest
without a corresponding error being made that a unitary object called “forest” existed.
Also significantly, the awakened being feels pleasant, painful, and neutral sensations
(vedanā). Upon seeing and tasting the apple, he experiences enjoyment, but unlike the
rest of us, craving (tṛṣṇā) towards the apple does not arise as a result. This is because he
views the apple as a conceptual imputation upon radically impermanent phenomena,
rather than as a self-subsisting enduring object capable of sustaining satisfaction.
This sketch of the Buddhist understanding of how error enters into our perceptual
and cognitive system allows us to distinguish between the first, and the deeper second
and third forms of suffering. The first of the three forms of suffering, duḥkha-duḥkhatā,
or explicit suffering, is identified with unpleasant sensation (vedanā). This is the kind of
sensation we ordinarily call painful: I stub my toe, smell decay or hear a sharp sound. As
just explained, sensation (vedanā) arises in awakened as well as afflicted cognitive
systems, and therefore even an awakened being free from ignorance and craving may
experience painful sensation. This is attested to in the early Buddhist scriptures by
accounts of the historical Buddha experiencing physical pain, such as sickness or a
splinter in the toe (Walshe 2005, 244: D ii 99; Bodhi 2000, 116: S i 27-29).67 Buddhist
sources are divided about whether awakened beings experience mental pain, but the
psychological suffering of ordinary persons, such as grief and frustration, should also be
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classified as explicit suffering.68 Although Buddhist texts identify explicit suffering with
unpleasant sensation, by extension it also refers to the external objects that bring
displeasure, as well as associated moments of consciousness (Vasubandhu 1988, 899).
Not only my pain, but the wasp that stings me and my awareness of the sting may all be
classified as explicit suffering.
In contrast to explicit suffering, the second and third forms of suffering arise as a
result of ignorance and craving and are therefore not experienced by liberated beings. It
is not, however, immediately obvious how to meaningfully distinguish these forms of
suffering. The suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā) relates to pleasant sensation,
and is said to refer to the fact that pain will arise when a pleasant sensation ends. Strictly
speaking, the resulting painful sensation should be a form of explicit suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā), but Buddhist texts are not consistent on this, and sometimes the painful
sensation is itself referred to as the suffering of change.69 The root problem behind the
suffering of change appears to be the impermanence of pleasure. Meanwhile, the
suffering of being conditioned (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā) refers to the unsatisfactoriness
belonging to any moment of experience in virtue of its dependence upon causal
conditioning for its existence. The commentaries claim conditioned things are suffering
because they are “oppressed by rise and fall,” that is subject to creation and then
68

Of course, arhats and Buddhas who have eliminated craving and ignorance will not experience mental
pain like frustration and grief that arises from craving. The Sallasutta and The Questions of King Milinda
claim that arhats experience physical, but not mental pain (Bodhi 2000, 1264: S iv, 208; Rhys Davids
1890, 69: Mil 44). On the other hand, a few passages in early Buddhist texts suggest that the Buddha did
experience occasional mental frustration. For instance, he cites as one reason for his reluctance to teach
that to do so to foolish beings “would be wearying and troublesome for me” (M i 168; trans by Webster,
cited in Webster 2005, 17, and see this same article for commentary.) Further, numerous Mahāyāna
sources reference the bodhisattva feeling mental pain due to his great compassion for suffering beings,
including Śāntideva at BCA 6:123. It seems to me that since mental sensation (vedanā) arises in the
uncontaminated part of the perceptual system, there should be no objection in principle to a Buddha or
arhat experiencing mental pain. I return to this question in the fourth chapter of this dissertation.
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dissolution (Buddhaghosa 1991, 505). Again, the root difficulty seems to be
impermanence. Conditioned suffering has a wider scope, since it afflicts all conditioned
entities and experiences, and Buddhists hold everything with the exception of nirvāṇa is
conditioned.70 But apart from this, the unsatisfactory aspect of both forms of suffering
appears to be impermanence, and it is not immediately apparent why two terms need to
be used.
We can begin to disentangle the two by noting that the suffering of change is
explicitly identified with and restricted to pleasant sensations, and by extension with the
consciousness that experiences pleasant objects as well as the objects of pleasure.
Conditioned suffering is identified with neutral sensations, and by extension the relevant
objects and conscious experience. The commentaries, however, explain that this
identification is made only because conditioned suffering is the only kind of suffering
afflicting neutral sensations. Painful and pleasant sensations, as well as associated
objects and consciousness, are also dependent on causes and conditions, and therefore are
also afflicted by conditioned suffering. This opens up two possible avenues for
determining what “conditioned suffering” refers to. We might consider neutral
sensations in isolation, and determine in what way they are unsatisfactory (Engle 2009,
123). Likewise, we can ask in what way a pleasant sensation is unsatisfactory,
specifically in virtue of being pleasant, and use this to determine the meaning of the
suffering of change. Since the commentaries claim that the suffering of change is easier
to understand than conditioned suffering (Vasubandhu 1988, 900), I begin with this latter
strategy.

70

Certain Buddhist schools, like the Vaibhāṣika, hold in addition that space and disjunction are not
dependent on causes and conditions. See Vasubandhu 1988, 59.
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The Suffering of Change and Related Forms of Suffering
The suffering of change, in the early sutras, is described as afflicting pleasant
sensation, and multiple commentaries explain that it refers to the fact that suffering will
arise when a pleasant sensation ends. As the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya states, “Agreeable
sensation is agreeable when it arises, agreeable when it lasts, but suffering in its change”
(Vasubandhu 1988, 899). Early Buddhist texts, however, draw attention to numerous
shortcomings of pleasure other than the pain that arises when a pleasant sensation ends.
Moreover, the suffering of change is the kind of suffering belonging to sensations (and by
extension related objects and consciousness) in virtue of being pleasant, and all of the
drawbacks of pleasure alluded to in Buddhist texts fit this description. Therefore, in this
section I treat together all of these dangers of pleasant sensation, although we should
keep in mind that most Buddhist texts only explicitly use the term vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā
as marking the fact that pleasure turns into pain.
Buddhist texts hold that there is nothing about pleasant sensation itself that
inevitably makes suffering arise. This is shown clearly in The Shorter Discourse on the
Mass of Suffering (Cūladukkhakkandha Sutta) in which the Buddha claims to be able to
experience more pleasure in deep meditation than a king with unlimited access to sense
pleasure (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995, 188-89 :M i 94-95). Likewise, we saw above that
sensations of pleasure (sukha-vedanā) arise even in an awakened being.71 Pleasant
sensation becomes harmful only when it occurs within a cognitive system infected with
craving (tṛṣṇā) caused by ignorance (avidyā) superimposing permanence and

71

In addition, Buddhist texts refer approvingly to the pleasure that arises from helping others. I return to
this in the fourth chapter.
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independence upon dependent and transitory phenomena. It is this craving for enduring
satisfaction from inherently transitory phenomena which results in the experience of grief
when the pleasant experience ends.
Buddhists, therefore, hold that pleasant sensations occurring in the mindstream of
a liberated being are not harmful. It is only pleasure arising in a saṃsāric person’s
cognitive system that is marked as suffering. Here, there are broadly two attitudes.72 The
first, which draws attention to what I will call “the object-related drawbacks of pleasure,”
accepts that even pleasure arising in a mindstream afflicted by craving is, of itself, not
harmful, but should be avoided because it will inevitably lead to pain. This strategy is
made particularly explicit in a passage from the second century CE poet, Aśvaghoṣa’s
Life of the Buddha (Buddhacarita), in which the young prince Gautama, who has recently
realized the transience of all phenomena, scorns a roomful of courtesans his father has
provided to entice him back to a life of kingship and sensual pleasure.
I do not despise sense objects.
I know that the world consists of them.
Having realized the world is impermanent,
my mind does not delight in it.
If these three did not exist,
Old age, disease and death,
Then I would also take delight
in these objects known by the mind. (Aśvaghoṣa 1995, my translation)73
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It is natural to suppose that these two attitudes towards pleasure found in the early Pali canon developed
into the realist and antirealist positions on the existence of pleasure exemplified by the Vaibhāṣika, and the
Madhyamaka as well as certain early Buddhist schools, respectively. See Vasubandhu 1988, 903-908 for
the Vaibhāṣika response to a series of arguments regarding the nonexistence of pleasure.
73
nāvajānāmi viṣayān jāne lokaṁ tadātmakam|anityaṁ tu jagamatvā nātra me ramate manaḥ||85|| jarā
vyādhiśca mṛtyuśca yadi na syādidaṁ trayam| mamāpi hi manojñeṣu viṣayeṣu ratirbhavet||86|| Aśvaghoṣa
1995. See also translation by Olivelle in Aśvaghoṣa 2008, 115.
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The root problem illustrated in this passage has nothing to do with the nature of
pleasure in itself; in fact, the Buddha-to-be claims that he would happily dally with the
woman if convinced their beauty would not fade. The difficulty with pleasure is that in
ordinary minds it is coupled with craving that desires its continuance. Since pleasure is
impermanent, this will lead to pain when it collapses. It is this transformation of pleasure
into pain that gives the suffering of change its name. Pleasure, here, is seen as worthy of
desire, but dangerous and to be discarded since it is conducive to suffering.
Other Buddhist texts also leave unchallenged the satisfactory nature of pleasure,
but draw attention to various difficulties of attaining and protecting it. The Greater Mass
of Craving Sutta, for instance, emphasizes hardships, like cold, heat and insect bites that
one must endure to accumulate riches, as well as the inevitable breaking out of quarrels
once wealth is achieved (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 2005, 180-81: M i 86-88). Another
frequently emphasized drawback is the anxiety one experiences once the objects that
bring pleasure are obtained. This point is made vividly in the story of Bhaddiya
Kāļigodha, a former king who becomes the disciple of the Buddha, and is overheard
saying “what bliss, what bliss” repeatedly when meditating. The other monks assume he
is fantasizing about his former riches, and take him to the Buddha for admonition.
Bhaddiya explains that when he was a king, despite the presence of numerous royal
guards, he lived in constant paranoid fear of losing his wealth. It is only now as a monk,
having renounced all but essential possessions, that his mind is finally at ease (Thanissaro
2012: Ud 18).
All the passages cited so far do not challenge the assumption that pleasure would
be valuable if it lasted, even when it arises within a saṃsāric cognitive and perceptual
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system; for all he has said thus far, king Bhaddiya might have slept soundly had he
invincible magical golems directly under his control to protect his wealth. The problem,
rather, is with the world, in the impermanence and the fragility of its objects, and in the
greed and hatred of its inhabitants. There is, however, a deeper critique of pleasure
leveled by certain Buddhist texts where the impoverished nature of pleasure arising in a
mind infected by craving is itself emphasized. I refer to this as “the subject-related
drawbacks of pleasure,” since it locates the suffering pleasure engenders as arising from
the mind of saṃsāric persons directly, regardless of what the world is like.
As before, I turn to Aśvaghoṣa’s Life of the Buddha for an illustration of this kind
of suffering. In this passage, the Buddha speaks of the insatiable nature of desire.
For pleasures are fleeting, robbing wealth and virtue,
They are empty, like phantoms in this world;
Even when wished for,
They delude the minds of men;
How much more when actually possessed?
For men overwhelmed by pleasures find no relief
In triple heaven, much less in this mortal world;
For pleasures do not sate a man full of desires,
As firewood a fire accompanied by the wind. (Aśvaghoṣa 2008, 304-305)74
The contrast between this and the first passage by Aśvaghoṣa is striking. Earlier,
the Buddha-to-be had claimed that only the impermanence of the women’s beauty
restrained him from indulgence. In contrast, now craving is characterized in its nature as
incapable of fulfillment, and the pleasures that accompany the pursuit of sense objects are
said to merely increase longing without providing satisfaction. Pleasure, arising in the
mind of a saṃsāric person, is now seen in itself to be a kind of suffering, regardless of
the fragility and vulnerability of the objects from which it arises. The logic of this second
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passage suggests that a roomful of woman bearing eternal beauty would be the ultimate
torment for a person afflicted by ignorance and craving.
This insatiability of desire is illustrated by numerous images in Buddhist texts,
with perhaps the most provocative belonging to the Māgandiya Sutta from the early Pali
canon.
Suppose, Māgandiya, there was a leper with sores and blisters on his limbs, being
devoured by worms, scratching the scabs off the openings of his wounds with his
nails, cauterizing his body over a burning charcoal pit; the more he scratches the
scabs and cauterises his body, the fouler, more evil smelling and more infected
the openings of his wounds would become, yet he would find a certain measure of
satisfaction and enjoyment in scratching the openings of his wounds. So too,
Māgandiya, beings who are not free from lust for sensual pleasures, who are
devoured by craving for sensual pleasures, who burn with fever for sensual
pleasures, still indulge in sensual pleasures; the more such beings indulge in
sensual pleasures, the more their craving for sensual pleasures increases and the
more they are burned by their fever for sensual pleasures, yet they find a certain
measure of satisfaction and enjoyment in dependence on the five cords of sensual
pleasure. (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995, 611-12: M i 507-508)
The image of the leper scratching and burning his sores illustrates how a sensation
can feel pleasant while being so deeply impoverished that it should itself be viewed as a
kind of suffering. To interpret the passage as claiming that the pleasure of scratching the
sores is intrinsically good, but outweighed by the pain of infection and so on, is to
misread the image. Pleasure itself here is suffering, regardless of its future results.
Similarly, the Potaliya Sutta emphasizes the insatiable nature of craving by using the
image of a famished dog gnawing at a meatless bone smeared with blood (Ñānamoli and
Bodhi 1995, 469: M i 364). Likewise, Śāntideva compares the pursuit of sense pleasure
to licking honey off the edge of a razor (BCA 7:64). The images suggest the cycle of
addiction in which pleasure sought by a mind infected with craving merely increases the
force of desire without satisfaction.
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There are, then, two distinct strands to the early Buddhist critique of the pursuit of
pleasure, an external strategy focusing on the limitations of impermanent objects, and an
internal one emphasizing the insidious nature of craving itself. The two strategies,
however, may be brought closer together by observing that both depend, in some sense,
upon the cognitive mismatch between our desire for permanence, and the impermanence
of what is encountered. This is obvious in the object-related drawback strategy: it is
because the beauty of the woman is impermanent, while the young prince desires
permanent satisfaction, that he turns away from the harem. In apparent contrast, the
images given in the subject-related approach seem to treat desire as a brute force that
craves insatiably, regardless of the characteristics of the object given to it.
Buddhism, however, does not treat craving as a brute given. Craving is analyzed
and given a causal explanation as a grasping that arises when permanence and
independence are superimposed upon transient and dependent phenomena. In the
Māgandiya Sutta, this is indicated by referencing the distorted mental faculty of the leper,
meant to be analogous to the ignorance that superimposes permanence and independence
upon conditioned momentary events (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995, 611-12: M i 507). Both
subject and object related drawbacks of pleasure, then, arise because of a cognitive
mismatch between subject and world, in which desire seeks nonexistent permanence.
Where the two strategies differ is the level at which the collision between our
expectations and the way the world is occurs. We can characterize this in abhidharma
terminology by saying that what I have called the object-related drawbacks of pleasure
occur at the level of conventional reality (saṃvṛtisatya), in which partite objects, with
spatial and temporal extension, appear to endure for a period of time before dissolution.
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From the standpoint of ordinary life, the beauty of the women seems to last, and I do not
recognize dissatisfaction from partaking in this pleasure until their beauty, as well as my
own virility, have begun to fade. Passages emphasizing the insatiable nature of craving,
in contrast, reveal that during this whole stretch in which I appear (even to myself) to be
robustly enjoying sensual pleasures, there is a deeper underlying dissatisfaction, which
might even be characterized as subtle pain, arising from all this sensual indulgence. This
is because at the level of ultimate reality (paramārthasatya), in which experience is
analyzed into discrete radically impermanent mental and physical events, each instant of
engagement with sense pleasure represents a new affective response to cognitive error.
Craving, by its very nature, in its moment-by-moment arising, is never capable of any
real satisfaction, since it inevitably seeks nonexistent entities. What this means is that the
suffering of change is nested. The sensualist experiences moment-by-moment subtle
dissatisfaction while indulging in pleasure, and then the more obvious pain that is
ordinarily recognized as explicit suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhatā) when the temporally
extended sequence of pleasure comes to a close.
What I have done in this section is to group together a number of strategies
present in early Buddhist texts that emphasize the dissatisfactory nature of pleasant
experience. Many Buddhist commentaries identify only the pain that arises when
pleasure collapses as the suffering of change. This represents one aspect of what I have
classified as object-related drawbacks to pleasure. Since vipariṇāma-duḥkha is meant to
mark the unsatisfactory nature of sensation insofar as it is pleasant, however, I think it
helpful to group together under this heading a wider selection of the drawbacks to the
pursuit of pleasure represented in early Buddhist texts. These include other object-related
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drawbacks, such as the difficulty of obtaining and defending pleasurable objects, and the
subject-related drawback that pleasure cannot satisfy craving even temporarily, and
should itself be recognized as a form of subtle pain.

Conditioned Suffering (Saṃskāra-duḥkhatā)
Conditioned suffering (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā) is the unsatisfactoriness things
possess as a result of arising in dependence on causes and conditions. Above I explained
that all conditioned entities possess conditioned suffering, but that neutral sensations are
explicitly identified with it because they are not afflicted by any other kind of suffering.
This makes conditioned suffering somewhat puzzling, since it is not immediately clear
why a neutral sensation, inasmuch as it is simply neutral, should be a kind of suffering at
all. 75
Traditionally, the Buddha is said to have listed eight forms of suffering in his first
sermon, the last of which the fourth century CE philosopher Asaṅga identifies as
conditioned suffering.
[B]irth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering,
union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation from what is pleasing is
suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates
subject to clinging are suffering. (Bodhi 2000,1844: S v 421)76
Item one, birth, is held to be unsatisfactory in being a physically painful event and
in being the foundation for future sufferings (Buddhaghosa 1991, 506-7). Items 2-7 are
most naturally identified as cases of explicit suffering, although Asaṅga considers
separation from what one likes and not getting what one wants as suffering of change,
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See Engle 2009, 120-137 for an extremely helpful explanation of saṃskāra-duḥkha, which has
influenced my account.
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since these sufferings arise as a result of our attachment to pleasure. The eighth item in
the list references the five aggregates or skandhas: matter (rūpa), sensation (vedanā),
recognition (saṃjñā), consciousness (vijñāna), and mental factors such as volitional
intent (saṃskāra). These five are held by Buddhists to jointly constitute the experience
of sentient beings. Indeed, the definitive Buddhist claim is that these five impersonal and
impermanent elements alone are sufficient to account for sentient experience, and that we
err when we identify any or all of them as being or belonging to an enduring self (ātman).
In the Buddha’s sermon, he identifies as suffering the aggregates that are subject to
clinging (upādāna), itself a stronger form of craving (tṛṣṇā), meaning that any aggregate
arising in the cognitive and perceptual system of a being under the influence of craving
and ignorance is suffering.
This eighth item in the list of sufferings, then, identified by Asaṅga with
conditioned suffering, refers to the entire cognitive and perceptual system of
unenlightened beings. It constitutes a value judgment on saṃsāric experience as a whole.
This suggests a contrast between the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā) and
conditioned suffering (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā): the suffering of change is atomic, in
referencing the drawbacks of a particular instance of pleasure. By contrast, conditioned
suffering is holistic, drawing attention to the situatedness of a particular sensation within
an impoverished cognitive and perceptual system that functions under the influence of
ignorance and craving.
The term “saṃskāra” which I have been translating as conditioned, literally
means that which has been caused together, indicating that the thing is dependent on
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causes and conditions. Aryadeva (c. 300 CE.) suggests that merely an awareness of this
causal relatedness of experience should awaken great terror.
You cannot see the initial cause
Of even a single effect;
Seeing how vast the causes of even one effect are,
Who would not be frightened?77
There are two reasons that the causal relatedness of our experience should terrify.
First, since states arise in a vast causal network beyond our control or even
understanding, our present experience can be replaced by suffering at any moment. This
instability is marked as saṃskāra-duḥkha because it is itself unsatisfactory, just as
working for a company that kept threatening to fire you at any moment would be
unsatisfactory. Second, each event is itself a causal condition for many future events.
Any present occurrence, therefore, can contribute to the arising of innumerable future
sufferings.
The Tibetan commentator Tsong-kha-pa likewise emphasizes that instability, and
its role of acting as a causal condition for more obvious forms of suffering, are what most
strongly characterize conditioned suffering.
Though you have occasional moments when painful feeling is absent, because the
aggregates are firmly embedded in the dysfunctional tendencies of suffering and
the afflictions, the suffering of conditionality is still present, and therefore myriad
sufferings are just on the verge of arising in countless ways. Therefore, since the
suffering of conditionality pervades all suffering and is the root of the other two
types of suffering, meditate on it often in order to become disenchanted with it.
(Tsong-kha-pa 2000, 291)
In this passage, Tsong-kha-pa characterizes conditioned suffering as the cause of
the other kinds of suffering because pleasure and pain are both instances of, and arise in
dependence upon causally conditioned phenomena. Like Aryadeva, he also draws our
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attention to the extreme fragility of any moment of respite from the arising of explicit
suffering. This is in contrast to the suffering of change, in which pain arises because a
specifically pleasant item or experience has been lost. Here, Aryadeva and Tsong-kha-pa
draw attention to the fragility that characterizes any conscious event whatsoever.
Asaṅga characterizes the suffering of change as being “accompanied by a state of
indisposition” (dauṣṭhulyam), referring to the presence of harmful habitual tendencies
(anuśaya) and seeds (vāsanā) that ripen into eruptions of negative mental states (kleśas)
like anger, craving, and jealousy.78 The point is that as long as a cognitive system is
dominated by craving and ignorance, any mental episode, including apparently harmless
neutral sensations, may become a contributing factor to the ripening of negative mental
states that condition new forms of explicit suffering. A second characteristic of
conditioned suffering emphasized by Asaṅga is that “one’s welfare is not secure” (Engle
2009, 124). Asaṅga connects this remark to subtle impermanence, the doctrine that
objects and events are not only perishable, but also disintegrate immediately after coming
into existence. Except in advanced meditative states, subtle impermanence cannot be
directly observed, and must be inferred as a condition of anything changing at all.79
Engle explains that reflecting on this radical impermanence “creates a profound sense of
helplessness that represents a realization of the suffering of conditioned existence” (Engle
2009, 132).
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These are the Sanskrit equivalents of the Tibetan terms Tsong-kha-pa uses. See Engle 2009, 122-123,
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The Sautrantika argument for this position is that any cause must have an effect. Therefore, if the
destruction of a dharma (impartite object) is caused, then the cause has as its effect the absence of the
dharma. But an absence is not a real thing, and therefore cannot be an effect. Therefore, destruction
cannot be caused, and so things must perish of their own accord. Radical momentariness follows, since we
would have no reason to suppose a temporally extended thing would perish at one moment rather than
another (since its destruction is uncaused). Therefore, to account for the appearance of change, dharmas
must perish as soon as they arise. See Siderits 2007, 120-123.
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We have already seen that one of the prominent aspects of the Buddhist critique
of pleasure is its emphasis on the fear of losing objects of enjoyment. Fear of specific
occurrences is also implicit in the analysis of explicit suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhatā); I can
be afraid of the physical pain of an operation, or the mental torment of an upcoming
divorce proceeding. The holistic nature of conditioned suffering allows us to mark
another distinction between it and these other forms of suffering. The anxiety
engendered by conditioned suffering is not a fear directed at the loss of any specific
object, nor at encountering something unwanted; this follows from the fact that
conditioned suffering ranges over neutral feelings as well as objects to which we are
indifferent. Conditioned suffering marks the fact that a moment of experience is
embedded in a saṃsāric cognitive system, and is unsatisfactory insofar as it arises from
and acts as a causal condition for the furtherance of the entire saṃsāric system of pain.
The affective state associated with conditioned suffering, then, is not object-directed fear,
but anxiety, in something close to Heidegger’s sense, as a background free-floating
unease about the very conditions of our existence in the world.80 Conditioned suffering
does not make us fear any particular event, but rather makes us feel anxious about being
in saṃsāra at all.
Drawing together these various characterizations of conditioned suffering allows
us to summarize it as referring to the fact that any given moment of experience occurs
within a cognitive system under the influence of ignorance and craving. All such
experiences are unsatisfactory in that they are unstable, due to radical impermanence, are
liable to be replaced by events of explicit suffering, and that moreover they act as causal
conditions for the arising of future states of suffering. In contrast to the suffering of
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change, conditioned suffering is holistic, in that it draws attention to the entire system of
saṃsāric experience in which the indicated moment of awareness is causally situated. It
results in an intense feeling of helplessness, an anxiety directed not towards any
particular item, but rather the entire saṃsāric cognitive system as a whole.
We can illustrate the difference between the three types of suffering (duḥkha) by
considering various arguments we might use to convince a friend to leave an abusive
partner. Our friend might point to periods of relative stability and even enjoyable
moments occurring as interludes between emotional and physical abuse as justifying their
decision to remain in the relationship. In response, we might remind our friend how
awful particular instances of abuse were (duḥkha-duḥkhatā), and point out that any joyful
periods are merely respites between the inevitable reoccurrence of abuse (vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā). It is conceivable that the friend could response that these relatively enjoyable
periods, combined with periods of peace, nevertheless outweigh the occurrences of
explicit pain and suffering. We could respond by insisting that these supposedly good
times cannot really be enjoyed since anxiety as to when violence will reoccur
contaminates any satisfaction taken from them. This is the strategy exemplified by
Buddhists in their analysis of saṃskāra-duḥkhatā: all saṃsāric experience is
contaminated by anxiety, and is unsatisfactory in being part of an impoverished system of
pain.

Buddhist Suffering and Theories of Welfare
In this section, I consider how the accounts of Buddhist suffering just explored
constrain the shape an acceptable theory of well-being can take, and thereby provide a
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defense of the kinds of lives Buddhist texts endorse. I begin by briefly distinguishing
three of the most influential theories of well-being in the Western tradition. I then argue
that Buddhist texts are compatible with each of these theories, and therefore are not
committed to any single theory of well-being. Nevertheless, the Buddhist analysis of
suffering explored in the last section constrains the shape any theory of well-being
acceptable to the Buddhist can take. I argue that this narrowing of these accounts of
well-being is enough to provide a defense of the kinds of lives Buddhist texts affirm, as
well as explicate why the bodhisattva’s commitment is less severe than it appears since
much of what he gives up is not worth pursuit.
A theory of well-being explains what is in an individual’s best interest, in the
sense of explicating at the deepest level what makes her life go as well as possible. A
mental state theory claims that welfare consists solely in experiencing certain
psychological states. The most prominent historical example of a mental state theory is
hedonism, the position that welfare consists in pleasure and the absence of pain. One
influential critique of hedonism points out that most of us care about more than our own
mental experience. Nozick famously makes this point through his experience machine
thought experiment. We are asked to imagine a machine that stimulates our neurons to
give us experiences qualitatively identical to those had in ordinary life. Nozick claims
that most of us would not choose to hook ourselves up permanently to an experience
machine, even if we were able to program in as many pleasurable experiences as we
desired. This shows that humans care about more than how the world feels to us (Nozick
1974, 42-44).

85

One solution to the problem raised by the experience machine is to endorse a
desire-satisfaction theory that claims that satisfying one’s desires is what makes a life go
well. The ordinary version of this theory claims satisfying whatever desires we happen to
have is what welfare consists in. An obvious problem with this view is that we often
desire things that are bad for us, and that some of these desires result from false
information. The theory may be nuanced to account for this objection by including
rationality and informational clauses, so that a life is said to go well when a rational agent
with all the relevant information satisfies his desires. A difficulty facing the informeddesire theory is that it is no longer clear why the satisfaction of desire, rather than
objectively good qualities of the object desired, are thought to be welfare promoting. If a
fully informed rational agent desires a given item, the objection goes, surely there must
be some feature of the object desired that is valuable for its own sake, regardless of
whether anyone wants it.
James Griffin suggests that it will help us to maintain a distinct conceptual space
for informed-desire theories by distinguishing between higher and lower order desires
(Griffin 1986, 13). Different fully informed rational agents might still choose to pursue a
variety of higher order ends: for instance, one might aim at a life of maximal excitement,
while another pursues fame and another a life devoted to family and raising children.
The role of information in this multi-layered account is to facilitate the achievement of
the higher goal. A fully informed rational agent would pursue only first order ends that
are conducive to achieving the higher order end. Since, however, there is no constraint
on the highest order wants accepted, what Griffin refers to as the global desires by which
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we organize our lives, the theory of value remains grounded in the satisfaction of the
desires of the agent (Griffin 1986, 12-13).
In contrast to desire theories, an objective list theory claims that certain items
enhance our welfare, regardless of whether we want them. The list of objective welfare
enhancing items might include things like friendship, appreciation of beauty, and
character development, but also can include subjective mental states such as pleasure and
even desire satisfaction.81 Objective list theories are distinguished from desire theories in
that they hold the items on the list benefit an individual whether or not she desires them.
An important characteristic of an objective list theory is its rejection of subjectivism, the
view that the agent has the final say as to how well her life is going (Haybron 2008, 22).
Although this taxonomy is not exhaustive, considering whether Buddhists would
endorse any of these three theories will be sufficient for my purpose. My argument in
what follows is similar to the argument in the first chapter that Śāntideva does not appear
to be committed to any particular theory of the right, since his ethical commitments are
compatible with multiple foundational normative theories. Here instead I argue that the
Buddhist commitment to ending suffering and developing the virtuous qualities (kuśala
dharma) of Buddhahood is compatible with multiple theories of well-being, and therefore
Buddhists are not committed to any particular theory about what makes a life go well.
Given Buddhists’ emphasis on the importance of eliminating suffering, it might
seem obvious that they would accept some form of mental state theory where welfare
consists in mental states that lack suffering. All of the theories listed above, however,
can acknowledge the welfare-increasing value of ending suffering. A Buddhist desire
81
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theory can claim that a particularly important desire possessed by each of us is to remove
our suffering, and that our life goes much better if that desire is fulfilled.82 An objective
list theory may accept absence of suffering as one of the items that are a direct source of
value to my welfare.83
Buddhist texts also devote considerable energy to analyzing and explaining how
to develop the various virtuous qualities (kuśala dharmas) that are conducive to
liberation. One might use Buddhist language praising these virtues as evidence that
Buddhism accepts an objective list theory, since these seem to be esteemed even if they
do not bring pleasure and are not desired by some individuals. A difficulty with this
interpretation is that it does not rule out the possibility that such items have only
instrumental value, possessing worth only insofar as they contribute to either obtaining
the positive mental state of absence of suffering (mental-state theory), or achieving our
desire to be free of suffering (desire-theory). Like the emphasis on suffering, the
attention Buddhists give to the virtues is compatible with all three theories of well-being
listed above. Pointing out that the Buddhist goal is the attainment of nirvāṇa, the state in
which ignorance and craving are eradicated forever, is no help, for we can then ask
whether this state is valued for its own sake, or because we desire it. We might also
claim with Damien Keown that attainment of nirvāṇa is constituted by intrinsically
valuable virtuous states, thereby pushing us back towards an objective state theory of
welfare.84
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Although it is undeniable that Buddhist texts are committed to removing suffering
and developing virtue, and that they hold this is vital to the welfare of sentient beings,
they do not clearly mark the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. As a
result, they do not mark at the deepest level what it is that makes a person’s life go best:
whether it is to experience a mental state free of pain, or to fulfill one’s desire to be free
from suffering, or to perfect the human virtues, one result of which is freedom from
suffering. It is therefore difficult if not impossible to determine which theory of wellbeing Buddhists would adopt. Nevertheless, the Buddhist analysis of suffering discussed
in the first part of this chapter excludes many of the items usually held to have welfare
value by contemporary versions of these three theories. It therefore functions to narrow
the shape that any theory of wellbeing acceptable to Buddhists can take. Below, I discuss
the forms these three theories might take that would be compatible with Buddhist
commitments.
A mental state theory acceptable to Buddhists will be quite different from
contemporary varieties. Given the drawbacks of the pursuit of pleasure illustrated by the
Buddhist analysis of the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā), the prospects of a
Buddhist hedonism are grim. It is true that, as remarked above, pleasure in itself is not
viewed as harmful when not conjoined with ignorance and craving. Nevertheless, there
are only scant references in Buddhist scriptures to arhats and the Buddha enjoying a kind
of rarified pleasure, usually in deep meditative states, and no indication that this is the
underlying aim of Buddhist practice. Still, a mental state theory that emphasized a mind
free of craving and suffering might be developed into a plausible Buddhist candidate for a
theory of welfare. Such an account would sit well with examples like that of the monk
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Bhaddiya who finally experiences relief from anxiety when he gives up his kingly
possessions. What this means is that, although Buddhists can accept a mental state
theory, the shape it can take is radically constrained by their analysis of suffering. Many
of the pleasures endorsed by hedonisms like Bentham and Mill would be banished from
the Buddhist version, and instead only mental states conjoined with the virtuous qualities,
and lacking the mental afflictions (kleśas) and states of pain (duḥkha) would have
value.85
As far as I know, no one has defended a desire-theory account of Buddhist wellbeing, and at first its prospects might seem particularly dim, especially given the critique
of craving emphasizing the subject-related drawbacks to pleasure in which desire is seen
as an insatiable force. The English word “desire,” however, is ambiguous, and can refer
to a mental state of attached grasping, or to a more neutral state in which one is motivated
to act with no additional implication of greedy attachment to the result. The Sanskrit for
craving, tṛṣṇā, refers to only the first of these motivational states, but Buddhists accept
that even fully liberated beings can have the motivation to act in the second sense. To
borrow Paul William’s example, even the Buddha can be motivated to go on his daily
alms round without implying he has craving for its results (Williams 2000, 44).
Buddhists, therefore, are not barred at the outset from accepting some form of
desire theory, so long as desire is understood to be a karmically neutral pro-attitude rather
than a negative state of clinging. A basic desire-theory in which satisfying whatever
desires one has makes one’s life go better, however, must be rejected by Buddhists. As
we have seen in the discussion of the suffering of change, humans are massively deluded
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about what we think will bring us happiness. The entire point of the extensive Buddhist
critique of pleasure is to convince us of how wrong we are about what will make our
lives go well.
A more sophisticated informed-desire theory, however, is compatible with the
Buddhist analysis of suffering. Here, the Buddhist will claim that many of the goals we
ordinary use to structure our lives are accepted on the false supposition that they will
bring lasting satisfaction. By invoking the information clause of the theory, Buddhists
will claim that only the pro-attitudes of one who deeply understands the various forms of
dissatisfaction accompanying saṁsāric pursuits will be incorporated into the theory as
well-being conducive. Likewise, a Buddhist desire theorist will exclude desires that arise
involuntarily as a result of the series of cognitive mistakes that take place when
impermanent and dependent phenomena are incorrectly experienced as if they were
lasting.86 As with mental-state theory, we find the Buddhist analysis of suffering
radically limiting the shape an acceptable desire-theory may take. As a result of its
strong informational condition, the list of acceptable desires that are well-being
conducive will be constrained, likely containing only commitments to the Buddhist goals
of pursuing arhatship and bodhisattvahood.
The content of objective list theories tends to be similar to those of informed
desire theories, since it is natural to suppose fully informed rational agents would desire
mainly the things that an objective list might posit as possessing objective value. Items
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that frequently appear as candidates for intrinsic value in objective list theories include
pursuit of knowledge, friendship, the raising of a family and the achievement of life
goals. Some of these items are at least somewhat resistant to the Buddhist critique of
pleasure. A career that on the whole promotes the well-being of others, enduring
friendships spanning many years, attention paid to one’s children, all these apparent
goods have resonances with Buddhist virtues, such as compassion (karuṇā), and love
(metta). Moreover, occasional pleasures of Mill’s higher variety, like philosophical
discussion or an evening at the theater, do not in any obvious way incite the pernicious
lust alluded to by Buddhist texts. The Buddhist may respond, of course, that the suffering
of change can be subtle, and can infiltrate even ordinarily wholesome relationships. A
parent often acts with a virtuous motivation, caring only for his child’s benefit, but then
might also become angry when the child fails to obey, or become jealous of another
parent whose child is more successful in school.
Perhaps an even stronger Buddhist critique of mainstream objective list theories
would be to draw upon the analysis of conditioned suffering, in which all such items are
seen as unsatisfactory insofar as they are experienced within impoverished perceptual and
cognitive systems in which negative mental states arise repeatedly and sufferings
constantly reoccur. At this level of analysis, the Buddhist need not convince us that any
single item, such as children or an achievement like the publication of a first book, is of
itself suffering. It is enough that the item links us to a system of suffering which as a
whole ought to be rejected. The fact that my high salary at a stress-filled and unpleasant
job lets me care for my children and support charity is all the worse for me, since it likely
means I will not escape the situation in which I suffer. Likewise, the Buddhist can claim
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that the enjoyment of poetry and the raising of children are unfortunate snares that bind
us to the cycle of rebirth and death.
This in no way entails Buddhists could not accept an objective list theory; as
before, it only restricts the shape such a theory must take. The acceptable contents of
such a theory will be largely limited to kuśala dharma, the Buddhist virtues that are
conducive to liberation of self and others, as well as perhaps mental states that are free
from suffering, or the achievement of the desire to be free of suffering itself.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to forge a connection between Western theories
of welfare and the Buddhist analysis of suffering which provides the ultimate justification
for Buddhist conceptions of valuable lives. The most straightforward defense Buddhists
might make would be to defend a certain theory of welfare which endorses Buddhist
lives, and then to claim that this theory is superior to the theories with which these
Buddhist ideals conflict. I have, however, argued that Buddhist texts do not offer a
theory of welfare, at least in the sense of specifying which items have intrinsic value in
making a life go well. Nevertheless, although multiple theories of welfare are compatible
with early Indian Buddhism, accepting the Buddhist analysis of the three kinds of
suffering severely restricts the shape any of these theories can take. Moreover, this is
enough for the Buddhist to offer a philosophical defense of her conception of what makes
a life go well. The Buddhist can claim that items of supposed value, such as career,
family, acquisition of secular knowledge, and sensual pleasure, the lack of which made
monastic and renunciant lives seem impoverished, are infected with multiple forms of
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suffering and are therefore not themselves worth having. They must be stripped from any
adequate theory of welfare. This lets the Buddhist claim that lives devoted to ending
craving are themselves the best lives there are. Whether they are good because they lead
to mental states free from suffering, the satisfaction of our informed desires or an
intrinsically valuable virtuous character can be left aside as one more speculative
question that is not worth answering.
The relevance of this application of the Buddhist analysis of suffering to
Śāntideva’s claim that the bodhisattva path is not overly demanding will hopefully be
fairly obvious. It initially seems as thought the lives of bodhisattvas are deeply
impoverished, as a result of giving up family ties, career aspirations, sensual pleasures
and so on. However, these items will fall outside, or at least at the periphery of any
theory of well-being acceptable to Buddhists. Therefore, Śāntideva can claim that the
bodhisattva gives up very little in abandoning these pursuits. Furthermore, the Buddhist
analysis of suffering suggests that it will always be in the individual’s interest to commit
to either arhatship or bodhisattvahood, since both of these paths will reduce and finally
eliminate the deeper forms of suffering that arise from the mental afflictions. Therefore,
even taking on the apparently very demanding bodhisattva path is better than remaining
outside Buddhist practice whatsoever.
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Chap 3: Weakness of Will and the Bodhisattva Path
In the last chapter, I argued that the bodhisattva gives up much less than is
initially apparent, since ordinary goals are permeated with subtle forms of suffering and
are not worth pursuit. In the next three chapters, I examine various aspects of the
psychological transformation the bodhisattva undergoes, which help either to outweigh or
to lessen the demandingness of his other-regarding actions. This chapter focuses on the
how the development of Buddhist virtues allows the bodhisattva to overcome a severe
form of weakness of will that prevents him from doing what is intellectually understood
to be in his interest. Both early Buddhist practitioners aiming at individual liberation, and
Mahāyānists undertaking the bodhisattva path will overcome this difficulty as part of
their training, although we will see that bodhisattvas have additional motivational
resources as a result of their aspiration for liberation to benefit sentient beings.
In the first chapter of his text, Śāntideva provides a powerful image to illustrate
how hard it is to even undertake the bodhisattva path.
Just as lightning illuminates the darkness of a cloudy night
for an instant, in the same way, by the power of the Buddha,
occasionally peoples’ minds are momentarily inclined toward
merit. (BCA 1:5)
The reason entering and remaining upon the path is difficult is not merely the
intrinsic hardships of the path itself, but because of deeply engrained habits (anuśayas)
built up over countless lives to react physically and emotionally under the sway of the
mental afflictions (kleśas) of ignorance, attachment and aversion. Therefore, ordinary
persons will be unable to systematically engage in any kind of constructive action.
Śāntideva suggests in this verse that it practically takes an act of divine intervention, here
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represented by the assistance of a Buddha, to move our deluded minds to constructive
activity.
I begin this chapter by contrasting the Buddhist problem of weakness of will with
the Western problem of akrasia, acting intentionally against one’s better judgment. I
argue that Buddhist weakness of will is particularly pernicious, in that it is both a broader
phenomena than akrasia, and is particularly severe, since its origins are rooted deeply in
our cognitive systems. I next explain the basic Buddhist strategy of applying virtuous
antidotes to eliminate the afflictive mental states that cause Buddhist weakness of will. I
then discuss Śāntideva’s strategy of using afflictive emotional energy as the motivational
force to fuel the functioning of these virtuous qualities. I finish by considering how
compassion and the aspiration for full awakening to benefit others acts as a motivational
resource for bodhisattvas that is not available in the same degree to early Buddhist
practitioners.

Buddhist Weakness of Will
In Western thought, the experience of a person freely acting against her better
judgment has been referred to as weakness of will, or akrasia, the term Aristotle used to
characterize the phenomena. The experience in question is familiar to most of us. I
intellectually acknowledge the value of reducing my sugar intake just seconds before
biting into the caramel brownie, and so on. One of Śāntideva’s most explicit
acknowledgements of the Buddhist version of this problem occurs in the fourth chapter of
the BCA. I leave a key term, cetanā, untranslated and will return to it below.
I have somehow obtained the advantageous state that is very difficult to achieve,
and though aware of that, I am led back to those same hells. (BCA 4:26)
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The cetanā in this matter is not mine, as if bewitched by spells. I do not know by
whom I am bewitched or who dwells inside me.87 (BCA 4:27, translation
modified)
These passages are followed by a number of verses describing the cognitive and
emotional defilements (kleśas) of anger, attachment and delusion, the forces that cause
Śāntideva to act against his commitment to the bodhisattva path. The key phrase in the
second verse is his claim that the cetanā does not belong to him. Cetanā has been
variously translated as will, intention, volition, effort, and choice, but there isn’t any
single term that adequately captures its meaning.88 In Buddhist psychology conscious
experience is made up of moments of conscious awareness (citta) and various mental
factors (caitasika) that provide the affective and cognitive content of the conscious
experience. Cetanā is a mental factor held to be present in all conscious experience that
moves itself, conscious awareness (citta) and the other mental factors (caitasika) to the
object being experienced. Object, here, refers to anything that can be the content of
mental awareness.89
For example, when I look at a painting on the wall, the conscious awareness
(citta) is the visual awareness (cakṣur-vijñāna) that apprehends the painting. It is
accompanied with an assortment of mental factors that contribute to my experience of the
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picture, such as the attention (samādhi) needed to focus on the picture, the concept
(saṁjñā) through which I experience it as a picture, my affective reaction (vedanā) of
pleasure or distaste, any emotional response I might have such as a desire (rāga) to
possess it, and so on. Cetanā groups all of these mental factors together so that they can
each play their role in our experience of the picture. It has the same function in instances
of mental awareness. When I remember a past conversation, cetanā moves awareness
(citta) which here takes the form of a mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna) along with
the requisite mental factors to that memory. Cetanā plays this role in any conscious state
whatsoever.
In the second verse quoted above, Śāntideva is complaining that the cetanā that is
impelling his mind and mental factors does not belong to him. In other words, he has
committed intellectually to the bodhisattva path, and identifies this as the entire purpose
of his life. As such, he also commits to a host of supporting practices, such as various
forms of meditation, creating meritorious karma though helpful speech and actions, study
of Buddhist teachings and so forth.
Instead, his mind is constantly driven by anger and attachment to rest upon
harmful objects, such as distasteful features of sentient beings that arouse anger,
diversions that distract him from spiritual practice and so on. Alternately, the object itself
may be neutral, as in the case of thinking of a friend, but cetanā might move afflictive
mental states to the object, such as jealousy when I am envious of my friend’s success.
The problem resembles akrasia, since Śāntideva intellectually recognizes that he is
behaving in ways that harm his purpose in life. There is a stronger and weaker reading of
this verse, both of which I think are appropriate here. In the stronger, he finds himself
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fixated on these objects literally against his deliberate control. In the weaker reading,
Śāntideva allows his mind to be influenced by the afflictive mental states, even though it
is within his power to resist their sway.
“Cetanā,” the word referring to the key mental state in Buddhist weakness of will,
has a broader semantic range than the terms generally used to translate it into English,
such as “will,” “intention,” “volition” and “choice.” These English terms most naturally
refer to deliberate action, and choice in particular suggests that rational deliberation
preceded the action in question. Cetanā does accompany rational and deliberate action,
but since it is a required element of any conscious experience, it also functions in habitual
action, as well as mental experience not under a person’s direct control.90 This means
that the range of experience referred to by Śāntideva in these verses is much broader than
akratic action as traditionally understood. When I habitually obsess over the brownie,
for instance, this is an example of Buddhist weakness of will, even if I have limited
conscious control over the trajectory my thoughts take.
Although contemporary discussions of akrasia usually focus on akratic action,
Amélie Rorty, in her influential article “Where does the akratic break take place?”
broadens the discussion to illustrate how akratic response can take place at multiple
psychological levels. Like the Buddhist, Rorty is concerned with unskillful mental
reactions, even in cases when these reactions may not result in a physical action against
our better judgment. As a way of broadening our understanding of the forms Buddhist
weakness of will can take, below I survey relevant varieties of akratic reaction identified
by Rorty. In order to suggest these breaks were of concern to Śāntideva also, and to give
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I am indebted to Meyer’s (2011) for this point. I follow her in holding that conscious deliberation and
choice cannot be essential to the meaning of the term, since cetanā accompanies all conscious states. See
especially Meyers 2011, chap 4.
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an initial indication of his strategy in responding, I offer citations from his text in which
he appears to confront the akratic break in question. I offer a more detailed account of
his solution to weakness of will in a later section.
1) Akrasia of Direction or Aim. Rorty characterizes akrasia of aim as a break between
general beliefs about what is good and the commitment to guide one’s actions by these
evaluations (Rorty 1980a, 335). I might, for instance, acknowledge that eating animals is
needless and cruel, but refrain from becoming a vegetarian. For the Buddhist, akrasia of
aim occurs when there is acknowledgement of the Four Noble Truths, but no
commitment to practice Buddhism. It might also involve acknowledgment of the greater
value of the bodhisattva path, while maintaining an aspiration for individual liberation.
For the Buddhist, this occurs because, under the influence of mental afflictions like greed
(rāga) and hatred (dveṣa), the cetanā does not move a mental consciousness (manovijñāna) and associated mental states (cetasika) to the mental representation of a
particular Buddhist goal that has been intellectually acknowledged as what should be
done.
In the BCA, Śāntideva formally commits to the bodhisattva path in the third
chapter. If he were to offer a solution for akrasia of aim, we would expect it to come
before this point. In fact, Śāntideva offers two motivations to undertake the bodhisattva
path. In the first chapter, he praises the nobility of the bodhisattva path, suggesting the
bodhisattvas are great men (BCA 1:30) worthy of veneration by gods and humans (BCA
1:9). In the second, he reminds us of the horrible suffering that awaits us if we do not
commit to Buddhist teachings. Below are two sample verses from an extended section
detailing the trauma of death.
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One completely languishes while being led today to have the limbs of one’s body
amputated. Parched with Thirst and with pitiable eyes, one sees the world
differently. (BCA 2:43)
How much more is one overpowered by the horrifying appearances of the
messengers of Death as one is consumed by the fever of terror and smeared with a
mass of excrement? (BCA 2:44)
Śāntideva is aware that we have deeply engrained psychological blocks that
prevent our experiencing the terror of our awaiting death. For this reason, he offers us
the image of amputation as a contrast. The image of having a leg or arm cut off as
punishment for a crime or as treatment for an infection creates a visceral reaction.
Reading the lines or hearing the words forces us to imagine the event, and we have a
sense of the terrible suffering of fear and pain that accompany the event. Śāntideva can
then point out that the suffering of death will be much greater than this, since not just a
limb but one’s entire body, as well as friends and possessions, will be lost. We should
note in the second line the language Śāntideva uses to help us feel some sense of the
terrible pain resulting from the separation from everything at the time of death. One
suffers from the fever of terror (jvara-mahātrāsa) which is so great that one literally
defecates in petrifaction! This will motivate us to take up the bodhisattva path that
intellectually we have already judged to be best.
2) Akrasia of Interpretation. According to Rorty, in akratic interpretation one interprets
a particular situation in a way that conflicts with the principles one has adopted (Rorty
1980a, 338). Below, I consider three subspecies of akratic interpretation identified by
Rorty that are relevant to Śāntideva’s text.
As will become clear, these kinds of akratic interpretation are closely related, and
therefore Śāntideva’s treatments of each will largely overlap. Below, I refer to passages
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that seem particularly appropriate to the akratic break in question, but all these passages,
I think, would have some beneficial impact on treating other forms of akratic
interpretation.
2a) Akrasia of Perception: Akrasia of perception occurs when I interpret and categorize
what I perceive in a way that conflicts with my principles (Rorty 1980a, 338). For
instance, even though I am committed to disabled rights, I might interpret a person using
a wheelchair as weak. Rorty gives voluntary shifting between aspects of a gestalt, like
the painting of two women or a vase, as evidence that we have some control over
perceptual interpretation (Rorty 1980a, 338). For Rorty, to the extent that they are
voluntary, perceptual interpretations and categorization can be akratic. As I suggested
above, Buddhist weakness of will is a broader phenomena, and will also be concerned
with involuntary perceptual reactions against what one intellectually judges to be best.
One purpose of Buddhist meditation is to bring these involuntary reactions under our
conscious control.
For a Buddhist monk, viewing a woman’s body as beautiful would conflict with
his commitment to reducing lust. Śāntideva’s solution to this case of akratic perception
is to use descriptions calling to mind repulsive images to counteract such habitual
interpretations.
You fear a skeleton that has been seen like this, even though
it does not move. Why do you not fear it when it moves as if
set in motion by some ghost? (BCA 8:48)
If you have no passion for the impure, why do you embrace
someone else, who is a skeleton of bones tied by sinews and
smeared with a mire of flesh? (BCA 8:52)
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A monk struggling with sexual impulse should view the woman to whom he is
attracted as an animated skeleton draped by a flesh covering. The imaginative
reinterpretation counteracts the monk’s usual perception of the woman’s body as
beautiful, allowing for it to be seen as repulsive and fearful instead.
2b)Verbal Characterization. In verbal akrasia, we characterize situations in ways that
conflict with our principles and considered judgments. Rorty gives the example of a
person committed to nonsexist attitudes characterizing an assertive woman’s behavior as
“unreasonable” and “demanding,” while calling similar behavior in a man “selfrespecting” (Rorty 1980a, 339).
Although we can distinguish akrasia of verbal characterization from perceptual
akrasia, it is closely related, since we ordinarily verbally characterize a situation based
upon our perceptual interpretation of it. Not surprisingly then, Śāntideva’s strategy for
dealing with such cases will overlap. His strategy here will be to use provocative
language that interferes with our habitual characterizations. A female body, usually
characterized as “beautiful”, for instance, is referred to as “being smeared with flesh”
(BCA 8:52), “a sack of muck” (BCA 8:53), and “composed of filth” (BCA 8:56), as a
means of helping the monk avert his lust.
A startling feature of Śāntideva’s text is his employment of grim humor in his
recharacterization of what we usually take to be beautiful.
Either you have seen that bashfully lowered face before as
being lifted up with effort, or you have not seen it as it was
covered by a veil. (BCA 8:44)
Now, that face is revealed by vultures as if they are unable to
bear your anxiousness. Look at it! Why are you fleeing away
now? (BCA 8:45)
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Śāntideva taunts his reader (and perhaps himself), pointing out that since the lover
longed for and fantasized about the face of the beloved when it was covered by a veil, he
should be delighted now that the vultures of the charnel ground have removed the flesh
and laid open the face. The characterizations, disturbing and playful at the same time,
sharply contrast with the usual romantic characterizations of the woman’s body.
2c) Emotional Reactions: Rorty suggests that emotional reactions can be akratic when
they conflict with the person’s judgment of the situation (Rorty 1980a, 340). We might,
for instance, judge that a colleague deserved a promotion more than we did, but still feel
jealous towards him. As I will discuss below, Buddhists believe that over time habitual
tendencies (anuśayas) to experience negative mental states increase, entailing particularly
strong harmful emotional responses. It is not surprising, then, that Śāntideva spends
much of the text offering techniques to influence them. For instance, remembering that
one has vowed to help others achieve the supreme welfare of awakening will dissolve
jealousy arising as a result of their material prosperity (BCA 6:83), and remembering the
sufferings that await one in hell as a karmic result of anger acts as an antidote to this
affliction (BCA 6:89).
Śāntideva’s systematic treatment of emotional akrasia is to develop virtuous
qualities like patience and generosity that act as antidotes to these emotional responses, a
strategy that incorporates the types of description and images that I have commented on
in this section. I consider this strategy in a later section.
3. Akrasia of Character: This is the variety of akrasia that has attracted the most
philosophical attention, in which one acts against one’s better judgment (Rorty 1980a,
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343). Śāntideva, however, gives relatively little attention to physical behavior in his text.
His emphasis is on perfecting one’s character by developing the virtues of the
bodhisattva. Once the akratic breaks identified in this section are resolved by these
virtuous dispositions, then akratic action will cease with little further effort.

The Strength of Buddhist Weakness of Will
In the last section, I argued that the Buddhist version of weakness of will is
broader than the traditional problem of akrasia, in that it includes non-deliberative action
as well as mental states not ordinarily under conscious control. Drawing upon Rorty’s
article, I suggested that the concerns of Buddhists like Śāntideva extend to our
commitment to inappropriate goals, harmful perceptual categorization, negative
emotional response and unwise verbal characterization. In this section, I turn to the depth
of the problem of Buddhist weakness of will, and explore two interrelated reasons why it
requires immense effort to overcome.
The first of these difficulties is a version of a cause of akratic action Amélie
Rorty identifies in her article “Akrasia and Conflict.” According to Rorty, the akratic
course of action is often the one we habitually take, and as a result requires no extra
motivation to pursue. If the course we judge to be better departs from habitual action, we
will likely need additional motivation to pursue it, and this may result in performing the
habitual but akratic action instead (Rorty 1980b, 210).
Buddhism accepts a particular strong case of this akratic motivational drift, since
Buddhist psychology holds that one of the effects of acting and feeling is the
strengthening of a habitual tendency (anuśaya) to feel an emotion or perform an action in
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the future. Feeling angry, even when I do not act on it, is dangerous in part because it
strengthens my propensity to feel anger in the future. These habitual tendencies
(anuśayas) are the dormant forms of the defilements (kleśas), and Buddhists hold that
they travel with the mental stream when it takes rebirth. This means that these
propensities increase over countless lifetimes, resulting in a severe inclination to respond
in adverse ways in the future. Moreover, the strengthening of these habitual tendencies
will result in increased akratic drift towards every one of the kinds of weakness of will
explained in the prior section. Because of the strengthening of the habit of attachment,
for instance, I will be likely to commit to harmful goals like saṃsāric success, and I will
perceive phenomena in harmful ways such as viewing a woman as sexually attractive and
so forth.
In addition to habitual tendencies, Buddhist psychology also posits a series of
cognitive mistakes that take place in the structuring of conscious awareness which
provide a second related explanation for Buddhist weakness of will. This process is
called prapañca, or conceptual proliferation, in which the bare data that is processed by
the senses and the various factors of consciousness is reified into the dual constructions
of self and objects, both understood as enduring entities existing independently of each
other.91 What a person really experiences is a stream of dependently arisen sensory
events, but in proliferation the stream is divided into subject and object poles, with the
subjective side erroneously believed to be an enduring self (ātman), and the object side
unified and reified into distinct enduring and independent objects. Subprocesses involved
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I draw upon Hamilton 2001, especially pps. 55-60 in my interpretation of prapañca. See also Waldron
2003, chapter 1. This is the same series of cognitive mistakes that I alluded to in chapter two as causing the
two deeper forms of suffering (pps. 66-69) In this chapter, I am interested in the role these they play in
giving rise to craving and the other mental afflictions.
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in conceptual proliferation include the processes of I-making (ahaṃkāra) and minemaking (mamakāra), resulting in the belief in a lasting subject who may possess and
interact with a world of independent objects. What follows is the superimposition of
unrealistic expectations on these mentally fabricated objects. In reality (yathābhūtam)
what exists lacks independence (anātman), is impermanent (ānityam), and is incapable of
providing lasting satisfaction (duḥkha), but I perceive these things as if they were
independent and enduring objects that are capable of satisfying me. As a result, I suffer.
Conceptual proliferation means that in Buddhist psychology we must distinguish
two levels of cognitive error: a deep level in which the stream of experiences are
interpreted as enduring subjects and objects, and a surface level of ordinary perceptual
mistakes that are at least partially within conscious control of ordinary persons.92
Interpreting a stream of interconnected moments of matter and consciousness as a woman
is an example of the first, deeper level, while interpreting this woman as capable of
providing lasting pleasure is an example of the second. Buddhists would claim that
conceptual proliferation results in a particularly pernicious form of what Rorty calls
perceptual akrasia, in which momentary and dependent phenomena are experienced as if
they were enduring and independent. Further, conceptual proliferation and its processes
of I-making and mine-making are themselves types of the habitual tendencies (anuśayas)
just discussed. At this deep psychological level, my reification of experience into subject
and object poles will itself strengthen my propensity to reify experience this way in the
future.

92

These two levels correspond to the two levels of unsatisfactoriness associated with pleasure that I discuss
in the second chapter as the object and subject related drawbacks of pleasure.
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Much of the attention in the Western philosophical tradition on weakness of will
has focused upon the question of how it is possible to intentionally act against what one
recognizes to be the better course of action. For Buddhists, the process of conceptual
proliferation explains why this takes place. Buddhist texts indicate that cetanā, which
moves mind and its mental factors, can arise from perceptual and affective experience
(saṃjñā and vedanā) prior to reflective thought (vitarka) (Heim 2003, 532-535). This
perceptual and affective experience, when entangled with active processes of conceptual
proliferation, results in craving and the other defilements. Therefore, prior to reflective
thought (vitarka), I am already motivated to react aversely in the situation in question. I
may intellectually believe the brownie to be harmful, but an intention to grasp it will have
already arisen from these deep psychological processes.93
Combining these accounts of conceptual proliferation and the underlying habitual
tendencies lets us reconstruct the vicious feedback loop that constitutes saṃsāric
experience and accounts for the deep forms of weakness of will with which Śāntideva
must contend.94 In conceptual proliferation, I misinterpret the interdependent and
impermanent stream of experience as an enduring subject standing apart from
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I believe that my account of conceptual proliferation as an explanation for Buddhist akrasia is for the
most part in accord with that given by Tillemans 2008. Tillemans draws on Dharmakīrti’s explanation of
defiled intelligence (klistā-prajñā) which reifies the self and causes the defilements of anger and
attachment. He suggests Buddhist akrasia can be understood on a compartmentalization model, in which
practitioners may acknowledge the dangers of samsāra and the value of Buddhist practice, while their
defiled intelligence makes the opposite assessment, leading to akratic pull. See Tillemans 2008, 158-160.
What I want to emphasize, in partial contrast to Tillemans, is that the functioning of this afflicted
intelligence (which I have discussed as prapañca) generally occurs at a more basic level of consciousness
than ordinary reflective intelligence, leading to the very strong form of akratic response with which
Śāntideva must content. Tillemans does note the role of subconscious or semi-conscious processes in the
conclusion to his article, and insightfully points out that akrasia can be a mark of spiritual achievement for
the Buddhist, since it indicates the practitioner has attained at least the possibility of intentionally
intervening in his habitual harmful patterns of thought and action. See Tillemans 2008, 161-2. See Hayes
1996 for another explanation of acting against one’s acknowledged best interests as a result of
compartmentalization.
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Waldron (chap 1) describes the processes constituting samsāric perception as a feedback loop.
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independent objects. Adverse emotional reactions arise as a result of these cognitive
errors, and I engage in harmful physical behavior. Each of these processes reinforces the
habitual tendency (anuśaya) to engage in this error in future experience. Higher level
reflective thought, even if it is directed towards virtuous action, may not be strong
enough to intervene in the process.

Weakness of Will and the Bodhisattva’s Virtuous Qualities
Above we saw that the Buddhist version of weakness of will arises when the
cetanā which moves conscious awareness and its accompanying mental factors falls
under the influence of afflictive mental states such as greed and anger. Śāntideva’s
solution to the problem is to develop the virtuous qualities (kuśala-dharmas) to act as
antidotes to the afflictions. This results in conscious experience in which cetanā moves
awareness and accompanying mental factors to virtuous or at least neutral objects, instead
of harmful ones.
Śāntideva organizes his text according to the Mahāyāna classificatory scheme of
the six perfections (pāramitās), the virtuous qualities (kuśala-dharmas) of generosity
(dāna), ethical discipline (śīla), patience (kṣānti) energetic perseverance (vīrya),
concentration (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā).95 One of the vital functions of these
virtuous qualities is to act as an antidote to one or more of the afflictions. Generosity and
patience are said respectively to be the antidote to attachment and anger. Although it
does not have its own chapter, generosity is a frequent theme throughout the text; in the
fifth chapter, for instance, it is defined as the mental state that arises when one adopts the
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I examine these virtues in more detail in the following chapter, but here limit my consideration to the role
they play in dissolving Buddhist weakness of will.
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intention to give all possession and karmic benefits away (BCA 5:10). Patience receives
an entire chapter consisting largely of techniques to dissolve anger, such as the following:
If there is a remedy, then what is the use of frustration?
If there is no remedy, then what is the use of frustration? (BCA 6:10)
The verse encourages us to remember that anger, and any other negative mental
state, is always an additional and needless suffering on top of whatever difficulty one
faces.
Śāntideva, as a Madhyamaka, takes wisdom to refer to the realization of the
emptiness of all phenomena. It acts as antidote to the defilement of ignorance, and when
realized at the deepest level it stills the conceptual proliferation (prapañca) which is the
deepest form of ignorance, and from which all the other defilements arise. Śāntideva also
applies wisdom as an antidote in dissolving various emotional afflictions including anger,
attachment, and fear. Many of these occur in the ninth chapter, which is dedicated to its
development, but Śāntideva resorts to this strategy frequently throughout the text. The
following example comes from the fourth chapter.
Mental afflictions do not exist in sense
objects, nor in the sense faculties, nor in the
space between, nor anywhere else. Then
where do they exist and agitate the whole
world? This is an illusion only. Liberate
your fearing heart and cultivate perseverance
for the sake of wisdom. Why would
you torture yourself in hells for no reason? (BCA 4:47)
In this passage, Śāntideva deploys one of the stock arguments for the emptiness of
phenomena to the defilements (kleśas). He points out that if a defilement, like anger for
instance, existed intrinsically, as a real thing independent of our conventions, then we
should be able to mentally locate it. As an example, consider feeling angry with a person
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who cuts us off on the freeway. Careful examination of our mind will reveal only a
continuous stream of mental moments, some of which have an energetic and tight feeling,
but none of which are individually accurately described as the anger we feel. But of
course our anger does not exist in the other person either, nor in the space between us and
them. The conclusion is that anger is a conceptual imputation we place on a series of
moments of mind arising in quick succession. Careful meditation on this fact will
dissolve the anger we feel towards the other person, and similar techniques can be used to
dispel the other defilements.
The fifth chapter of the BCA, which as I explained in the introduction serves as
Śāntideva’s chapter on ethical discipline (śīla), focuses on two supporting conditions that
allow the effective application of the various techniques that redirect or dissolve the
defilements. These are mindfulness (smṛti), an overall awareness of what is occurring in
the body and mind, and introspection (saṃprajanya). Introspection, Śāntideva says,
arises once mindfulness is present (BCA 5:33) and is defined as “the repeated
examination of the state of one’s body and mind” (BCA 5:108).

Introspection allows

one to apply whatever antidote is needed when the mind is contaminated by one of the
defilements (BCA 5: 54). In this chapter, Śāntideva gives examples of how one can
intervene to combat attachment and repulsion (BCA 5:48), pride, arrogance and deceit
(BCA 5:49), the inclination to abuse others (BCA 5:50) and so on.
If one’s mindfulness and introspection are perfected, one will continuously apply
the needed antidote whenever a defilement begins to arise, and therefore successfully
eliminate all but perhaps the most deeply engrained instances of Buddhist weakness of
will. The difficulty is that for all but the most advanced practitioners, both mindfulness
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and introspection require great effort to consistently apply. As in the case of akratic
action, the practitioner will be susceptible to falling into habitual patterns of mental
activity, in which mindfulness and introspection are absent. Obviously, positing a second
order level of mindfulness and introspection would only lead to a regress as well as
mental exhaustion. Further, sustaining mindfulness and introspection may themselves be
hindered by a form of perceptual akrasia. The practitioner might interpret their present
mental state as having the required level of mindfulness and introspection, and thereby
convince themselves that no further effort is needed, while in fact their mind is dull and
subject to the arising of the defilements.
What is needed, then, is a source of motivational energy to enable the practitioner
to continually apply mindfulness and introspection. One obvious source of motivational
energy is the root bodhisattva virtue of bodhicitta itself. For most beginning
bodhisattvas, however, compassion for others will not have developed sufficiently to
provide the needed amount of motivational energy. Śāntideva’s solution is to employ
another of the six perfections, energetic effort (vīrya), which he defines as “enthusiasm
for virtue.” It is said to be the antidote to sloth, clinging to the reprehensible, apathy and
self-contempt (BCA 7:2).
It is, however, of little help to merely tell a practitioner to develop his effort, and
Śāntideva’s solution here is to again employ repulsive imagery reminding us of the
saṃsāric horrors to come. Chapter seven which is devoted to the development of effort
contains some of Śāntideva’s most graphic descriptions of the sufferings that accompany
death and rebirth.
Scented out by the hunters, the mental afflictions, you have
entered the snare of rebirth. Why do you not recognize even
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now that you are in the mouth of death? (BCA 7:4)
You do not see that those of your own kind are gradually
being killed. You even fall asleep like a buffalo among
butchers. (BCA 7:5)
When Yama watches you and your path is blocked on all
sides, how can you enjoy eating, and how can you sleep and
have sexual intercourse? (BCA 7:6)
Realizing "I am like a live fish," your fear is appropriate
now. How much more when you have committed vices and
face the intense suffering of hell? (BCA 7:11)
So, delicate one, you burn even when touched by hot water.
Upon performing deeds leading to hell, how will you remain
at ease? (BCA 7:12)
The actual energy of effort, for most of this seventh chapter, comes from
contemplating the suffering one will endure at the time of death and beyond if one does
not progress quickly on the Buddhist path. Similarly, one is encouraged to maintain
mindfulness (BCA 5:29), keep one’s bodhisattva vow (BCA 4:4-4:12), and devote one’s
present rebirth to Buddhist practice (BCA 4:23) all by imagining the terrors that await
one in hell if Buddhist practice is not successful.
Śāntideva’s use of Defiled Energy
In this chapter, I have argued that Buddhists like Śāntideva face a particularly
broad and deep form of weakness of will. Unlike the usual understanding of its Western
counterpart, Buddhist weakness of will takes place not just at the level of action, but also
perceptual interpretation, emotional response, commitment to goals and verbal
characterization. Moreover, weakness of will, in the expanded sense that Buddhists
contend with it, is a particularly difficult problem, both because of the ever-strengthening
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force of the habitual tendencies towards unskillful action, and because of a series of
embedded cognitive mistakes that result in habitual unskillful perceptual classification at
the deepest level of cognitive experience. In the last section, I explored how the various
virtuous qualities of the bodhisattva act as antidote to weakness of will, but require
motivational energy to function. I ended the section by considering Śāntideva’s use of
our fear of negative rebirth to provide this energy. In this section, I consider in more
depth Śāntideva’s use of the afflictive mental states to provide motivational energy
needed to engage and progress along the bodhisattva path.96
The ultimate motivational source for the bodhisattva will be bodhicitta, the mind
aspiring towards awakening for the sake of all sentient beings. Although Śāntideva offers
praises of bodhicitta in the first few chapters, it is not till halfway through the eight
chapter that he offers actual meditations designed to develop compassion for others.97
One can surmise that compassion is not tapped as a motivational resource until late in the
text because developing a sufficiently strong sense of concern for others requires
weakening one’s sense of self, and the corresponding attachment to one’s own welfare.
This will require progressing some way down the bodhisattva path, and of course the
bodhisattva will require sufficient motivation to get to this point. Resorting to the energy
arising from the defilements acts as a stopgap measure in the meantime.
Perhaps the most obvious appeal to the energy arising from aversion comes from
directing anger towards the defilements, which would include of course anger itself.
I shall be tenacious in this matter; and fixed
on revenge, I shall wage war, except
96

On the use of energy arising from the afflictions, see also Jenkins 1999, 45-6.
These begin at BCA 8:89, and continue for much of the remainder of the chapter. In the early chapters,
bodhicitta is also praised, but the motivation to develop it tends to focus on bodhicitta’s benefits for
oneself, rather than compassion for others.
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against those mental afflictions that are related
to the elimination of mental afflictions. (BCA 4:43)
The energy anger provides is afflictive, in that it arises out of deeply engrained
ignorance. We have some control over emotional responses like that of anger, and the
BCA seeks to extend this level of control. To this end, Śāntideva often provides
techniques meant to dissolve these negative responses, such as the verse reminding us
that anger never serves any purpose. For all but highly advanced Buddhist practitioners,
however, there is a limit to our control over emotional response. In such cases,
Śāntideva’s strategy will often be to redirect this energy towards aims of the Buddhist
path. It would be better to avoid anger altogether, but until this is possible it is best to
redirect its energy towards liberative purposes.
By far, the most common use of negative energy in the BCA is that of fear,
especially the terror that grips us when we contemplate death. We have seen a number of
examples of this already, in the passages I quoted to illustrate Śāntideva’s response to
perceptual akrasia, and in his fueling of the virtuous quality of energetic effort (vīrya).
Since the fear of death arises because we are averse to the loss of vitality, possessions and
companions that occurs at that time, it can be classified as one of the afflictions that arise
from the defilement of aversion.98
Śāntideva’s use of our fear of death illustrates particularly well his strategy of
turning defiled energy back upon the delusion that is its source, since for the Buddhist the
fear of death itself arises in dependence upon the delusion of permanence. The point is
made well in the following passage from Buddhagoṣa’s Visuddhimagga:
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Ultimately, fear arises from ignorance that believes the self to endure, a point made by Śāntideva in the
ninth chapter (BCA 9:56).
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[The deluded person] is confused about death, instead of taking death thus, ‘Death
in every case is break-up of aggregates’, he figures that it is a [lasting] being that
dies, that it is a [lasting] being’s transmigration to another incarnation, and so on.
(Buddhagoṣa 1991, 555)
The passage illustrates that there are in fact two types of death referenced in
Buddhist texts. The first is momentariness, the continual breaking up all physical and
mental phenomena upon their very arising. The second is the death of the conventional
person, what we ordinarily refer to as “death.” Recall that for Buddhists, persons are
actually streams (santāna) of closely connected momentary mental and physical
processes. Such a stream is labeled a person merely for convenience, but because of
ignorance (avidyā) we mistake this stream to be an enduring entity. As a result of this
cognitive mistake, we falsely believe that this enduring entity perishes upon death, and
fear of this event arises.
In reality, then, the perishing of the physical being is no different in kind from any
other moment of the causal stream, in which every item associated with the
conventionally labeled person arises and dissolves. Because of our ignorance, however,
we mistakenly attribute an underlying unity to this constant series of momentary deaths.99
As a result of the reification of the moments of the stream into an enduring entity, the
event in which the final moments associated with the stream dissolve is also reified into
the death of an enduring entity. The fear of death, itself, is predicated upon this cognitive
mistake.
The insight that Śāntideva manipulates to such devastating effect in the BCA is
that these pockets of defiled energy, themselves predicated upon cognitive mistakes, can
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be redeployed against that very source of the cognitive error. Śāntideva spurs deluded
beings into greater heights of imaginary terrors for the sake of salvation. The strategy is
particularly apparent with death, but actually all defiled energy arises because of
cognitive error. It is because we see beings as enduring entities, for instance, that anger
can arise towards them.
The use of energy arising from attachment is less pronounced in the BCA. In one
verse Śāntideva talks about desiring (tṛṣṇā) to benefit others (BCA 8:109). But this
strategy is most obvious in the first chapter, where somewhat surprisingly Śāntideva
extols the root bodhisattva virtue of bodhicitta, the mind that strives towards awakening
for the sake of all beings, by listing its many benefits for the bodhisattva himself. He
states that we should achieve bodhicitta because it quickens our own path to liberation by
purifying vices (BCA 1:13-14), increases our supply of karmic merit (BCA 1:17-22), and
leads to our being esteemed by gods and humans (BCA 1:9).100 Again, we can see the
same strategy at work that Śāntideva used with regard to anger and suffering above.
Toward the end of the bodhisattva path one’s compassion towards others will be all the
motivation one needs, but while the defilement of attachment remains strong, it is likely
to outweigh what little pull our concern for others has. Therefore, it is attachment to
one’s own welfare itself that must be channeled into the aspiration to attain full
buddhahood for the benefit of all.
As for ignorance, since it is the root of both attachment and aversion, Śāntideva’s
use of the other defilements implicitly depends on the manipulation of ignorance as well.
There are also places in the text where Śāntideva uses false conceptualization directly as
an aid. Above I considered a passage from the eighth chapter in which Śāntideva asks us
100
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to view a woman as a walking skeleton to avert lust. The passage reveals that much of
Śāntideva’s text is not attempting to stimulate accurate perception, but is rather trading
off a pernicious cognitive error for a useful one. The stream of mental and physical parts
we identify as a woman is no more a walking skeleton than it is a thing of beauty;
considering it as inherently one is as much an error as the other. Viewing the body as a
skeleton, however, counteracts our habitual tendencies of lust, and for this reason
Śāntideva suggests that we do this when necessary.
Perhaps the most intriguing use of ignorance as an aid to development on the
bodhisattva path is the series of verses in the eight chapter explaining what Śāntideva
refers to as the great mystery of exchanging oneself with others. In these series of
meditations, the practitioner imaginatively takes up the identity of another person who is
either inferior, equal, or superior to himself, and then from their vantage point
contemplates himself. A fascinating aspect of this meditation is that Śāntideva
encourages the meditator, while contemplating himself from the other person’s
standpoint, to develop negative emotional responses, such as envy and pride, towards
himself.
Placing your own identity in inferior ones
and placing the identity of others in your
own self, cultivate envy and pride with the
mind free of discursive thoughts. (BCA 8:140)
He is respected, not I. I am not wealthy as he is. He is
praised, while I am despised. I am unhappy, while he is
happy. (BCA 8: 141)
The second quoted verse illustrates the thoughts of the meditator, who has taken
up the identity of an inferior person, and from their vantage point experiences envy
towards what are now viewed as his own superior qualities. The point of the meditation
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is to help the meditator to gain empathy for the inferior person through understanding the
pain they feel in relation to him. Similar meditations awaken empathetic understanding
with one who is our equal, or superior to us. In these meditations, the practitioner uses his
habitual tendency to reify momentary mental and physical events into an enduring person
creatively, applying this reification and identification to the imagined mental stream of
another person. The identification is so strong that if it is successful even the negative
defilements habitually accompanying reification of self will occur in our imaginative
identification as the other person.
These meditations on exchanging self with others are located late in the eight
chapter, where Śāntideva finally turns his focus to developing great compassion for
others as a way of fueling progress on the remainder of the bodhisattva path.
Fascinatingly, even at this late stage Śāntideva uses energy arising from the defilements,
here ignorance and the pride and envy that arise from it, to fuel the development of
compassion.

Bodhicitta as motivation
It is remarkable that a text like the BCA, which characterizes itself as a manual
for the development of the virtuous qualities of the bodhisattva, places so much of its
emphasis on the manipulation of various forms of negative energy arising from delusion.
Nevertheless, Śāntideva’s commitment to the goal of complete emotional transformation
in which concern for others saturates our mental continuum is never in doubt. He
expresses these aspirations most forcefully in chapter three, when bodhicitta is adopted,
and chapter ten where he dedicates his efforts to others.
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May I be a protector for those who are without protectors, a
guide for travelers, and a boat, a bridge, and a ship for those
who wish to cross over. (BCA 3:17)
May I be a lamp for those who seek light, a bed for those
who seek rest, and may I be a servant for all beings who
desire a servant. (BCA 3:18)
To all sentient beings may I be a wish-fulfilling gem, a vase
of good fortune, an efficacious mantra, a great medication, a
wish-fulfilling tree, and a wish-granting cow. (BCA 3:19)
Through my merit, may all those in all directions who are afflicted
by bodily and mental sufferings obtain oceans of joy
and contentment. (BCA 10:2)
As long as the cycle of existence lasts, may their happiness
never decline. May the world attain the constant joy of the
Bodhisattvas. (BCA 10:3)
For as long as space endures and for as long
as the world lasts, may I live dispelling the
miseries of the world. (BCA 10: 55)
Ultimately, as the strength of the defilements are reduced, the bodhisattva will use
the energy of bodhicitta itself, the motivation to attain full awakening for the benefit of
all sentient beings, as a resource to provide energy (vīrya) and disentangle cetanā from
influence by the afflictive mental states. This resource is unavailable to the early
Buddhist practitioner who has not committed to the bodhisattva path, and therefore this in
itself provides a deep benefit of following the way of the bodhisattva. In addition, love
(maitrī) is one of the antidotes for anger, and therefore since the bodhisattva’s love for
sentient beings is greater than the early Buddhist, control over the afflictive mental state
of anger will be much easier for him to develop.101
Śāntideva’s greater emphasis on the energy arising from afflictive emotions,
rather than these motivational sources that are more closely linked to the bodhisattva’s
101
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commitment to others’ welfare, is at first puzzling. It can be understood, however, as his
acknowledgement of the particularly strong varieties of weakness of will that I have
explicated above as resulting from habitual tendencies (anuśaya) and conceptual
proliferation (prapañca). Cetanā, at the beginning of the path, is simply too depraved,
buffeted to and fro by festering mental afflictions, to assemble for any length of time a
collection of virtuous mental states able to motivate progression along the path. Since
defiled energy is mainly what he has to work with, it is what Śāntideva employs.

Conclusion:
In the previous chapter, I argued that the bodhisattva gives up far less than it
initially appears in leaving behind saṁsāric pursuits, since all such pleasures are afflicted
with subtle forms of suffering. Therefore, entering the Buddhist path aiming at either
individual liberation or bodhisattvahood will always be in the benefit of the individual, in
comparison to the alternative of remaining in saṁsāra. In this chapter, I have argued that
one of the deep benefits accruing to the bodhisattva is overcoming particularly deep
forms of weakness of will that prevents aspirants from deeply engaging in Buddhist
practices. I explained how Śāntideva overcomes this difficulty by developing virtuous
qualities to act as antidotes to the afflictive mental states that cause weakness of will. I
then explored Śāntideva’s use of afflictive mental energy arising from the defilements
themselves as a motivational resource to fuel effort (virya) and overcome weakness of
will.
One of the beneficial results of his practice, therefore, is that the psychology of
the bodhisattva is altered so that his awareness and mental states are moved by cetanā to
only beneficial objects. The practice of cultivating virtuous qualities as antidotes to
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afflictive emotions is shared by early Buddhist practitioners and bodhisattvas, and
therefore the benefit of overcoming weakness of will is shared as well. We have also
seen, however, that Śāntideva is able to appeal to our great compassion for suffering
sentient beings as an additional motivation to transform our mind, a strategy which will
have far more resonance for the Mahāyānist traveling the bodhisattva path than the early
Buddhist disciple.
In the next chapter, I consider in more detail the function of the virtuous qualities
emphasized by Śāntideva, with particular attention to their role in lessening the suffering
the bodhisattva experiences when he makes apparent sacrifices for sentient beings.

122

Chapter 4: The Virtues of the Bodhisattva
In the last chapter, I explored one aspect of the virtuous qualities of bodhisattvas:
their ability to control the particularly severe form of weakness of will posited by
Buddhists. In this chapter I continue to explore their potential benefits for the
bodhisattva. For the Buddhist, these virtuous mental states (kuśala dharmas) are the
qualities that eliminate the suffering of oneself and others. Most of the virtues are held in
common by both early Buddhist and Mahāyāna traditions, although the bodhisattva
places greater emphasis on other-regarding virtues like compassion (karuṇā) and
generosity (dāna), and incorporates the root bodhisattva virtue of bodhicitta, the mind
dedicated to attaining full awakening for the benefit of sentient beings. For early
Buddhism, the relationship between the development of the virtues and one’s own wellbeing is straightforward: it is replacement of afflicted mental qualities with virtuous ones
that ultimately eliminates the suffering of the practitioner, and therefore development of
these virtues makes a life go well. For the Mahāyānist, the relationship is more difficult,
since she remains in saṃsāra as a result of developing generosity and compassion for
sentient beings.
In the first part of this chapter I comment on some general features of Buddhist
virtue theory that apply to both early Buddhist and Mahāyāna sources. In the second, I
provide brief descriptions of the virtues emphasized by Śāntideva in his BCA. In the
third, I illustrate how nurturing the bodhisattva’s virtues makes her path less demanding
than it appears, since their development results in a deeply rooted tranquility that is
resistant to mental suffering, even during temporary experiences of painful sensation. I
suggest that this greatly lessens the demandingness of the bodhisattva’s path, but does not
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of itself show that committing to the bodhisattva path is actually in the bodhisattva’s
interest. In the final section, I focus on a perfectionist element in the Bodhicaryāvatāra,
in which Śāntideva claims that development of the bodhisattva’s virtues represents a
praiseworthy achievement far greater than the accomplishments of the seeker after
individual liberation. This provides good reasons to pursue the bodhisattva path, even if
it is not in one’s best interest.

Buddhist Virtue Theory: General features
The strategy of all Buddhist virtue theory is to replace the afflictive mental states
(akuśala dharma, or kleśa) derived from ignorance with virtuous mental states (kuśala
dharma) conducive to liberation from suffering. A great deal of attention is given to
these virtuous and afflictive mental states in early Buddhist texts, and they are classified
systematically in the later abhidharma manuals. These abhidharma texts analyze reality
into lists of fundamental and irreducible elements, or dharmas, although different schools
accept slightly different lists. Sarvāstivādins, for instance, posit 75 dharmas, while
Theravadins accept 82. The most general classification of dharmas is into conditioned,
that is causally dependent, and unconditioned elements, the latter category including in
some systems only nirvāṇa (Gethin 1998, 210). Classification of the conditioned
dharmas differs somewhat from school to school, but all include the category of
consciousness (citta), and that of associated mental factors (cetasika). As we saw in the
last chapter, consciousness is the bare awareness that accompanies any mental episode.
The mental factors that accompany a moment of consciousness are subdivided into a
number of categories, including neutral factors like sensation (vedanā) and recognition
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(saṃjñā) that process experiential data. Most important for our purposes are the
categories of virtuous mental factors (kuśala cetasika/dharmas) and unvirtuous mental
factors (akuśala cetasika/dharmas). These are the mental qualities which are conducive
to liberation or bondage to saṃsāra, respectively.
Although Śāntideva’s own school of Madhyamaka Buddhism wrote no
abhidharma manuals of their own, their sister Mahāyāna school of Yogācāra created
several treatises that became influential for both Mahāyāna schools. In Asaṅga’s
Abhidharmasamuccaya, for instance, the unvirtuous mental factors are categorized
according to the three root afflicted mental states, or kleśas, of ignorance (avidyā),
craving (rāga) and hatred (pratigha) (Asaṅga 2001, 11). Hatred is defined as
“malevolence with regard to living beings, suffering, and conditions of suffering”
(Asaṅga 2001, 11). It is subdivided into a number of further mental states, including
anger (krodha) which arises in a particular situation, and rancor (upanāha), in which one
holds a desire for revenge (Asaṅga 2001, 15). Ignorance and craving are also subdivided
into further mental states, such as pride (māna), defined as “exhalation of the mind”
(Asaṅga 2001, 12) and avarice (mātsarya), defined as attachment to riches and esteem
(Asaṅga 2001, 15). Many of the positive mental states are defined at least partially in
opposition to a negative mental state: for instance absence of hatred (adveṣa) and absence
of delusion (amoha). Other virtues are instrumental to progressing along the path to
liberation, such as effort (vīrya), defined by Asaṅga as “firm effort aimed at virtuous
things”, and serenity (praśrabdhi) which is defined as “maneuverability of the body and
mind” (Asaṅga 2001, 10). Śāntideva in the BCA does not attempt to give an exhaustive
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survey of the positive mental factors, but chooses a handful of essential ones for analysis
and development.
There are a number of fairly distinctive features of Buddhist virtue theory, as seen
in the early Abhidharma texts and later works like Śāntideva’s BCA, that deserve
comment. First, great attention is paid to negative states of mind. Asaṅga is not atypical
in itemizing more than thirty unvirtuous mental states, all having their root in the series of
cognitive errors that make up ignorance. One reason for the greater attention given to
negative mental states is that nirvāṇa, the complete cessation of suffering, is achieved
when all such afflictive mental states are wholly removed. Further, the proliferation of
both negative and positive mental states in the Abhidharma lists have their origin in the
practice of meditation, in which extreme states of awareness and concentration enabled
distinguishing between very close metal states.
Second, in contrast to Aristotle, who classifies the virtues as dispositions (hexis)
for responding well emotionally and in action, the primary element of Buddhist virtue
theory is the mental event itself, kuśala or akuśala dharma, lasting only a fraction of a
second. “Anger (krodha)”, for instance, refers primarily to the mental moment of anger
arising in the mind.102 Habitual responses are also theorized, however, being referred to
as anuśaya, the dormant tendency for negative mental states to arise in the future. In the
last chapter we saw that these habitual tendencies are particularly pernicious, since any
occurring mental state increases the power of the relevant habitual tendency, which
travels with the stream of mental moments to the next life. Positive habitual tendencies
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also are strengthened by occurring positive mental states, and accompany the mental
stream to the next rebirth.
A third significant feature of Buddhist virtue theory is the importance it places on
negative mental factors, even when physical or verbal action does not follow. A moment
of anger, for instance, not only increases the habitual tendency to become angry in the
future, but also creates karmic propensities (vāsanā) that will ripen into future unpleasant
experience, or even a negative rebirth in a lower realm. This is not to say that physical
and verbal action is neglected: actions to be avoided, such as killing, stealing, lying and
so on appear in multiple lists, including the five lay precepts (pañcaśīla) and the ten
unwholesome paths (daśākarmapatha). Further, monks and nuns commit to following
several hundred additional rules severely restricting all aspects of their lifestyle.
Nevertheless, Buddhist ethical texts view restraint of speech and physical action as a
second line of defense against the strengthening of the negative mental states which are
the primary cause of suffering and bondage to rebirth.
A fourth feature is the close relationship between negative and positive affective
states and respectively conceptual error and correct understanding. This has already been
commented on in the last chapter where we saw that mental afflictions arise as a result of
a series of cognitive errors in which momentary mental and physical events are reified
into twin enduring constructions of subject and object. Since many of the virtuous
mental qualities are defined as the absence of a defiled mental state, elimination of these
cognitive errors is essential to the development of positive mental states as well. In
addition, in Mahāyāna texts the root virtuous qualities like generosity and patience are
perfected by understanding the absence of self in all phenomena.
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In the last chapter, we already explored one of the main functions these positive
mental states play in the transformation of the mind. Positive mental states that are
defined at least partly in opposition to a negative mental state act as antidotes to their
opposites. Meditations designed to develop absence of hatred (adveṣa), or love, for
instance, dissolve hatred, since these mental factors cannot coexist. Similarly, no
afflictive mental state can coexist with deep concentration, and so the development of
concentration is one way to temporarily cease all afflictive emotions. The virtue of
wisdom (prajñā), which accurately sees things as impermanent, unsatisfactory and
selfless, is the ultimate antidote to all afflictive mental states; once it is perfected, not just
ignorance, but anger, attachment, and all other negative mental states will be eliminated
forever.
Another main function of many of the virtuous mental states is to act as
supporting conditions to skillfully manipulate the mind. Certain forms of awareness, like
introspection (samprajanya) and mindfulness (smṛti), facilitate recognition of what
mental states are occurring in the mind. It is only by recognizing that we are angry, for
instance, that we create the possibility of applying the antidote of love. Similarly,
serenity (praśrabdhi) which is defined as “maneuverability of the body and mind” keeps
the mind fluid and responsive, while energy (vīrya) defined by Asaṅga as “firm effort
aimed at virtuous things” (Asaṅga 2001, 10), provides the motivational force to develop
the other virtues and combat negative mental qualities.
The endpoint of this psychological transformation is to completely rid the mind
of all afflictive mental states, and any tendency for these mental states to arise in the
future. Early Buddhist texts describe this as a mental seclusion that is both the parallel to,
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and the motivation behind the monastic seclusion from social life. This is the mental
seclusion obtained when the mind is completely and permanently separated from the root
afflictions of ignorance, attachment and aversion, as well as the other negative mental
states (āśravas) and habitual tendencies (anuśayas) that arise out of them. 103 The early
texts describe the arhat who has achieved this state as literally unable to perform negative
verbal and physical actions; he cannot steal or kill, for instance, because the intention to
steal can no longer arise in his mind. 104 For a Mahāyānist like Śāntideva, development
of the virtuous qualities continues long after the stage at which the early Buddhist
practitioner has achieved this level of mental perfection, with the emphasis now turned to
perfecting the other-regarding virtues like generosity and compassion. I turn to a brief
survey of Śāntideva’s characterization of the role of the virtues below.
The Virtues of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra
Although Mahāyānists presuppose the classification of positive and negative
mental states found in abhidharma texts, two major innovations are introduced in their
development of Buddhist virtue theory. First, Mahāyāna virtue manuals emphasize a
scheme of six, or sometimes ten perfections (pāramitās) essential to the development of
full Buddhahood. The six, which become close to ubiquitous in Indian Mahāyāna texts,
are generosity (dāna), ethical discipline (śīla), patience (kṣānti), effort (vīrya),
meditative concentration (samādhi or dhyāna), and wisdom (prajñā). All of these virtues
are recognized in the early Buddhist tradition, but they receive new emphasis in
Mahāyāna texts. The second development, which is a core feature of Śāntideva’s text, is
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the emphasis on bodhicitta, the mind aspiring to attain full awakening in order to help
sentient beings, as the root virtue of the bodhisattva.
Śāntideva’s account of the virtuous qualities of the bodhisattva presupposes both
the mainstream abhidharma accounts, and these Mahāyāna innovations. His own
presentation, however, is somewhat idiosyncratic. Chapters one, three and four of the
BCA focus on the bodhisattva’s root virtue of bodhicitta, with the first chapter explaining
its value, and the third and fourth explaining how it is adopted and protected. The second
chapter focuses on preparing the mind to develop bodhicitta and commit to the
bodhisattva vow, by making offerings to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and by
confessing past negative actions. In the tenth chapter karmic merit (puṇya) from practice
is dedicated for the sake of all sentient beings. The five remaining chapters are each
named after a virtuous quality essential to the bodhisattva’s path. These virtues overlap
with the six perfections stressed in other Mahāyāna texts, although generosity and ethics
are missing, while introspection (saṃprajanya) is given a chapter of its own, in which the
importance of mindfulness (smṛti) is also emphasized. This difference is less than it
appears, however, since upon closer examination it becomes clear that the introspection
chapter is about ethical discipline in its role of restraint of the mind. It is noteworthy that
there is within the BCA no explicit extended treatment of generosity. The virtue of
generosity, however, is briefly defined in chapter five. Further, it is sometimes claimed
that the chapters dealing with the root bodhisattva virtue of bodhicitta also act as
Śāntideva’s treatment of generosity (Wallace and Wallace 1997, 12).
The virtues treated in detail within the BCA, therefore, are as follows:
Chap 1, 3, 4: Bodhicitta
Chap 5: Introspection, Mindfulness, Ethics, Generosity:
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Chap 6: Patience:
Chap 7: Effort
Chap 8: Meditative Concentration:
Chap 9: Wisdom:
Bodhicitta can be translated as the thought or aspiration (citta) that strives for full
awakening (bodhi). The aim is the fully enlightened state of a Buddha, distinguished
from the lesser awakening of an arhat, who escapes from rebirth without developing the
advanced trainings necessary to liberate others from suffering.105 Śāntideva distinguishes
between two forms of bodhicitta, aspiring and venturing, comparing these with one who
wishes to travel, and one who actually travels (BCA 1:15-16). Bodhicitta causes an
uninterrupted stream of merit (puṇya) to accumulate in the mind-stream of the one in
whom it arises (BCA 1:17-27), and Śāntideva suggests that emphasizing this fact can be
used to convince those inclined towards personal liberation to strive for full awakening
(BCA 1:20). Another feature of bodhicitta that is of immediate benefit to the practitioner
is that it protects one from the ripening of negative karmic effects (BCA 1:13).
The organization of the fifth chapter around introspection and mindfulness is
particularly interesting, revealing Śāntideva’s tendency to prioritize control of the mind
above physical and verbal action. It becomes apparent that he intends this chapter to act
as his chapter on ethics by his definition of the perfection (pāramitā) of ethical discipline
(śīla) as a restrained mind (virati-citta) in the eleventh verse. The chapter has strong
resonances to the early Buddhist Dhammapada, repeating the earlier text’s emphasis on
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the power of the mind to create all future happiness and suffering. Śāntideva talks at
length about the danger of allowing afflictive mental states (kleśas) to arise, emphasizing
in particular the karmic effect of rebirth in hell (BCA 5:7), but we can understand here as
well the strengthening of habitual tendencies (anuśaya) for negative mental states to arise
again, as well as the performance of harmful physical and verbal actions that occur when
the mind is not restrained.
Śāntideva’s emphasis on restraint of the mind as the core of ethics explains why
the chapter is named after introspection (saṃprajanya), which, along with the closely
related mental factor of mindfulness (smṛti), is of particular importance in restraining the
arising of negative mental factors. Introspection (saṃprajanya) is explicitly defined as
“the repeated examination of the state of one’s body and mind” (BCA 5:108).
Mindfulness is not defined, which is unfortunate since the term has a variety of uses in
Buddhist texts. Śāntideva spends much of the chapter detailing the importance of careful
attention to one’s physical actions, and one’s mental state, and therefore the term seems
to mean a fluid flexible awareness of one’s experience. These two mental factors allow
us to guard the virtuous mind (kuśala-citta) filled with positive mental states. (BCA
5:22). Mindfulness, then, makes us aware of whether our mind is in a virtuous state, and
introspection acts as an auxiliary mental factor that repeatedly checks to see if the factor
of mindfulness is still in place. These two factors together provide an essential line of
mental defense against the arising of afflictive emotions. Further, when an afflictive
emotion has arisen, they ensure the practitioner will become aware of it and be able to
apply the correct antidote to dispel it.
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We also find a brief treatment of generosity (dāna) in the fifth chapter, where
Śāntideva defines it as “a state of mind due to the intention of giving away everything to
all people” (BCA 5:10). Here again we find Śāntideva’s inclination to locate the core of
any given virtue in the sphere of mental intention. One can be generous without giving
any thing away, as long as one’s aspiration to give is perfected. Such a definition also
renders coherent how virtues such as generosity might be perfected during lifetimes of
solitary meditation.
The virtue of patience (kṣānti), which is the focus of the sixth chapter, is also not
explicitly defined in the text, but it is clear that Śāntideva uses the term to refer to the
complete lack of animosity towards any living being. What is particularly remarkable
about this chapter is the great variety of techniques offered to eliminate anger. Some of
these strategies are independent of Buddhist metaphysical or soteriological commitments.
Śāntideva points out, for instance, that anger is always a useless additional suffering,
since if there is a remedy to a problem, we can simply fix the problem without frustration,
and if there is no remedy then anger merely makes the situation worse (BCA 6:10).
Likewise, he points out that over time we will become used to certain kinds of pain,
thereby lessening our distress (BCA 6:14). Meditations like these could be incorporated
without tension into non-Buddhist therapy. Another meditation points out that
experiencing suffering increases compassion for other suffering beings, and lessens
arrogance (BCA 6:21). Although applicable to non-Buddhists, this meditation is
particularly appropriate for the Mahāyānist, since it suggests that anger is an
inappropriate response to suffering, since pain helps increase the bodhisattva’s
compassion for sentient beings.
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Other meditations in this chapter depend at least partly upon acceptance of
Buddhist presuppositions in order to be effective. In a long sequence of verses, for
instance, Śāntideva claims that sympathy rather than anger is appropriate towards beings
who are driven by the mental afflictions to perform harmful actions (BCA 6:22—6:41).
Further meditations focus on the individual’s responsibility for the suffering he or she
experiences, as a result of past negative karmic actions (BCA 6:42—6:46). Other
sections of the text urge the reader to restrain anger for fear of creating future negative
karmic results, such as rebirth in hell (BCA 6:69-74). The chapter finishes with a verse
listing the traditional positive karmic consequences of patience: beauty, health, charisma,
long life, and the joys of a king (BCA 6:134).
Effort (vīrya), the subject of the seventh chapter, is defined as “enthusiasm for
virtue,” and is said to be the antidote to factors that impede spiritual progress like sloth,
apathy and self-contempt (BCA 7:2). Śāntideva spends much of this chapter
characterizing with graphic intensity the terrors that await us at the time of death and in
future negative rebirths. The eighth chapter is named after meditative concentration
(dhyāna), although much of it focuses on the faults of saṃsāra. It also includes an
extended series of meditations designed to develop compassion towards other beings,
some of which are commented on elsewhere in this dissertation.
A distinctive feature of Mahāyāna texts is the claim that the most significant
virtues of the bodhisattva path, in particular generosity, ethical discipline, patience, effort,
and concentration, are perfected through the wisdom that realizes the emptiness of all
phenomena. Generosity, for instance, is perfected when one sees oneself as giver, the
gift, and the recipient as empty of intrinsic existence (Candrakīrti 2004, 61). As a result,
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no attachment for any particular result from the giving will arise. Consider, for instance,
feeling indignant that a person is not grateful for a carefully chosen gift, or does not repay
a gift in the future. The claim of the Mahāyānist is that it is only by realizing the
emptiness of phenomena that such attachment-laden responses will be eliminated.
Similar remarks apply to the other Mahāyāna virtues; for instance, realizing the
emptiness of one’s ethical restraint will ward off pride. Śāntideva’s own treatment of
wisdom (prajñā), which occupies the ninth chapter of the BCA, focuses largely on
warding off misunderstandings of the Madhyamaka Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness, and
defending it against various Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical opponents.

Buddhist Virtues and Psychological Flourishing
I have already remarked that the virtuous mental qualities (kuśala dharma) are
those that reduce the suffering of oneself or other persons. These virtuous mental
qualities, however, do not directly eliminate either the physical or the mental sensation
(vedanā) of pain, but rather the negative mental factors (akuśala dharma) such as anger
and attachment.106 In Buddhist psychology, unpleasant sensation (vedanā) and negative
mental factors (akuśala dharma) are closely related; negative emotional states like anger
and attachment arise in response to pleasant or unpleasant feeling (vedanā).
Nevertheless, both physical and mental painful and pleasant sensation are distinct from
our emotional responses to them. I experience a pleasant sensation when I see, touch or
taste the apple, and then the mental state of greed arises. I feel an unpleasant mental
sensation when I think of the dentist, and then aversion to my impending visit arises.
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I discuss the distinction between mental and physical pain on pps 11-12 of this study.

135

Strictly speaking, it is only sensation that is affective, not the mental factors like
compassion and attachment. Certain mental factors are reliably linked to strong negative
or positive sensation, however, so through association we think of them as being pleasant
or painful in themselves. Take anger (krodha) as an example, which Asaṅga defines as
“mental malevolence . . . caused by a present prejudice”(Asaṅga 2001, 29). Anger itself
is the desire to harm the person we are angry at. It is always coupled by a sensation
(vedanā) of mental pain (caitasika-duḥkha, or daurmanasya), and since these consistently
co-occur, we identify the emotion of anger as itself being painful. What has really
happened, however, is that an initially unpleasant sensation has given rise to an emotional
response, which itself increases the strength of subsequent painful mental sensations that
accompany the emotion. The painful physical feeling as I cut my knee is relatively mild,
but my aversion to the discomfort increases newly arising painful mental sensations that
accompany this emotional state.
Buddhist virtues dispel or prevent negative emotions (kleśas) from arising, and
they therefore prevent the painful mental sensations that accompany this emotional
response. They cannot, however, directly affect physical or mental painful sensation
(vedanā) itself. 107 In fact, there are a number of passages in the Pali canon that portray
the Buddha as experiencing physical pain, often with great mental tranquility.108 As to
whether enlightened beings can experience painful mental sensation (caitasika-duḥkha
vedanā), here the early texts are divided. The Questions of King Milinda claims they
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cannot,109 but elsewhere the Buddha is portrayed as susceptible to mental discomfort.
Perhaps most famously, upon attaining liberation he gives as a reason for his hesitation to
teach that doing so would cause him weariness of mind (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995, 260:
M i 168).
Regardless of the textual tradition, according to Buddhist karma theory there
should be nothing mysterious about mental pain arising in even fully awakened beings.
Buddhists hold that pleasant and painful sensations (vedanā) arise as a result of past
karmic action. For instance, when I touch the cactus, I feel tactile pain as a result of past
karmic imprints ripening. Further, Buddhists accept that in addition to the five physical
sense organs, there is a mental organ (manas) that synthesizes sensory data, and also
experiences mental objects like thoughts and memories. When I think of the dentist, the
unpleasant sensation that results when my mental organ (manas) connects with the idea
of the dentist is also the result of the ripening of past karma. After attaining liberation by
eliminating ignorance, arhats and Buddhas create no new karma, and at least according
to the early Buddhist texts, do not take rebirth. For the reminder of their current life,
however, they continue to feel physical painful sensation (kāyika-duḥkha- vedanā) as a
result of past karma ripening. Although the texts are not consistent about this, it seems as
though even a Buddha should continue to experience mental painful sensation (caitasikaduḥkha-vedanā) as well, as a result of contact between the mental organ and mental
objects. Just as a Buddha is karmically wired to experience physical pain when he
touches a cactus, he may be karmically wired to experience mental unpleasant sensation
when he thinks of the dentist. Since all his afflicted mental states (kleśas) have been
eliminated, however, he experiences no increase in painful mental sensation that would
109
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accompany emotional aversion to these unpleasant physical or mental sensations. He
does not become angry when stepping on the cactus, nor fearful when thinking of the
dentist. Although he experiences unpleasant sensations, he experiences no deep suffering
as a result of them.
If my account is correct, then the positive effect Buddhist virtues will have on
welfare is a deeper abiding tranquility that is not disturbed by surface-level unpleasant
physical and mental sensations. This marks a partial contrast between Buddhism, and
hedonists like Mill and Bentham for whom surface-level hedonic sensations are at least
an important element of what happiness consists in. This propensity of Buddhist virtues
to diminish deep emotional pain, while leaving unaffected surface-level painful physical
and mental sensation, suggests a similarity with the account of happiness developed by
contemporary scholar Daniel Haybron. The key to Haybron’s account of happiness is to
distinguish between what he calls central and peripheral affective states. Central
affective states are connected with one’s emotional life, such as contentment, joy, anxiety
and depression. Haybron contrasts these to peripheral affective states like momentary
pleasure and pain, or “mild amusement or irritation.” Haybron’s claim is that happiness
depends on central affective states, but has little to do with peripheral ones (Haybron
2008, 29-30). Experiencing a twinge of pain in one’s back, eating a piece of candy, or
even feeling mild irritation when unable to find one’s keys will have little effect on how
happy one is. Irritation that crosses over into anger, the joy of seeing old friends, and the
satisfaction one takes from a long day’s work, on the other hand, affects one’s happiness.
Haybron also includes in his account what he calls mood propensities, the disposition to
experience relevant moods including “high-spiritedness” and “peace of mind” (Haybron
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2001, 506). Happiness, for Haybron, is better characterized as “psychic flourishing,”
rather than simply a predominance of pleasurable mental states over painful ones
(Haybron 2008, 31).
Examining Śāntideva’s emphasis on restructuring our mental life to eliminate
afflictive mental states (kleśas) suggests that the state the bodhisattva achieves through
perfecting the virtues is much closer to the psychic flourishing model presented by
Haybron, than a surface level pleasure and pain centered hedonism. The following verses
come from the fifth chapter in which Śāntideva connects development of the virtuous
mental habits of mindfulness and introspection with a deeply tranquil mind.
Where would there be leather enough to cover the entire
world? The earth is covered over merely with the leather of my sandals. (BCA
5:13)
Likewise, I am unable to restrain external phenomena, but I
shall restrain my own mind. What need is there to
restrain anything else? (BCA 5:14)
The point of the image in BCA 5:13 is this: there are two ways to walk from my
house to the store without hurting my feet. The less practical solution would be to cover
the entire distance with a rubber mat to walk on. A better solution, of course, is to wear
shoes. Likewise, an unpractical solution to avoid mental distress from anger and craving
is to rearrange the entire universe so that nothing interferes with my desires. Since this is
impossible, Śāntideva suggest that we instead adapt our minds so that anger and craving
never arise, no matter what the situation. This is done in part by developing mindfulness
and introspection, the closely related virtuous qualities emphasized in BCA chapter five,
by means of which negative states are identified and immediately counteracted.
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In the sixth chapter, which focuses on patience (kṣānti), Śāntideva talks explicitly
about the pain that anger brings. Here we should remember that this is not simply painful
mental sensation (vedanā) that even a liberated being (theoretically at least) could
experience, but rather the deeper forms of painful sensation that accompany the emotion
of anger arising when we do not get what we are attached to.
The mind does not find peace, nor does it enjoy pleasure
and joy, nor does it find sleep or fortitude when the thorn
of hatred dwells in the heart. (BCA 6:3)
Even dependents whom one rewards with wealth and honors
wish to harm the master who is repugnant due to his anger. (BCA 6:4)
Even friends fear him. He gives, but is not served. In brief,
there is nothing that can make an angry person happy. (BCA 6:5).
Much of the sixth chapter of the BCA is spent providing antidotes to anger, like
the ones discussed in my brief survey of Śāntideva’s virtues above. As a result of
perfecting patience, Śāntideva claims that we should be able to maintain a happy state of
mind, even when facing extreme adversity (BCA 6:9). At times, he is even more
explicitly that it is possible to experience pain while maintaining a tranquil mind.
Not even in suffering (duḥkha) should a wise person disrupt his
mental serenity, for the battle is with the mental afflictions;
and in battle pain (vyathā) is easily obtained. (BCA 6:19)
None of this is to say that eliminating all painful sensation is not a concern of
Śāntideva, or of Buddhism as a whole. In fact, the early Buddhist emphasis on ending
rebirth must be explicable at least in part by a motivation to end all painful sensation.
Since the arhats have eliminated the negative emotional states, the only reason for them
to seek an end to rebirth is to end the painful physical (and perhaps also mental)
sensations that continue to occur as a result of past karma. Nevertheless, passages like
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these make clear that the main focus of a text like Śāntideva’s BCA is eliminating the
deeper suffering that accompanies the mental afflictions (kleśas).
Of course, the early Buddhist will also develop virtues like patience, and therefore
benefit from their role in lessening the depth with which we experience pain. But an
advantage the bodhisattva has is that compassion and love, both developed to an
extraordinary degree on the bodhisattva path, are antidotes to anger. This is made
explicit in The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra)
traditionally ascribed to Maitreya and Asaṅga:110
For a pigeon who greatly cherishes her young and stays and
gathers them to herself, anger is precluded; it is just the same for a
compassionate one concerning beings who are her children.
Where there is love, the thought of anger ceases. Where there is
peace, malice ceases. Where there is benefit, deceit ceases. And
where there is comforting, there is no more intimidation. (Thurman 2004, 172.
13:22-23)
The bodhisattva, then, will be able to develop these virtues more easily than his
early Buddhist counterpart.
Although Haybron’s psychic flourishing model of happiness helps illustrate the
mental state of a highly advanced bodhisattva, there are a couple of qualifications that
need to be made. First, it might be thought that the account given here provides evidence
that Buddhism should be classified as a mental state theory, with the provision that the
relevant state should be interpreted as an overall psychological state, rather than
occurring sensations of a particular type. The Buddhist, however, need not necessarily
identify the bodhisattva’s mental state itself as constituting the agent’s well-being. In line
with the arguments I make in chapter two, we can here ask the further question of
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whether it is the desire to obtain a state of psychic flourishing, or the psychological state
itself, or the development of the virtues which lead to this state that contribute at the
deepest level to the bodhisattva’s welfare. In other words, accepting the importance of
psychic flourishing is compatible with desire-satisfaction and objective-list theories of
welfare, as well as expanded versions of mental-state theory. Although Buddhist texts
pay great attention to what makes a life go better, it is simply not part of their project to
mark out the foundational units of well-being, and therefore the Buddhist texts
themselves will not answer this question.
Second, I want to address a potential tension between a psychic flourishing model
of welfare like that developed by Haybron and Buddhist virtue theory. As explained
above, Buddhist virtue theory takes occurring momentary positive and negative mental
states as their primary object of analysis. It is not dispositional mood propensities or
durable emotional states that are explicitly theorized in Buddhist virtue theory, but rather
fragmentary emotional instants. This may appear to be in tension with Haybron’s
account of psychic flourishing. The concern here is that the Buddhist fragmentary
account of causally connected instants cannot represent the rich and fluid psychological
state assumed by an account of mental flourishing like Haybron’s.
The best answer to this concern, I think, is to point out that the Buddhist must
claim that the abhidharmic analysis of experience into radically discrete causally
connected moments is able to explain many ordinary features of our experience that seem
to possess continuity, such as watching a performance, having an engrossed conversation,
athletic activity and so on. He could therefore likewise claim that the apparently
enduring mental state of psychological flourishing would likewise be found, upon careful
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mental analysis, to be comprised of discrete but closely connected mental experiences. In
other words, if there is a tension between the abhidharmic analysis of experience and a
Haybron like model of psychic flourishing, it is no greater than the tension between the
abhidharmic analysis and our ordinary experience as a whole.
Further, we should remember that as a Madhyamaka, Śāntideva does not accept
the abhidharma claim that experience can be analyzed into discrete mental states that are
themselves unanalyzable. For Madhyamakas, the virtuous and unvirtuous mental factors
themselves are analyzable into their causal conditions, and therefore are themselves
conventional designations (prajñapti) empty of essential nature (svabhāva). What this
means is that Madhyamakas like Śāntideva use the abhidharmic analysis as a convenient
shorthand to help gain better control of mental development, rather than as an accurate
representation of our mental lives. Tension between the abhidharmic analysis and
ordinary experience, therefore, would be less troubling to the Madhyamaka, since he does
not believe the abhidharmic list of virtues correctly characterize the reality of our mental
lives.
In this section, I have argued that one of the ways Buddhist virtues increase the
well-being of their possessor is by nurturing a deeply entrenched sense of emotional wellbeing, something close to what Daniel Haybron calls “psychic flourishing.” Realizing
that this is the bodhisattva’s psychological condition goes a long way to explaining how
development of the bodhisattva’s virtues drastically reduces the actual suffering a
bodhisattva experiences in lives undertaken to benefit sentient beings. The bodhisattva
would still experience physical, and for at least a time mental painful sensation during
voluntarily rebirths. But a psychic flourishing account of happiness like Haybron’s can
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accommodate the possibility that a person might be happy even while experiencing a
good deal of pain. This is because the psychic flourishing model grounds happiness in
deeply rooted emotional propensities, which have the potential for enduring painful
surface sensations. We have already seen that Śāntideva claims the bodhisattva should
maintain his mental tranquility even when enduring hardships. Making a connection
between Śāntideva and Hayborn’s psychic flourishing model of happiness suggests that
such a bodhisattva might be called happy, even while experiencing pain in her attempt to
help sentient beings.

Buddhist Virtues and Perfectionist Value
In the last section, I showed that the development of certain virtues essential to
the bodhisattva path, like introspection, mindfulness, and patience, results in a deeply
rooted tranquil psychological state that is resistant to distress even when painful sensation
is experienced. This provides yet another way that the bodhisattva path will be less
demanding than it seems; however, it does not show that it is actually in the practitioner’s
interest to aspire to full Buddhahood. This is because these virtues can be developed
fully, or at least to a very high level, by the early Buddhist aiming at individual liberation,
as well as by the bodhisattva. It would seem, then, that it would be better for the
individual to concentrate on the self-benefiting virtues like patience, and avoid intense
development of virtues like generosity, compassion and bodhicitta that lead the
bodhisattva to make sacrifices for the sake of sentient beings.
In this section, I explore another kind of potential positive effect that the
development of the bodhisattva’s virtues has for the practitioner, which I will refer to as
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“Śāntideva’s perfectionism.”111 A perfectionist theory focuses on the development of
traits important to, and perhaps distinctive of human beings. Following Thomas Hurka,
we can distinguish between narrow and broad kinds of perfectionisms. Narrow
perfectionists emphasize developing our essential nature; for instance, Aristotle’s ethics
stresses performance of rational activity throughout a lifetime. Likewise, broad
perfectionists emphasize the development of human talents and abilities, but unlike
narrow perfectionists, they do not claim that humans have an essential nature to develop
(Hurka 1993, 4).
It is difficult to argue that Śāntideva is a narrow perfectionist, since as a
Madhyamaka he believes nothing has an essential nature (svabhāva), and therefore
cannot literally hold that humans possess a unique essence that can be developed. It
would be possible, however, for a Madhyamaka to ascribe to a broad perfectionism.
Taking the Buddhist stock example of the chariot to illustrate this point, it is
unproblematic for a Buddhist to point out that this assemblage of causally connected
parts is conducive to quick speed, and valuing this property in no way commits him to a
metaphysics emphasizing the existence of an independent unitary chariot with essential
properties. Likewise, a Madhyamaka can claim that there are facts about certain
assemblages of physical and mental moments that result in certain human capabilities
such as the ability to prevent or lessen suffering. A Buddhist broad perfectionism, then,
can claim that developing the bodhisattva’s suffering-reducing virtues has perfectionist
value, in being a distinctive and important kind of human achievement.
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An analogy may be helpful in explaining what is distinctive about this approach.
We value the achievements of Olympic athletes not because of their direct benefits to us,
but because they are the highest examples of a certain kind of achievement possible for
human bodies and minds. There is nothing intrinsically wonderful about thrusting a
metal ball through the air, and yet we praise the excellent shot-putter because he has
excelled at demonstrating the limit of what human strength can achieve. Likewise, part
of our admiration for actors such as Katherine Hepburn or musicians like Yo-yo Ma is
that they have reached the greatest heights of a unique kind of human achievement. We
can praise these accomplishments without committing ourselves to a metaphysics that
claims these talents rise out of a distinctive human essence. Likewise, Śāntideva can
claim that the bodhisattva’s skill in removing suffering is itself praiseworthy, and in this
sense has a value that goes beyond the total amount of pain she eliminates.
This perfectionist strand is seen in verses from the BCA that characterize the
bodhisattva ideal, and the development of bodhicitta, as praiseworthy.
When bodhicitta has arisen, in an instant a
wretch who is bound in the prison of the cycle of existence is
called a Child of the Sugatas and becomes worthy of
reverence in the worlds of gods and humans. (BCA 1:9, translation altered)
Now my life is fruitful. Human existence is well obtained.
Today I have been born into the family of the Buddhas. Now
I am a Child of the Buddha. (BCA 3:25)
Thus, whatever I do now should accord with [the
Bodhisattvas'] family, and it should not be like a stain on this
pure family. (BCA 3:26)
The reference in the first quoted verse about the bodhisattva being praised by
“gods and humans” shows that the achievement of full Buddhahood, which the
bodhisattva aims at, is seen as an accomplishment worthy of veneration by any being in

146

the universe, no matter how powerful. The second verse comes after the bodhisattva
commits to the bodhisattva path, and illustrates that this alone makes human rebirth
worthwhile. All three verses, moreover, emphasize that the praiseworthiness of the
beginning bodhisattva is due to being in the lineage of the Buddhas. Even an early stage
bodhisattva still struggling with the mental afflictions has a share in the perfectionist
value achieved by the Buddhas who have come before.
Other verses suggest that we should accept the bodhisattva path as praiseworthy,
since it has been examined by the Buddhas and past bodhisattvas and has been found to
be worthwhile.
Although one has made a commitment, it is appropriate [to
reconsider] whether or not to do that which has been rashly
undertaken and which has not been well considered. (BCA 4:2)
But shall I discard that which has been examined by the
sagacious Buddhas and their Children, as well as by myself
according to the best of my abilities? (BCA 4:3)
Here we can remember that one of the qualities of a Buddha is a limited
omniscience, and so they would be particularly well suited to judge the value of what
they have achieved.
Often the focus of praise is not the bodhisattva path per se, but the root
bodhisattva virtue of bodhicitta.
The world's sole leaders, whose minds are fathomless, have
well examined its great value. You who are inclined to
escape from the states of mundane existence, hold fast to the
jewel of bodhicitta. (BCA 1:11, translation altered)
Just as a plantain tree decays upon losing its fruit, so does
every other virtue wane. But the tree of bodhicitta
perpetually bears fruit, does not decay, and only
flourishes. (BCA 1:12, translation altered)
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Just as a blind man might find a jewel amongst heaps of rubbish,
so bodhicitta has somehow arisen in me. (BCA 3:27, translation altered)
In other verses, the bodhisattva who travels on the path to full awakening is directly
praised.
He satisfies with all joys those who are starving for
happiness and eliminates all the sorrows of those who are
afflicted in many ways. (BCA 1:29)
He dispels delusion. Where else is there such a saint? Where
else is there such a friend? Where else is there such merit? (BCA 1:30)
The world honors as virtuous one who makes a gift to a few
people, even if it is merely a momentary and contemptuous
donation of plain food and support for half a day. (BCA 1:32)
What then of one who forever bestows to countless sentient
beings the fulfillment of all yearnings, which is inexhaustible
until the end of beings as limitless as space? (BCA 1:33)
The perfectionist strand of Śāntideva’s thought represented in these verses is
important because it provides another answer to the question of why one should commit
to the arduous process of becoming a bodhisattva. One response to this question that
reappears throughout the text is that the development and finally perfection of the
bodhisattva’s virtues represents a uniquely valuable human achievement that is
praiseworthy much as the achievements of an Olympic athlete would be. Even the deities
acknowledge that the life of the bodhisattva is simply the most admirable life any sentient
being might lead.
Does this perfectionist strand to Śāntideva’s text provide a way that developing
the virtues of bodhisattvahood actually benefits the bodhisattva? It has been a
controversial point in Western philosophy as to whether perfectionist value, of itself,
benefits its possessor. Aristotle claims that developing our rational nature, which he
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takes to be essential to human beings, is largely what human flourishing (eudaimonia)
consists in. Aristotle, however, is a narrow perfectionist in Hurka’s sense, and makes this
claim because he believes rational activity constitutes what is essential to being a fully
functional human. The connection between a narrow perfectionism and the flourishing of
the agent is quite close. If humans have an essential nature, then quite plausibly our lives
would be deeply impoverished if we did not develop it. In fact, some varieties of
Mahāyāna Buddhism might endorse a narrow perfectionism. In particular, the
tathāgatagarba tradition holds that there is an essential Buddha nature that is recovered
when the defilements are eliminated. Such a school might claim that developing the
compassion of a bodhisattva represents an aspect of recovering our true nature, and that
this is therefore necessarily to lead a truly flourishing life.
I have already noted, however, that a Madhyamaka like Śāntideva cannot be
characterized as a narrow perfectionist. Moreover, it is less clear how closely related
perfectionist value and well-being are for a broad perfectionism which simply
emphasizes developing distinctive human talents and abilities without claiming they
represent an essential human nature. The Olympic athlete may be universally praised for
her achievements on the field, and yet we might still hold that her many years of selfsacrifice to her sport have left her less well off than had she lived a more balanced life.
Likewise, one might claim that the bodhisattva’s virtuous development is admirable,
without accepting that the achievement it represents of itself makes the bodhisattva’s life
go better. What this suggests, instead, is that for Śāntideva the perfectionist value of fully
developing the bodhisattva’s virtues provides good reasons for adopting the bodhisattva’s
path, even if it does not increase our well-being in any obvious way.
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Conclusion:
In this chapter, I have argued that the suffering the bodhisattva experiences as a
result of committing acts of apparent self-sacrifice motivated by development of otherregarding virtues like generosity and compassion is less than it appears. This is because
the development of other virtues, such as introspection, mindfulness and patience results
in a deeply rooted tranquil psychological state that is resistant to emotional distress, even
when surface level sensations of pain are experienced. Nevertheless, these sufferingreducing virtues are also developed by early Buddhists who do not commit to perfecting
the other-regarding virtues. This suggests that it is not obvious that completely
developing the full set of the bodhisattva’s virtues is in her interest, since early Buddhists
can prioritize development of the virtues that benefit oneself. Of course, this loss may be
outweighed by other factors, such as the bodhisattva’s psychological identification of
their own good with the good of others that I will discuss in the next chapter.
I also considered whether the perfectionist strand of Śāntideva’s text might
compensate the bodhisattva for the sacrifices he makes to help others. I argued that since
Śāntideva cannot be plausibly construed as a narrow perfectionist, who holds there is an
essential human nature to be developed, this is unlikely. Nevertheless, the perfectionist
value of the bodhisattva’s virtues still provides good reasons for taking their development
as a goal, even though this might not directly result in an increase in the well-being of the
bodhisattva.
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Chap 5: No-Self and Demandingness
In the last chapter, I showed how the development of certain Buddhist virtues,
like patience, mindfulness, and introspection, greatly lessens demandingness by helping
the bodhisattva to radically decrease mental pain, even when undergoing physically
painful experience. This chapter will continue to consider how virtues contribute to wellbeing, although here the virtue to be examined will be wisdom (prajñā), in its aspect of
understanding the nonexistence of any enduring, independent self. I begin by examining
a passage from the Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu in which he considers how
bodhisattvas are psychologically able to commit to the demanding task of becoming fully
awakened Buddhas. I argue that Vasubandhu’s comments provide insight into several
closely related demand-lessening strategies connected to the development of wisdom.
First, developing wisdom benefits the bodhisattva by reducing mental pain from fear and
attachment to one’s body and well-being. Second, the bodhisattva uses the psychological
flexibility achieved from realizing no-self to radically identify his well-being with that of
others. I illustrate how these strategies are developed by Śāntideva in his BCA, and
argue that they lessen the demandingness the bodhisattva faces, or even result in a gain of
well-being when he satisfies his desire to help others, or experiences joy from doing so.
Although as far as I know no Buddhist text explicitly formulates and responds to
the overdemandingness objection, one of the authors to come close to doing so is
Vasubandhu, in his Commentary to the Treasury of Higher Doctrine, or
Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, where he considers the question of why anyone would take on
the incredibly difficult task of becoming a bodhisattva. Vasubandhu’s concern is to show
that it is psychologically possible to adopt the bodhisattva path, and he is not trying to
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show how benefiting others also benefits the bodhisattva and lessens demandingness.
Nevertheless, after considering Vasubandhu’s comments, I will argue that they help us
understand how several elements of a Buddhist response to the overdemandingness
objection would go.
For what reason do they undertake the effort? They make the effort for the
welfare of others, so they would become able to rescue others from the great flood
of suffering. How does the welfare of others benefit them? Since they desire the
welfare of others, it is their own welfare.112
Vasubandhu claims that bodhisattvas undertake the demanding task of becoming
buddhas because they identify their own well-being with the well-being of others.113
Many of us have this kind of attitude towards our children or close friends and family; a
parent will herself flourish when her child flourishes, even if this requires undertaking
hardships for the child’s well-being. What is astounding is that the bodhisattva takes this
attitude towards all sentient beings, including strangers. Here we might wonder how this
is even psychologically possible. Vasubandhu continues:
Some people take delight in the pain of others because they lack compassion as a
result of always focusing on their own welfare. Likewise, [bodhisattvas] take
delight in doing actions for the welfare of others, since they lack all concern about
themselves, because of repeatedly feeling compassion. Just as those who are
ignorant of the mark of conditionality of conditioned selfless elements, who by
the power of repeated practice have become settled in attachment to the self,
endure suffering because of this [self]. Likewise, [bodhisattvas], after eliminating
attachment towards the self arising from these [erroneously grasped selfless
112

yadyapyanyathâpyasti mokṣâvakâúa:, kimarthaṃ ta iyantaṃ yatnamârabhante? parârthaṃ ta iyantaṃ
yatnamârabhante ‘kathaṃ parânapi mahato duḥkhaughât paritrâtuṃ úaknuyâm’ iti| ka eṣâṃ parârthena
svârthaḥ? eṣa eva teṣâṃ svârtho yaḥ parârthaḥ, tasyâbhimatatvât| Vasubandhu 1988, 430. See also the
English translation by Pruden in Vasubandhu 1988, 480-81. The reference to desire might be taken to
suggest Vasubandhu ascribes to a desire-satisfaction theory of wellbeing, but I think this is too quick. It is
compatible with this quote to hold that Buddhists are hedonists who hold satisfaction of desire is valuable
since it brings pleasure. Other theories of wellbeing might also be defended. My point is that mentioning
satisfaction of desire provides little evidence for a particular foundational theory of wellbeing, since most
theories will give some value to the satisfaction of desires.
113
See also Vasubandhu’s commentary to the Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature
(Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra): “When suffering must be endured, the bodhisattva will be able to find pleasure
even in that suffering, as it serves as the cause of helping others” (Thurman 2004, 209).

152

elements], through the power of repeated practice, increase concern for others and
endure suffering on account of them. The family [of bodhisattvas] comes from
another lineage which experiences suffering because others suffer, and happiness
because other are happy, not from their own happiness.114
In the above passage, Vasubandhu links the selfish attitudes persons obsessed
with their own welfare display to ignorance about the selfless and conditioned nature of
the elements making up the conventional person. In other words, the selfishness of
ordinary persons arises because they erroneously believe themselves to be unitary,
enduring and self-subsisting selves. The reason bodhisattvas are psychologically able to
care more for strangers than they do for themselves is that they have overcome this belief
in an enduring self. Here, we should remember that Buddhists hold that there is no
enduring self (ātman) that grounds our identity, but rather that “person” is merely a
conventional designation (prajñapti) we give to mental and physical events in close
causal interaction, what Vasubandhu calls “the conditioned elements,” that account for
human experience. Further, they claim that our egoistic concern is rooted in
misidentifying this impermanent conventionally existing self as an enduring unitary self
that is not dependent on conventional labeling for its existence. Since the bodhisattva has
eliminated his belief in this self, his egoistic selfishness has been destroyed.
According to Vasubandhu, then, understanding the nonexistence of any enduring
independent self has two related psychological effects that explain how it is
psychologically possible for bodhisattvas to commit so radically to the welfare of others.
First, elimination of belief in self eliminates self-cherishing, and once this deeply rooted
114

yathā ceha kecidabhyastanairghṛṇyā astyapi svārthe paravyasanābhiratā upalabhyante| tathā narabhyastakāruṇyā asatyapi svārthe parahitakriyābhirāmāḥ santīti sambhāvyam| yathaiva
cābhyāsavaśādanātmabhūteṣu saṃskāreṣu saṃskṛtatalakṣaṇānabhijñā ātmasnehaṃ niveśya
taddhetorduḥkhānyudvahanti, evaṃ-unarabhyāsavaśādātmasnehaṃ tebhyo nirvartya pareṣvapekṣāṃ
vardhayitvā taddhetorduḥkhānyudvahantīti sambhāvyam| gotrāntarameva hi tat tathājātīyaṃ nirvartate yat
pareṣāṃ duḥkhena duḥkhāyate sukhena sukhāyate, nātmana iti| Vasubandhu 1988, 430. See also the
English translation by Pruden in Vasubandhu 1988, 481.
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selfishness has been destroyed, it will easier for the bodhisattva in training to give up his
possessions and even his life for others. Second, the destruction of the belief in an
enduring self results in an extreme psychological flexibility, which allows the bodhisattva
to radically identify his well-being with the well-being of others. Unlike most of us, who
can only deeply do this with close friends and family, the bodhisattva takes the wellbeing of everyone in the whole universe as his goal.
In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, Vasubandhu is writing from the perspective of
early Buddhism that holds arhatship is an acceptable goal, and he does not claim that
destroying the innate belief in self will necessarily lead one to become a bodhisattva. His
remarks here are distinct from Śāntideva’s arguments that we are obligated to commit to
impartial benevolence and accept the bodhisattva path. Further, his goal is not to argue
that the bodhisattva path is not overly demanding, but to show how it is psychologically
possible for one to undertake its difficulties. Nevertheless, as I will explain below, both
of the psychological effects of realizing no-self Vasubandhu identifies are also relevant to
the goal of Mahāyāna authors like Śāntideva who seek to reduce the demandingness of
the bodhisattva path.
This point may be seen as an extension of the strategy I developed in the last
chapter, which focused on the demand-lessening aspects of the bodhisattva’s virtues. The
virtue in question is now wisdom (prajñā), which Śāntideva devotes the ninth chapter of
his BCA to explaining and defending. Wisdom, for Śāntideva, refers to the realization
that all phenomena are empty (sūnya) of intrinsic existence (svabhāva). This means that
they have no essence of their own, but arise only in dependence upon their parts, causes
and conditions and conceptual labeling. This doctrine is an expansion of the early
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Buddhist belief in no-self. Like the early Buddhists, Śāntideva and the Madhyamaka
Buddhist school to which he belongs hold that persons are merely conventional
designations (prajñapti), a way of conveniently treating an assemblage of mental and
physical impermanent events together. The Madhyamaka emphasizes, in contrast to
certain early Buddhist schools, that all phenomena are empty of essence (svabhāva) in
this way; not just persons, but the objects they encounter in the world, as well as the parts
making up these objects are conceptual fictions, themselves designated upon an
assemblage of parts, causes and conditions and so on. For our purposes, however, we can
ignore the difference in scope between the early Buddhist doctrine of no-self and the
wisdom realizing emptiness emphasized by Śāntideva and other Madhyamakas. This is
because the demand-lessening aspects of the realization of wisdom that I will be
emphasizing from Śāntideva’s text focus upon the realization that no enduring self exists.
Śāntideva provides arguments at several places in the BCA intended to establish
the truth of the nonexistence of an enduring self. These passages double as meditations
designed to help the aspirant who intellectually accepts selflessness to deepen this
understanding and integrate it into her life. One of the strategies Śāntideva uses
repeatedly is to run through various possible referents of the I and point out that none of
them are acceptable.
Teeth, hair, and nails are not I, nor am I bone, blood, mucus,
phlegm, pus, or lymph. (BCA 9:57)
Bodily oil is not I, nor are sweat, fat, or entrails. The cavity
of the entrails is not I, nor is excrement or urine. (BCA 9:58)
Flesh is not I, nor are sinews, heat, or wind. Bodily apertures
are not I, nor, in any way, are the six consciousnesses. (BCA 9:59)
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The assumption behind verses like this is that if a unitary enduring self existed,
we should be able to find it by surveying the contents of our body and mind. Obviously,
none of the above body parts can be the enduring self, since they are all impermanent.
Moreover, they do not match the attributes of the self, since they are unconscious.
In other passages, Śāntideva considers whether any mental aspects of my
experience might serve as the referent of the I.
The past or future mind is not "I," since it does not exist. If
the present mind were "I," then when it had vanished, the "I"
would not exist any more. (BCA 9:73)
Just as the trunk of a plantain tree is nothing when cut into
pieces, in the same way,
the "I" is non-existent when sought
analytically. (BCA 9:74)
Here, Śāntideva points out that entities in the past and future can’t be the referent
of the word “I”, since they have not yet come into existence, or have already perished.
Current moments of consciousness, however, are impermanent, arising and dissolving all
the time, and therefore cannot be the enduring self.
One of the benefits of eliminating the belief in any enduring self, according to
Śāntideva, is the lessening and finally elimination of the pain accompanying fear. One
connection between fear and the realization of selflessness, made by other Buddhist
authors, is that realizing we are not enduring selves means understanding that there is
literally no enduring self to face death and harmful situations. The great Buddhist
commentator Buddhaghoṣa makes this point in a passage we already considered in
another context in the third chapter:
[The deluded person] is confused about death, instead of taking death thus, ‘Death
in every case is break-up of aggregates’, he figures that it is a [lasting] being that
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dies, that it is a [lasting] being’s transmigration to another incarnation, and so on.
(Buddhagoṣa 1991, 555)
The basic idea is simple. Once one has realized at the deepest level that there is
no enduring independent entity that grounds identity, then fear of the destruction of that
being will be gone. Intellectually accepting the nonexistence of self may result in some
lessening of fear, but deeper benefits accrue when one realizes this deeply in meditation,
and begins to actually relate to oneself as a dependently arisen convention entity.
Although Śāntideva would accept this point made by Buddhaghoṣa, his own
treatment of the relation between selflessness and fear is slightly different.
If there were something called "I," fear could come from
anywhere. If there is no "I," whose fear will there be? (BCA 9:56)
Śāntideva points out here that if we accept no-self, then there is no enduring being
to possess fear. Realizing this will undercut the terror we experience when we face
difficult experiences. We can connect this insight with Śāntideva’s use of afflicted
energy arising from fear that I considered in my third chapter. As long as we do not
deeply believe in the nonexistence of an enduring self, fear will arise, and can be
rechanneled towards liberative purposes. Once this belief is eradicated, however, then
the suffering of fear itself will be no more.
The well-being enhancing role of passages like these is fairly obvious. Although
they will explain its disvalue slightly differently, almost any theory of well-being will
assign a negative value to at least most instances of the pain accompanying fear. Most
mental state theories will classify it as a kind of suffering that lowers the welfare of the
experiencing individual. Of course, this mental pain may still have an instrumental value
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in keeping the individual from greater kinds of suffering, but at least of itself it has a
negative value. Likewise, a desire-theory would recognize that almost everyone desires
to be free from fear, and the suffering it causes, and thereby assign value to satisfying this
goal. An objective list theory could incorporate one or both of these ways of treating the
pain of fear into its list of what makes a life go better.115 Wisdom, then, which is partly
constituted by the realization of selflessness, helps protect the well-being of the
individual by guarding her from this kind of pain.
For the bodhisattva who undergoes severe austerities for sentient beings’ benefit,
this advantage of wisdom has a particular importance. Most of us would experience
terrible fear when facing horrible events such as amputation of a limb, sacrificing our life
or taking rebirth in a negative realm. The bodhisattva, however, will not attempt these
tasks until her realization of selflessness is strong, and therefore her experience of fear
will be greatly attenuated. Wisdom, thereby, lessens the demandingness of the
bodhisattva path by reducing the mental pain the bodhisattva experiences as she works
for sentient beings.
A second benefit from realizing the nonexistence of the self is alluded to
explicitly in the passage by Vasubandhu when he talks about eliminating attachment to
the self. Śāntideva treats this issue in a passage referred to in the introduction when I
discussed the gradual nature of the bodhisattva path.
At the beginning, the Guide116 prescribes giving vegetables and
the like. One does it gradually so that later one can give
away even one's own flesh (BCA 7:25).
When wisdom [prajñā] arises that one's own flesh is like a vegetable,
115

Of course, this is not an exhaustive survey of possible theories of well-being, but arguably any plausible
theory will at least usually place negative value on experiencing fear.
116
Guide here refers to the Buddha.
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then what difficulty is there in giving away one's flesh and
bone? (BCA 7:26, translation modified)117
The verses refer to the bodhisattva’s practice of sacrificing his body for others.
The reference to one’s own flesh being like a vegetable indicates his realization that the
body does not belong to oneself in any deep way. Rather the body is merely a collection
of momentary physical events in close causal association with mental events that are
together labeled the person. There is no enduring entity within this collection that owns
anything. In this way, the body is like any external possession, such as a vegetable.118
Śāntideva’s claim is that once this is realized, our attachment to our body will be
radically diminished, so that giving away our limbs or even our lives will be no different
in kind than giving up any other possession. This strategy is matched with other
meditations within the BCA that emphasize the foul and unpleasant nature of the body,
which suggest it is not even a particularly valuable possession that we should be
distressed about surrendering.119
As before, the value of this realization to our well-being is easy to establish.
Whether we talk about it in terms of mental states of suffering, or the desire to avoid
these states, our attachment to our body threatens our well-being when the body is
threatened. Once selflessness is realized, according to Śāntideva, the bodhisattva will
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Wallace and Wallace translate “prajñā” as “insight.” I use “wisdom” to make explicit the connection
with the theme of this chapter.
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Also relevant here is the following passage from Śāntideva’s ŚS: “Well-born son, just as a medicinal
plant, when it is stripped of its roots, stripped of its stalk, branches, bark, or leaves, stripped of its flowers,
fruits, or sap, does not imagine, ‘‘I am being stripped of my roots,’’ and so on until ‘‘I am being stripped of
my sap,’’ but instead without imagining [this] at all, it eliminates the illnesses of living beings—whether
they are lowly, average, or superior living beings—so too, well-born son, a bodhisattva mahāsattva should
regard his bodied being [ātmabhāva], which is composed of the four great elements, as medicine,
[thinking], ‘‘Let any living beings whatsoever take absolutely anything of mine for any purpose
whatsoever— a hand for those wanting a hand, a foot for those wanting a foot,’’ as stated previously.”
Cited in Mrozik 2007, 24, translation by Mrozik.
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Numerous examples can be found during Śāntideva’s charnel ground meditations in BCA 8:41-71.

159

stop experiencing mental suffering resulting from this attachment. Of particular
importance to this study, it will therefore result in a great lessening of mental anguish
when the bodhisattva is called upon to sacrifice his body for others.
The two kinds of benefits of realizing no-self just discussed are similar in that
they both emphasize a reduction in mental pain during what would usually be
extraordinarily demanding tasks. There is, however, another kind of demand-lessening
strategy that can be reconstructed from the passages I quoted by Vasubandhu. This is
referred to when he says that the bodhisattva takes the welfare of others to be his own
welfare, and because of this, takes great joy when sentient beings are benefited. We see
this kind of identification with the well-being of others to a limited degree in the
identification of a parent with their child. Even if the parent sacrifices great amounts of
time and money, we will probably agree that the parent’s life goes better when the child
flourishes. Most of us, however, only strongly identify with the well-being of close
friends and family. What is extraordinary about the bodhisattva is that he takes this
attitude towards all living beings.
The reason the bodhisattva can so radically identify his well-being with all
persons is that, as a result of his realization of selflessness, his conception of his identity
has become extremely fluid. This allows him to take the role of parent to all sentient
beings, fully identifying his welfare with theirs. The result is psychological
transformation that, on most plausible theories of well-being, connects the well-being of
the bodhisattva with those he serves. First, he experiences great joy when sentient beings
are liberated from suffering. Second, she desires the well-being of others, and
successfully satisfies these desires by aiding them. Since most plausible theories of well-
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being will give value to the satisfaction of desires, or experiencing joyful mental states,
this identification with the needs of others will result in an increase in the well-being of
the bodhisattva when she successfully aids others.
Śāntideva, drawing upon the realization of the nonexistence of any enduring self,
writes in detail about this psychological transformation, in which concern for one’s own
well-being is replaced by concern for others. In the verses below, he describes how the
bodhisattva undergoes this shift.
Just as the notion of a self with regard to one’s own body, which has no personal
existence, is due to habituation, will the identity of one’s self with others not arise
out of habituation in the same way? (BCA 8:115)
Therefore, just as you wish to protect yourself from pain, grief and the like, so
may you cultivate a spirit of protection and a spirit of compassion toward the
world. (BCA 8: 117)
The first verse points out that, since there is no enduring self, the body does not
belong to us in any deep way, and it is only because of habit that we believe it to do so.
Therefore, we can take that same habit of identification and shift it to others, thinking of
their bodies as if they are our own. The second verse claims that this imaginative
reidentification of our identity with other people results in the concern for their wellbeing arising with the same strength as we currently feel for our own well-being.
Śāntideva also provides a number of meditations and arguments to help us value
the well-being of others as much as our own, such as this one, in which he draws our
attention to the suffering that others experience.
One should first earnestly meditate on the equality of oneself and others in this
way: “All equally experience suffering and happiness, and I must protect them as
I do myself.” (BCA 8: 90)
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In the verse below, he combines the claim that eliminating self cherishing reduces my
own suffering with the claim that identifying our well-being with that of others brings us
great joy.
All those who are unhappy in the world are so as a result of their desire for their
own happiness. All those who are happy in the world are so as a result of their
desire for the happiness of others. (BCA 8: 129)
There is a jataka story telling of a former life of the Buddha in which we find a
particularly graphic employment of the demand-lessening strategies explained above. In
the story, the Buddha is born as a bodhisattva who is the ruler of a kingdom, and has been
asked by hungry demons for flesh and blood to feast on. The bodhisattva feels pity for
the demons, but since he will not harm his subjects to satisfy their needs, he decides to
offer his own flesh and blood as food (Āryaśūra 2010, 84-87). Fascinatingly, the
description of the bodhisattva cutting at his flesh with a sword acknowledges the physical
pain he feels, while insisting it is overwhelmed by the joy he experiences in his act of
giving.
The pain of being cut was not able to disturb the mind of [the bodhisattva]
because of his continual experience of the joy of giving during the whole time of
deprivation. (8:44)
The pain, called forth by the falling of the sharp sword, but cast far away by this
continual joy, was slow in entering his mind, as if lazy and despondent. (8:45)
Thus he, being filled with deep joy, was satisfying those demons with his own
flesh. (8:46ab, all three verses my translation)120
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hriyamāṇāvakāśaṁ tu dānaprītyā punaḥ punaḥ| na prasehe manastasya cchedaduḥkhaṁ vigāhitum||44||
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the online version of the P.L. Vaidya edition (1960) from the Digital Sanskrit Buddhist Canon to make my
translation. http://www.dsbcproject.org/node/7096. In verse 45, I read “dūram” for “dūṁram,” and
“śastra” for “śasra.”
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The second quoted verse makes clear that the bodhisattva experiences the
physical pain, which would ordinarily be agony, of the sword cutting away at his flesh.
Nevertheless, as all three verses explain, the bodhisattva’s joy at the act of giving is so
great that his mind is not disturbed by it. The image of the bodhisattva hacking away at
his flesh to feed evil demons is graphic and disturbing, but we can imagine common
sense equivalents, like a tattoo aficionado taking delight in getting a new tattoo, even
though he does not like the pain of the needle itself. The bodhisattva’s joyful selfmutilation represents the limit-case, most plausibly made possible by his realization of
selflessness which allows him to radically identify his wellbeing with that of others. 121
In these quoted verses, then, we find all of the demand-lessening techniques I have
identified in this chapter. The bodhisattva displays no fear or mental anguish over the
sacrifice he is about to make. More explicit in these passages, however, is the great joy
the bodhisattva experiences as a result of acting to benefit others, which compensates him
for the physical distress he endures.
In Śāntideva’s own writing, we see the results of the bodhisattva’s radical
identification with the well-being of others in the pair of verses that I quoted in the
introduction in which he links what appears to be the ultimate sacrifice of descending into
hell with the great joy the bodhisattva experiences when suffering beings are aided.
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Although realization of the non-existence of the self is not explicitly referenced in these passages, since
a high-level bodhisattva will have made great progress towards this realization, it is a fair assumption that
this at least partially accounts for the bodhisattva’s ability to face this physical torture without mental
distress. Interestingly, however, the strategy that is explicitly referred to in the story is more closely
aligned to the analysis of ordinary experience as pervaded by suffering explored in the second chapter of
this dissertation, with the bodhisattva’s body itself being viewed as contaminated and unsatisfactory. “Like
a malignant ulcer, this body is always sick and an abode of pain. Now I will return it that grief by availing
myself of it for the accomplishment of an extraordinary performance of surpassing loveliness” (Āryaśūra
2010, 87).
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Thus, those whose mind-streams are cultivated in meditation and who equally
accept the suffering of others dive into the Avīci hell like swans into a pool of
lotuses. (BCA 8: 107)
They become oceans of joy when sentient beings are liberated. Have they not
found fulfillment? What is the use of sterile liberation? (BCA 8: 108)
Although the image of the bodhisattva joyfully descending into hell beautifully
illustrates Śāntideva’s linkage of altruism and self-interest, both it and the story of the
bodhisattva sacrificing his flesh raise an obvious objection to this strategy. The
bodhisattva’s embracement of these apparently extreme demands might seem a fantasy of
self-flagellation, rather than a praiseworthy ideal of personal perfection. The initial
response to this concern is to point out that the basic strategy of psychological
transformation employed by Mahāyāna Buddhists is an intuitively plausible way of at
least somewhat lessening demandingness. We can see this by using everyday examples,
such as the parent caring for the child, or the cheerful volunteer taking great joy while
giving up his Sunday afternoon in service. Surely it is plausible to claim that a well-off
donor, signing away a modest portion of a paycheck to a scholarship fund, while taking
great pride in having increased educational accessibility, has contributed to the
flourishing of his own life.
Many of us will judge, however, that there are limits to the level of time and
resources that an individual can contribute before putting her own flourishing into
jeopardy. One concern, here, is the possibility of psychologically deluding ourselves
about how much it is healthy for us to give. Theories of welfare would characterize this
concern in different ways. For example, a hedonism might give the agent welfare credit
for an initial burst of manic generosity, but this would be outweighed by regret, as well as
distress from future lack of resources. In response, the Buddhist can claim that when
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belief in an enduring self is completely eliminated, because selfishness is eradicated,
future regrets will not arise and mental distress from future poverty will be minimal or
nonexistent. What this shows is that although the Buddhist strategy of demand-lessening
is itself sound, the Buddhist’s radical use of it depends upon controversial assumptions
about the psychological effects of realizing no-self.
A second concern arises if we accept a theory of well-being that marks as
particularly valuable pursuits like artistic achievement, career success, time spent with
family and so on. An objective list theory might grant these items intrinsic value, while a
desire-satisfaction or hedonic theory might claim achieving these types of goals, or
experiencing the pleasure associated with them has a particularly high welfare value. The
concern now is that the requirements of the bodhisattva path will not allow us to pursue
these items. Even if we grant that the satisfaction taken from helping others has welfare
value for the individual, this will be outweighed by the loss of these welfare-contributing
items. 122
Again, the Buddhist response will depend on a controversial principle, this time
the Buddhist analysis of ordinary existence as saturated by subtle forms of suffering
(duḥkha) which I explored in chapter two. The Buddhist will claim that family
relationships, career success, artistic achievements and so forth, when pursued by a mind
filled with craving for permanence, can never provide any lasting satisfaction. Therefore,
giving them up will be much less of a loss to well-being than it might appear. Evaluating
the plausibility of the Buddhist analysis of suffering, or their claims about the
psychological effects of realizing no-self, go beyond my present purposes. We can,
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however, conclude that the Buddhist strategy of demand-lessening is itself sound, but
keep in mind that the extent to which the Buddhists employ it depends upon the
acceptance of these potentially controversial Buddhist presuppositions.

Buddhist Demand-lessening Strategies and Contemporary Ethical Theory
Drawing upon passages from Vasubandhu, as well as meditations provided by
Śāntideva, I have in this chapter focused on several related benefits of realizing the
nonexistence of any enduring self for the bodhisattva. First, she will no longer
experience fear once she realizes at the deepest level that there is no being who is
destroyed, and no being who is afraid. Second, she will experience no mental pain
arising from attachment to her body or possessions when called upon to give these up for
sentient beings. Finally, realizing no-self results in an extremely fluid conception of
identity that allows her to radically identify her well-being with the well-being of others.
As a result, when she makes apparent sacrifices to help others flourish, her own wellbeing will be increased as well.
I also pointed out that the Buddhist depends upon potentially controversial
assumptions about the psychological effects of realizing no-self in claiming these benefits
for the bodhisattva. Both the depth and the breadth of her concern for others, which she
extends to all living beings, all of whom she views as equally important to herself, goes
well beyond what anyone not ascribing to Buddhist beliefs about no-self is likely to
accept. One obvious difficulty is that some philosophers may reject the Buddhist
metaphysical position about the nonexistence of the self. Alternately, one might accept
this doctrine, but reject Buddhist claims about the psychological effects of realizing no-
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self, like the dissolution of selfishness and the possibility of radically identifying one’s
well-being with others.123We might wonder, therefore, how useful the demand-lessening
strategies surveyed in this chapter would be for ethical theories that do not accept
Buddhist positions about no-self.
At least the strategy of identifying one’s well-being with others, however, can be
at least partly decoupled from its Buddhist psychological presuppositions. The
underlying Buddhist point, that we have at least some control over our desires, and what
brings us pleasure, does not depend on Buddhist premises. Reflecting on the needs of
others, for instance, will make most of us want to help them, and viewing the effects of
such aid will likely bring us joy as well. Of course, the image of the bodhisattva whose
welfare consists wholly in helping others will be beyond reach. Nevertheless, it is a basic
fact of the psychology of most persons that our desires and our joyful affective states are
often directed towards the well-being of others. Likewise, most of us will also accept
that we have at least some ability to increase this concern that we feel for others.
This suggests that this Buddhist insight can be incorporated into a response to the
overdemandingness objection acceptable to non-Buddhist ethicists. The basic strategy
will be for the theory to require that one sacrifice whatever portion of one’s welfare is
reasonable (whatever that turns out to be), and couple this with a requirement to slowly
modify one’s concerns to lessen the tension between self and others. One might begin by
donating a tenth of one’s income, for instance, but also develop an intimate relationship
with the benefiting aid organization to facilitate greater appreciation of the positive
effects of the gift. This will likely stimulate additional desires to be of increased benefit,
123
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accepting reductionist views about personal identity, but notes that others may have the opposite reaction.
See Parfit 1984, p. 251-2). I return to this issue in the conclusion.

167

as well as a sense of joy at what one has accomplished. On most theories of welfare,
either the joy experienced, or the satisfaction of these new desires will increase the
giver’s welfare. The theory can then require a greater percentage of income be donated,
without becoming overly demanding, and the process can continue.
Such an approach will itself avoid the overdemandingness objection as I have
formulated it, since at no time will the adherent be required to act in a manner that
sacrifices too great a portion of his welfare in a situation where this would be
unacceptably demanding. How high the theory may ultimately raise an adherent’s
obligation will depend on the individual’s psychological flexibility, as well as the
effectiveness of the methods employed in stimulating other-regarding joys and desires.
Perhaps the obtainment of moral sainthood conjoined with personal well-being will be
unlikely or impossible to achieve for most, without the incorporation of an additional
premise, such as the effects of realizing no-self that Vasubandhu identifies as explaining
how bodhisattvahood is psychologically possible. Nevertheless, the non-Buddhist
version of this response to the overdemandingness problem has the virtue of showing
how a theory can increase well above initial levels the amount it could reasonably ask of
its adherents.
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Conclusion
Summary of my Argument
In this dissertation, I reconstructed the response Śāntideva can make to the
overdemandingness objection, the claim that a moral theory asks too much of its
adherents. I argued that if we grant Śāntideva certain key presuppositions, in particular
the efficacy of certain Buddhist virtues, the psychological effects of realizing no-self, and
the saturation of ordinary experience by subtle forms of suffering, then Śāntideva’s moral
requirements are not unreasonably demanding. In my introduction, I also suggested that
it will be difficult to evaluate my defense of this thesis, since we are not likely to have
reliable intuitions about whether the severe torments the bodhisattva undergoes are
adequately assuaged or compensated by her progress towards psychological perfection.
I therefore also offered a weaker version of my thesis, which is that, assuming these same
presuppositions, the demandingness of the bodhisattva path is significantly less than it
appears, although it may still be unreasonably demanding. Both versions of the thesis
achieve my goal of showing how demandingness lessens and self-interest and
benevolence converge as the bodhisattva progresses on the way to liberation.
In the first chapter, I clarified that the version of the overdemandingness objection
I am concerned with is one in which a moral theory requires an individual to sacrifice an
unfair amount of their well-being. I claimed that Śāntideva faces this version of the
objection as a result of his argument that we should commit to impartial benevolence and
adopt the bodhisattva path. As I explained in the introduction, the bodhisattva path at
least appears extremely demanding, since it requires the bodhisattva to remain in saṁsāra
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and take almost limitless rebirths, including ones where she sacrifices limbs and her life,
or voluntary rebirth in a negative realm to work for the benefit of suffering beings.
The first chapter also argues that demandingness in the well-being version of the
objection should be assessed relative to the resources of the individual, which can include
psychological strengths and mental resilience. This means that the demandingness of the
bodhisattva path need not be assessed from the standpoint of one outside it, but rather can
take into account the psychological development of the bodhisattva to the extent that this
reduces demandingness. The remaining chapters each argued either that the bodhisattva
path is less demanding than it appears, or that the psychological transformation the
bodhisattva undergoes lessens the demandingness she faces, or contributes to her wellbeing and therefore compensates her for any real sacrifices that she endures.
The second chapter explored the early Buddhist analysis of suffering (duḥkha),
which is presupposed by Mahāyāna authors like Śāntideva. I gave particular
consideration to the two deeper forms of suffering, conditioned suffering (saṃskāraduḥkhatā) and the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā), which arise as a result of
ignorance and craving. I argued that the Buddhist analysis of suffering provides a
defense of Buddhist conceptions of what a good life looks like by constraining the shape
any acceptable theory of well-being may take. In particular, it excludes many items of
supposed value, like sense pleasures, career success, ordinary relationships and romantic
love that Buddhists focusing on spiritual practice forgo. This analysis of suffering
reveals that the bodhisattva path is much less demanding than it appears, since the
saṁsāric goals the bodhisattva abandons are infected with suffering and are not really
worth pursuit.
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The third chapter focused on the first of the psychological benefits the bodhisattva
attains as he progresses in his training. By developing and deploying the virtuous
qualities (kuśala-dharmas), he overcomes a particularly pernicious form of weakness of
will that is both broader and deeper than many versions of the problem found in the
Western tradition. I argued that Śāntideva redeploys defiled energy arising from the
mental defilements of craving, attachment and ignorance to provide the necessary energy
to fuel the development and employment of these virtues. I also argued that as she
continues to progress along the path, the bodhisattva will be able to draw upon her
compassion for sentient beings for the needed motivation to continue her practice.
Although the benefit of overcoming weakness of will is shared with early Buddhists, the
bodhisattva has greater access to the motivational energy stemming from compassion,
and therefore this represents a particular benefit of traveling the bodhisattva path.
The fourth chapter continued to examine the self-benefiting aspects of the
virtuous qualities developed by the bodhisattva. In particular, I argued that the
development of mindfulness (smṛti), introspection (samprajanya) and patience (kṣānti)
results in a deeply rooted mental tranquility that is resistant to surface level disturbance
by painful sensations. This means that the bodhisattva can undergo physical hardships
without experiencing deep emotional distress. I also considered a perfectionist strand of
Śāntideva’s thought that praises the development of the virtues of the bodhisattva as a
valuable human achievement. I argued that this perfectionist element does not in any
obvious way increase the bodhisattva’s well-being, but provides independent good
reasons for her to commit herself to perfecting the qualities of full buddhahood.
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The final chapter examined a group of closely related demand-lessening strategies
that become available to the bodhisattva as a result of fully realizing the nonexistence of
the enduring self. First, accepting no-self removes all fear that a bodhisattva faces, since
he realizes that there is no being to perish, or to even possess the emotion of fear.
Second, his clinging to his well-being, and particularly his attachment to his body is
eliminated, since he now understands the body is not possessed by any enduring entity.
As a result, he experiences no additional mental pain when sacrificing these things.
Finally, he is able to radically identify his well-being with the well-being of others, and
thereby flourishes when others attain happiness. This last strategy at least partially
compensates the bodhisattva for actual sacrifices he makes as he travels the bodhisattva
path.
There are a couple of ways these various strands of Śāntideva’s response to the
overdemandingness objection can be divided. First, we can group them according to the
type of benefit they confer on the bodhisattva. One type of response is not really a
benefit at all, but rather explains why the bodhisattva path is less demanding than it
appears. The Buddhist analysis of suffering explored in the second chapter falls under
this category, since it shows that the bodhisattva gives up much less than is initially
apparent. A second kind of response does not directly benefit the bodhisattva, but instead
lessens the demandingness of a painful experience. The deep mental serenity resulting
from the development of the virtues of patience, mindfulness and introspection, explained
in the fourth chapter, is an example of this kind of benefit, since these virtues lessen the
demandingness of experiencing physically painful sensations, in particular by ensuring
no painful mental sensations arise. The elimination of fear and the eradication of
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clinging to one’s own well-being that occurs after realizing no-self, which I explore in the
fifth chapter, are also examples of this second strategy. The third type of benefit actually
increases the well-being of the bodhisattva. In this category are the overcoming of
weakness of will detailed in the third chapter, and the identification of one’s own wellbeing with the well-being of others that leads to joy and the satisfaction of otherregarding desires. My argument has been that these various strategies will lessen the
demandingness of the bodhisattva path sufficiently so that Śāntideva is no longer
vulnerable to the overdemandingness objection.
A second way these various benefits can be organized is according to whether
they are unique to the bodhisattva path, or are shared with the early Buddhist aiming for
personal liberation. The Buddhist analysis of suffering detailed in chapter two is shared
between both early and Mahāyāna Buddhists. The deployment of Buddhist virtues to
overcome weakness of will is largely shared with early Buddhism as well, but here the
bodhisattva will have greater access to motivational energy arising from compassion and
bodhicitta. Likewise, both early Buddhists and Mahāyāna Buddhists will develop a deep
abiding tranquility as a result of perfecting virtues like patience, although the bodhisattva
will deploy this in a way that the early Buddhist does not need to, since the bodhisattva
maintains this serenity when she sacrifices her body or takes painful rebirths to benefit
others. In addition, both will eliminate fear and self-clinging by realizing selflessness.
Only the bodhisattva, however, radically identifies her well-being with the well-being of
others, and therefore this is a benefit that accrues only to her.
It is this shared nature of many of the bodhisattva’s benefits that makes me
skeptical about the accuracy of Śāntideva’s claim that undertaking the bodhisattva path
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actually benefits the individual, at least once we set aside the karmic benefits of
benevolence. As we saw in the introduction, the bodhisattva undergoes numerous
additional painful rebirths that the arhat who attains individual liberation will avoid.
Nevertheless, most of the demand-lessening benefits the bodhisattva attains are shared
with the arhat. Therefore, although we can conclude that the bodhisattva path is far less
demanding than it appears, it is unclear that it would actually result in a greater benefit
for the bodhisattva than the quicker path to individual liberation.
This does not mean that the bodhisattva does not have good reason to adopt the
bodhisattva path. In this dissertation I have explored two reasons for doing so that do not
depend upon self-interest. As explored in my first chapter, Śāntideva argues that given
the nonexistence of the self, it would be irrational to prioritize our own well-being over
others. Second, in my fourth chapter I explored a perfectionist strand of Śāntideva’s
thought, in which Śāntideva claims that developing the virtues of buddhahood provides a
unique human achievement. I argued that this perfectionist element provides good
reasons for the bodhisattva to commit to developing the virtues, even though it does not
appear to benefit him personally. We should conclude, then, that although adopting the
bodhisattva path is not obviously in the bodhisattva’s interest, not only is it much less
demanding than it appears, but when compared to arhatship, the bodhisattva may still
have good other-regarding and perfectionist reasons to adopt it.

Benefits of this study
One of the benefits of this study is historical, in the sense that considering the way
that benevolence and self-interest converge in the BCA helps us understand its role in the
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intellectual history of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Bodhisattvahood is recognized and admired
in early Buddhist texts, but it is not until proto-Mahāyāna texts begin to appear in the last
couple of centuries BCE that it is affirmed as a goal for ordinary persons. As the
Mahāyāna movement continues to develop, and begins to conceive of itself in opposition
to the early Buddhist goal of individual liberation, more stress is placed on the possibility
and even desirability of ordinary persons devoting their lives to the bodhisattva path.
This culminates in texts like The Lotus Sutra, which claims that full Buddhahood is the
only possible endpoint of spiritual practice, and in arguments like the one by Śāntideva
that I considered in my first chapter that claims it is irrational to prioritize one’s own
well-being above others.
This emphasis upon the desirability of becoming bodhisattvas creates a
conceptual tension in which ordinary persons are encouraged to commit to a seemingly
superhuman process of virtue development. Bodhisattva manuals like Śāntideva’s BCA
begin appearing at least in part as a way of resolving this tension. The role of any howto manual is to guide large amounts of people through complex and potentially difficult
tasks. By breaking down the bodhisattva path into a series of manageable steps, these
bodhisattva manuals for the first time transform bodhisattvahood from a praiseworthy but
unreachable ideal, into a concrete series of practices by which humans can structure their
lives. In this study I have demonstrated some of the ways bodhisattva texts actually go
about lessening the demandingness experienced by followers of the bodhisattva path. In
so doing, I help illustrate the role they play in the conceptual development of the
Mahāyāna in making the goal of bodhisattvahood accessible to all.
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A related benefit of my study in the area of intellectual history is its role in
helping us appreciate both the continuity and the development of the virtues as conceived
by early Buddhist and Mahāyāna traditions. Within early Buddhism, the virtuous
qualities, including the other-regarding virtues, are valued largely for their conduciveness
to individual release from suffering. One of the main roles of compassion, for instance, is
as part of a meditation designed to bring the practitioner to liberation.124 In the
Mahāyāna, virtues like compassion and generosity are radicalized, and the bodhisattva is
now portrayed as sacrificing his limbs and life out of concern for others. Chapter four of
my study demonstrates how other Buddhist virtues, like mindfulness, introspection and
patience, attenuate the newly demanding character of these other-regarding virtues. This
helps demonstrate the creative development of Buddhist virtue theory, in which both self
and other directed virtues play new roles as the conception of spiritual realization shifts to
the bodhisattva ideal.
Although a greater appreciation of the role the BCA plays in the intellectual
history of the Mahāyāna is an important benefit of my study, my main purpose has been
to demonstrate the philosophical importance of the demand-lessening elements of
Śāntideva’s text. Śāntideva does not formulate the overdemandingness objection and as
far as I am aware none of the Buddhist’s traditional opponents raise it explicitly against
Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nevertheless, Śāntideva’s apparent vulnerability to the objection
is a significant potential philosophical weakness of his moral thought. I have suggested
that Śāntideva, like other Mahāyāna authors, sensed the need to reduce the
demandingness of the bodhisattva path, and therefore incorporated demand-lessening
124

See for instance Walshe 1995, 194: D i 251-2, and Ñānamoli 2010: A ii 128. This is not, of course, to
suggest that the other-regarding virtues developed by early Buddhists lead to no altruistic action. See
Aaronson 1980 for a study of the role of other-regarding virtues in Theravada Buddhism.
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strategies into his text. His BCA, therefore, possesses the elements necessary to provide
a powerful defense against the overdemandingness objection. My role as a comparative
philosopher has been to frame these elements against the overdemandingness objection as
developed in contemporary ethics and thereby illustrate their philosophical significance
for Śāntideva as a moral philosopher.
In addition to demonstrating the philosophical significance of elements of the
BCA, this study also acts as a resource for contemporary thinking on moral
demandingness. Nagel, and following him several contemporary philosophers have
noted the possibility of employing psychological transformation to lessen the tension
between self-interest and benevolence as a response to the overdemandingness objection,
but as far as I am aware no contemporary thinker has developed this possibility in any
detail.125 Instead, contemporary solutions have focused on altering the structure of
normative theories to lessen what is owed to others, with this approach sometimes being
combined with political strategies to ensure that human needs are met.126 The strategy of
psychological transformation developed in Śāntideva’s text, however, has advantages
which commend it for serious consideration. For instance, since it functions by
preserving or increasing commonly accepted units of welfare value like desiresatisfaction or mental states of joy, it is compatible with multiple foundational theories of
well-being and theories of the right. As I illustrate at the end of my fifth chapter,
elements from Śāntideva’s text can profitably be incorporated as demand-lessening
strategies into multiple normative theories facing the overdemandingness objection.
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The possibility of lessening demandingness through psychological transformation is noted by Nagel
1986, 205-207; Scheffler 1992, 128-9; and Hooker 1996, 144.
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See the introduction of this study.
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In supporting my thesis about the demandingness of the bodhisattva path, I have
also tried to illustrate ways that contemporary philosophical work in ethics is relevant to
understanding Buddhist moral thought. Drawing upon recent writings in the areas of
moral demandingness, theories of well-being, virtue ethics, akrasia and perfectionism, I
have argued that Buddhist ethical texts often struggle with philosophical issues that
contemporary ethicists theorize, even though Buddhist authors tend to be less explicit
about what they are doing. Buddhist texts do not mark out foundational units of wellbeing, for instance, and yet they constrain the kind of elements that may be accepted into
a theory of well-being through their analysis of suffering. Buddhists do not develop
explicit accounts of why we knowingly act against our better interests, but I have
demonstrated that Śāntideva recognizes weakness of will as a particularly deep and broad
problem, and utilizes creative strategies to treat it. Likewise, regarding the issue of moral
demandingness that I have used as a frame for this study, Śāntideva and other Buddhist
philosophers recognize moral demand as a problem for the Mahāyāna path and develop
sophisticated demand-lessening responses to it, even though they never explicitly frame
the problem itself. All of this suggests the value of comparative philosophy between the
disciplines of Buddhist moral thought and contemporary ethics. Framing Buddhist
insights against contemporary work can often make explicit strengths of these ancient
texts that might otherwise be unrecognized.
Finally, my study illustrates that, at its ground level, much of Buddhist moral
thought stands or falls depending on the plausibility of its key presuppositions, in this
case the psychological effects of realizing no-self, the pervasion of ordinary experience
by suffering, and the efficacy of Buddhist virtues. All the demand-lessening strategies I
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have surveyed in this study depend upon at least one of these assumptions. I have also
claimed that my study is intended to be philosophical, meaning in part that it does not
depend upon premises that would be wholly inaccessible to someone from outside the
tradition. It is for this reason that I did not incorporate into my argument the karmic
benefits of compassion, a point stressed by Śāntideva himself. Therefore, I need to
explain briefly why the assumptions upon which Buddhist demand-lessening techniques
depend are worth careful consideration, and are plausibly at least partly correct.
Regarding the Buddhist analysis of suffering, it seems to me that at least some of
the drawbacks of pursuing pleasure identified by the Buddhist as the suffering of change
are at least sometimes obviously correct. The Buddhist claims, for instance, that sensual
pleasure cannot provide any lasting satisfaction. In support of this, surly all of us have
had the experience of deriving less gratification than expected from sensual indulgence.
Likewise, most of us will have experienced disappointment and frustration when
achieving a sought after goal left us feeling dissatisfied. This does not mean, of course,
that we will accept the Buddhist’s more radical claim that all ordinary experience is
saturated with one or more forms of suffering. Still, careful attention to the
dissatisfaction inherent in much human experience will move us close enough to the
Buddhist to enter into philosophical conversation with him.
Something close to the Buddhist rejection of an enduring self has been defended
in detail by contemporary philosophers, including most influentially by Derek Parfit in
Reasons and Persons. Even if we find such arguments convincing, however, this does
not necessarily mean we will accept Buddhist claims about the psychological effects of
accepting this metaphysical position. Here, it is perhaps worth quoting the reflections of
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Derek Parfit himself. In the following passage, he records his sentiments upon accepting
the truth of reductionism about personal identity, a position which is roughly equivalent
to the Buddhist rejection of any enduring self.
Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it liberating, and
consoling. When I believed that my existence was such a further fact, I seemed
imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was
moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I
changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the
open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people.
But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the
rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others. (Parfit 1984,
251)
Like the bodhisattva referred to by Vasubandhu, Parfit claims his selfishness
decreased and his concern for others grew when he accepted that personal identity is not
grounded on what he calls a further fact, one version of which would be the enduring self
rejected by Buddhists. Parfit also points out in the passage that others may not share his
reaction. For my purposes, I will content myself with pointing out that it seems likely
that at least many of us will experience some of the psychological effects Vasubandhu
and Śāntideva attribute to the realization of no-self. In addition, I argued in chapter five
that the Mahāyāna strategy of identifying one’s well-being with the well-being of others
does not wholly depend upon accepting no-self, although the depth to which this
identification can be made will be reduced when it is decoupled from Buddhist
presuppositions.
As for the efficacy of Buddhist virtues like mindfulness, introspection and
patience, it should be uncontroversial that careful control of the mind matched with the
meditations on patience offered by Śāntideva will have at least some potency for
reducing mental distress that results from anger. Of course, we may remain skeptical of
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the Buddhist claim that a state of psychological perfection in which anger is completely
eliminated is possible. Nevertheless, there should be at least partial agreement between
the Buddhist and contemporary thought about the demand-lessening results of developing
many Buddhist virtues.
What this means is that we should be sympathetic to the general demandlessening strategy laid out in Buddhist texts, at least to the point of taking their insights
seriously. We may well remain skeptical, however, about Buddhist claims regarding the
psychological perfectibility of humans. For this reason, the stunning image of the
bodhisattva joyfully diving into hell will likely remain out of reach. Nevertheless, we can
trace the logic in these Buddhist texts and come to understand why this image makes a
good deal of philosophical sense, given Buddhist presuppositions. Simultaneously, we
can acknowledge that, at a minimum, elements of these presuppositions themselves are
well worth serious philosophical consideration.
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Abbreviations:
BCA: Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva.
ŚS: Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva.
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